BṚHADĀRAṆYAKOPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

1.5

Saptānna Brāhmaṇa

अथ योऽन्यामिति ग्रन्थादारभ्योरुप्रयत्नतः ।
अविद्यायाः समाम्नाता आ समाप्तेर्विभूतयः ॥१॥
अध्यायस्यात्र चाविद्वान्वर्णाद्यात्माभिमानवान् ।
धर्मेण नियतात्मा सञ्जुहोत्यादिस्वकर्मभिः ॥२॥
देवादिक्रिमिपर्यन्तं बिभर्ति जगदव्ययम् ।
एवमेव जगद्योनिरेकैकः कर्मकृन्नरः ॥३॥

Beginning with the statement *atha yo 'nyām*, there have been enumerated up to the end of this chapter, with great care,[1] various appearances[2] of ignorance. [1]
Also in this connection is understood[3] one who is ignorant and has a regard for Varṇa etc., (and) being controlled in oneself by Dharma (religious duty) (and) performing one's own duties, viz. offering oblations etc., [2]
sustains, without perishing,[4] this world, beginning with gods etc. and ending with insects. Just in this way, each sacrificer, a human being, becomes the creator of this world. [3]

In BUBV 1.1-2 the worship of some deity by a sacrificer and then his death are described first. Later, his being a sacrificer is said to be his becoming identical with the deity, viz. Agni = Prāṇa. In BUBV 1.3, the Udgīthagāna which a sacrificer sings in a sacrifice is raised to the highest level, i.e. it is said to be the most potential part of the sacrifice. And, in BUBV 1.4, the Performer is Himself described in terms of a human sacrificer. Thus, a slow change of process is noticed in the foregone chapters and now this chapter of *saptānna* 'seven foods' describes the initial sacrificer as a creator of food.

[1]SP repeats *uruprayatna*, perhaps to mean 'with great effort'.
[2]Or alternatively, modifications.
[3]This has reference to BU 1.4.16.
[4]It is an adverb expressing 'without *vyaya*'.

कृत्स्नेन जगता यद्वत्कर्मकृत्समुपार्जितः ।
यथोक्तकर्मभिस्तेन जगत्तद्वदुपार्जितम् ॥४॥
स्वदेहवद्यतो भुङ्क्त एकैकोऽनवशेषतः ।
साधारणानि वस्तूनि तथासाधारणान्यपि ॥५॥

As the (initial) performer of (sacrificial) activities (i.e. the Sūtrātman) was obtained[1] by the entire world (of human beings), in the same way was obtained this world by that,[2] through (the performance of) ritual activities as prescribed (in the Śāstras), [4]
since each (individual) enjoys (i.e. experiences) all common and also uncommon objects in the same way as (he does) his own body.[3] [5]

[1]That is, brought into existence.
[2]It means: *karmakṛt* 'the initial sacrificer'.
[3]The verse justifies the statement in verse 4. The body is obtained and experienced by an individual through his doings (in earlier life); in the same way, the experience of all worldly objects, without exception, is owing to his earlier doing (i.e. *karman*).

स्वकर्मणानुपात्तस्य न च भोगोऽत्र दृश्यते ।
एकैकेनोपकारित्वात्तस्माज्जगदुपार्जितम् ॥६॥

Here (i.e. in this world) is not seen any enjoyment of what is not obtained[1] by one's own performance (of duty); therefore each thing becoming helpful, the world is (described as) what is obtained (by each one through that). [6]

This verse also justifies the statement in verse 4.

For every enjoyment there needs to be an enjoyer. Things of the world are enjoyable and, therefore each human being is described here as an enjoyer or an obtainer.

There is a stress on one's making an effort (or undertaking an activity) in order that one deserves enjoyment. It is noticed that one cannot enjoy what another has obtained through effort. This stress has become necessary in view of what one might point out as an object of enjoyment for all, e.g. the sight of the milky way (*svarnadī*)— suggestion of NKL.

[1]This refers to *bhogya*.

स्वभावतोऽखिलं कर्म धर्माधर्मादिलक्षणम् ।
साधारणविशेषात्मफलमारभते द्विधा ॥७॥

Each (ritual act) is by its nature characterized as either Dharma or Adharma and it begins (lit. produces) twofold fruits of the nature of the general and the particular.[1] [7]

This verse justifies the word *svakarmaṇā* in the preceding verse.

[1]The word 'general' refers to *adṛṣṭa* and the word 'particular' to such performance as leads to *dṛṣṭa*, viz. becoming rich or attaining to heaven. Or perhaps 'general' is what is shared by one in common with others and 'particular' is what one enjoys by oneself.

गुणप्रधानभावेन साधारणविशेषतः ।
सूत्रादेः कर्मणः कार्यं क्रिम्यन्तस्याभिजायते ॥८॥

In the case of (the world of) beings, beginning with the Sūtra and ending with insects, there is produced the result of (each) activity which stands in the relation of the principal and the subordinate, being either general or particular (in nature). [8]

This verse justifies the word *miśra* as understood from *ādi* in the preceding verse. See note above.

द्रव्यादिदर्शनाधीनं फलं सर्वस्य कर्मणः ।
साधारणादिसंभेदभिन्नं तेन क्रियाफलम् ॥९॥

In the case of each activity (it is seen that) the result depends upon the material etc.[1] which is noticed (in the activity); therefore the result of (each) activity is characterized by a variety of the general etc.[2] [9]

[1]This refers to *kriyā* etc.

[2]That is, the general or the particular or of mixed nature, as suggested by *ādi*— see the next verse.

NKL points out *svakalatradarśana* as an instance of particular nature and *nṛtyekṣaṇa* of general or common nature.

क्वचित्साधारणात्मैव तथासाधारणं क्वचित् ।
क्वचिच्चोभयथा कार्यं द्रव्यादीक्षणचित्रतः ॥१०॥

In some case, the result is of general nature; similarly, in some other case, of particular nature and, in yet some others, of both (i.e. of a mixed nature)— (this is so) on account of the various seeing (or view) of the material etc. [10]

समासव्यासतस्तस्माद्यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मभिः ।
एकैकेन जगत्कृत्स्नमुपात्तं भोगसिद्धये ॥११॥

Therefore each one (of the human beings) has obtained the entire world for the acquisition of pleasure by the knowledge and the activity (related to them), as already stated, either jointly by them or severally. [11]

सर्वः सर्वस्य कर्ता च कार्यं चापि यथा तथा ।
मधुविद्याप्रसङ्गेन विस्पष्टमभिधास्यते ॥१२॥

It will be clearly explained in the context of the lore of Madhu as to how (each one of) all (beings) is the agent and so also the effect of every (activity). [12]

This is to justify the *hetuhetumadbhāva* implied in the previous verse.

यदजीजनत्फलं कर्ता स्वकर्मज्ञानसाधनः ।
सप्तान्नप्रविभागेन तद्विभज्य प्रदर्श्यते ॥१३॥

Now is explained the varied result, divided in seven categories of food, namely that (result) which the agent, possessed of the means of his activity and knowing, produced (thereby). [13]

SP supplies *dhyānārtham iti śeṣaḥ*. This means: for *upāsanā* (NKL). The word *dhyāna* or *upāsanā* becomes significant in relation to a few of the following verses.

Cf. the note by the editor of NKL: *svakarmādinā sṛṣṭasya jagataḥ saptadhā vibhaktasya sūtrātmakasya svātmanā dhyānaṃ sūtrabhāvaphalakaṃ vidhātum idam brāhmaṇam ity arthaḥ.*

त्रीण्यन्नानि फलं कर्तुश्चत्वार्यन्नानि यानि तु ।
प्रयोगसमवायित्वात्तानि स्युः कर्मसाधनम् ॥१४॥

The result (of the activity) of the agent, viz. three foods and those (others) which are four foods, all are together the means of (that individual's) activity, inseparably connected with the performance of ritual. [14]

The seven foods that are under discussion are divided into two groups: (1) *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa together form one group and these three do not become connected with actual performance, viz. ritual activity. (2) The commonly eaten food, *huta* (what is poured into the fire) and *prahuta* (what is offered outside the fire or on the hand of a priest)— these (two foods) are for gods and that food, which is given to animals, viz. milk form the other group. In respect of the first group, we cannot overlook that whatever is created was for the enjoyment of the

sacrificer (*sarvaṃ sarvasya bhogyam*).

So far are mentioned, or rather, enumerated, the seven foods which come from the *sūtragrantha*, viz. the enumerative verses in BU. Later, in BU 1.5.2ff. are explained the meanings of the Mantras in BU.

Verses 15-97 are the discussion of BU 1.5.2.

विज्ञानात्मा पिता तावन्न मनो न प्रजापतिः ।
अविशिष्टाधिकारित्वान्न विज्ञानात्मनोऽपरः ॥१५॥

To begin with (it is stated) that the individual self, (who possesses) knowledge, is the father (of the creation); not *manas*, not also Prajāpati.[1] (This is so) because (anything) else than the individual self, possessing knowledge, is not a specifically eligible performer. [15]

This explains the word *pitā* in *yat saptānnāni ... pitā* of BU.
[1]Namely, Hiraṇyagarbha.

सिसृक्षितत्वान्मनसस्तथा त्र्यन्नात्मनः प्रभोः ।
साधारणात्मनः स्रष्टा नातः क्षेत्रज्ञतोऽपरः ॥१६॥

Since *manas* is what is contemplated for creation and also (*tathā*) (since Prajāpati is) the master, who is the common self and comprises three foods, there is not[1] a creator other than the individual self (lit. knower of the field). [16]

This is the reason for excluding *manas* and Hiraṇyagarbha as possible meaning(s) of *pitā*.

Though reference was made to *manas* as *sisṛkṣita*, it should not be overlooked that Prajāpati also was a product produced by the Ātman; cf. *dvayor api sṛṣṭiniviṣṭatvena kāryakoṭiniviṣṭatā na kāraṇatvam ity arthaḥ* (SP).

[1]That is, cannot be.

ग्रन्थार्थधारणाशक्तिर्मेधा यद्यपि भण्यते ।
तथापि ज्ञानमेवेह साधनत्वाद्विवक्षितम् ॥१७॥

Even if it is said (i.e. understood) that *medhā* (means) capacity to grasp (or, better perhaps, retain) the meaning of a work (studied); yet here, in this context, it is intended to express only knowledge, since it is a means (to ritual activity).[1] [17]

This verse explains the word *medhā* in the statement of BU: *medhayā 'janayat pitā.*

[1]This is to exclude the lore of the Brahman which is opposed to common knowledge.

शास्त्रीयलौकिकज्ञानाविशेषग्रहसिद्धये ।
सामान्यज्ञानग्रहणं मेधयेत्यभिधित्सितम् ॥१८॥

By the use of the word *medhayā*, it is intended to express the grasping of common knowledge, (this is) with a view to establishing the non-distinction between knowledge acquired from the Śāstras and from the worldly (dealings). [18]

One may recall here how Śaṅkara has in his Adhyāsabhāṣya pointed to the similarity between worldly and Śāstric dealings. This verse intends to avert the probable notion on the part of the reader of the Upaniṣad that the reference to knowledge has connection with *dhyāna* or *upāsanā* and that which was in the context (from the third Brāhmaṇa); cf. *jñānenājanayad ity ukte dhyānenaiveti prakaraṇānuroḍhī bhramaḥ syāt tannivṛtty-artham medhāgrahaṇam* (SP).

तपःशब्देन कृच्छ्रादि यदि नामाभिधीयते ।
तथापि कर्मग्रहणं सप्तान्नोद्भूतिहेतुतः ॥१९॥

Though indeed by the word *tapas* is expressed (an activity) such as *kṛcchra*,[1] even then (here) is to be understood an activity (in general), for it is the cause of production of the

sevenfold foods. [19]

[1]This refers to bodily mortification which can be for either penance or expiation of some wrong done by one.

धिया धियेति लिङ्गाच्च गृह्येते ज्ञानकर्मणी ।
मेधातपोगिरा नान्ये ग्राह्ये तदफलत्वतः ॥२०॥

Also, from the expression of the cause *dhiyā dhiyā* ... are understood knowledge and activity (viz. performance of the ritual); (therefore) by the (use of) the words *medhā* and *tapas*, are not to be understood two other meanings,[1] for they do not produce any result (lit. fruit).[2] [20]

This explains the reference to *dhī* in this very *kaṇḍikā*.
[1]*medhā* means grasping, and *tapas* means practising penances.
[2]That is, they do not raise a sacrificer to the status of Prajāpati and are in no way responsible for the creation of the world.

पाङ्क्तं हि प्रकृतं कर्म वेदेति ज्ञानमेव च ।
विहाय नातः प्रकृतं युक्तोऽप्रकृतसंग्रहः ॥२१॥

Indeed what is in the context is the Pāṅkta (i.e. fivefold) activity; and knowledge is expressed by the word *veda* 'he knew'; therefore it is not proper to accept what is not in the context by setting aside what is in the context. [21]

This is the conclusion of the discussion of *medhā* and *tapas*. It emphasises that *dhī* and *karman* are, in this context, the meanings of the two words. SP points out that the usually accepted meanings of the two words would involve the faults of *prakṛtahāni* and *aprakṛtakalpanā*.
Also, this has reference to *eṣa pāṅkto yajñaḥ ... ya evaṃ veda* (BI 1.4.17).

मेधातपोतिरेकेण नान्यत्स्यात्साधनं यतः ।

प्रसिद्धत्वादतो हीति व्याचष्टे श्रुतिरञ्जसा ॥२२॥

Since there is no means to ritual activity in addition to (i.e. beside) *medhā* and *tapas*, therefore the Śruti has clearly stated the words *ato hi*, for the two are known (means of activity). [22]

This brings out the stress on the word *hi* in *medhayā hi tapasājanayat pitā*. Also, this serves to emphasise that *medhā* and *tapas*, thus understood, can result into one's agency in the act of creation (*sraṣṭṛtva*).

अस्य भोक्तृसमूहस्य साधारणमचीक्लृपत् ।
एकमन्नं पिता सृष्ट्वा तच्चेदं यदिहाद्यते ॥२३॥

The father (of the creation or the world) intended one common food for this (entire) mass of enjoyers and, after creating that, (he created) this food which is what is eaten here (by all). [23]

This refers to BU: *ekam asya ... miśraṃ hy etat.*

यदिदं प्राणिभिर्नित्यमद्यतेऽहरहस्तृषा ।
साधारणमिदं युक्तं सर्वभूतस्थितेस्ततः ॥२४॥

Since this (food) is ever eaten by (all) beings, day after day and with relish (lit. thirst), therefore this is properly (called) common (food for all beings) owing to the sustenance of all beings thereby. [24]

स य एतदुपास्तेऽन्नमसाधारणरूपतः ।
पाप्मनो नैव स द्रष्टा व्यावर्तत इहातुरः ॥२५॥

He, who worships this (common) food, holding it as uncommon, cannot keep (lit. turn away) from (sin), since thus seeing, he is a weakling[1] in respect of this.[2] [25]

This has a reference to BU 1.5.2: *sa ya etad upāste.*

[1]The word *ātura* here means: a person who is weak in his understanding of 'the significance of food', since he uses the food only for himself. In other words, he does not hold it as food to be commonly shared.

[2]This is for *iha* in the sense of *annaviniyoga* (SP).

उपासनं च तात्पर्यमिह श्रुत्याभिधीयते ।
मोघमन्नमिति तथा मन्त्रे ताच्छील्यनिन्दनम् ॥२६॥

In this respect,[1] *upāsanā* means 'being devoted (or attached) to that[2]'— thus it is said in the Śruti, viz. in the Mantra *mogham annam* ...[3] and so also is there a censure of being attached to that.[2] [26]

The third line in this verse is metrically faulty; the sixth letter is short.

[1]Cf. SP: *sādhāraṇam annaṃ saptamyarthaḥ* (*i.e. ihārthaḥ*).

[2]*sādhāraṇam annaṃ.*

[3]*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 2.8.8: *mogham annaṃ apracetāḥ satyaṃ bravīmi vadha it sa tasya, nāryamāṇam puṣyati no sakhāyaṃ kevalāgho bhavati kevalādī.* This is an Arthavāda in respect of common food enjoyed by only one person who is the sacrificer.

In verses 29 to 38, there is a statement of Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of ekam asya sādhāraṇam and its refutation as well.

वैश्वदेवं हि नामैतद्यदन्नमुपसाध्यते ।
नालमेतद्धि सर्वेषां पाप्मनां विनिवृत्तये ॥२७॥
इत्येवं केचिदिच्छन्ति तत्तु युक्त्या न युज्यते ।
अनूक्तेर्यदिदमिति सिद्धोऽर्थोऽनूद्यते यतः ॥२८॥
प्रात्यक्ष्यं न च तस्यास्ति शास्त्रमात्रप्रमाणतः ।
यथा सर्वात्तृवक्त्रान्तस्थस्य प्रत्यक्षता तथा ॥२९॥

'It is indeed meant that this (common) food is what is utilized

(*upasādhyate*) for (the performance of) Vaiśvadeva;[1] certainly, this (food) is not capable of removing (or warding off) all the sins', [27]
thus, do some[2] hold. But that does not get justified by any reason inasmuch as it is given without a basis in (the Śruti-) statement— thus, here is restatement of what is already established. [28]
And that food (used for Vaiśvadeva) is not directly perceptible as such, for it is (understood) only from Śāstra;[3] (thus) it does not have that direct perceptibility which the food that enters into the mouths of all eaters has. [29]

This verse also has its third line metrically faulty; the sixth letter is short.

[1]Vaiśvadeva is offering of oblations made to all gods by one before one's daily meals (i.e. both in the morning and in the evening). It is a compulsory (*nitya*) rite to be performed by a householder; cf. *Manusmṛti* 3.84-91 (verse 90 in particular).

[2]This refers to Bhartṛprapañca.

[3]Namely, *Manusmṛti.*

प्रतिप्राणि ममेदं स्यादभिलाषश्च दृश्यते ।
सर्वप्राण्यंशमिश्रत्वं ततोऽस्मिन्नवसीयते ॥३०॥

And it is noticed in the case of every being that there is a desire, 'May this (food) be mine'; therefore it is concluded that, in respect of this (food), there is the character of the share for all beings. [30]

This is Sureśvara's justification in respect of the commonly shared food. For this reason, that food also cannot be exception to what is called food and is enjoyed in common.

नात्मार्थं पाचयेदन्नमिति चापि स्मृतेर्वचः ।
तैर्दत्तानप्रदायैभ्यो यो भुङ्क्ते स्तेन एव सः ।
अन्नादे भ्रूणहा माष्टीत्यादीह वचनं स्मृतेः ॥३१॥

Also, there is a statement of a Smṛti, viz. 'One should not get food cooked for only oneself'[1]; so also, there are such statements[2] from a Smṛti as 'He is indeed a robber who enjoys the foods from which he does not give to others...'[3] (and) 'He transfers[4] his sin to the eater of his food— the one who is the killer of a foetus.'[5] [31]

Reference to various Smṛti sentences is for rejecting Bhartṛprapañca's view that *sādhāraṇa* food is Vaiśvadeva food, that is holding the *asādhāraṇa* food as *sādhāraṇa*.

[1]SP supplies after *nātmārtham ... annam* three more *pādas*: *na vṛthā ghātayet paśum, na caikaḥ svayam aśnīyāt* and *vidhivarjaṃ na nirvapet*. Cp. *Ṛgveda* 10.117.6.

[2]*vacanam* stands for *vacanāni* (*jātāv ekavacanam*). *Manusmṛti* 3.105, 107 and 108. Cp. SP. This is understood from *ādi*.

[3]*Gītā* 3.13ab.

[4]*mārṣti*=*kṣipati* (NKL).

[5]*Manusmṛti* 8.317. SP however reads: *annādeḥ ... mārṣti anena abhiśaṃsati, stenaḥ prayukto rājani yāvan nānṛtasaṃkaraḥ*. Also, it states: *vakṣyati hi variṣṭhabrahmatā ceha bhruṇahety abhidhīyate*.

तस्यापि चान्तःपातित्वात्सर्वाद्यस्यैव युक्तिमान् ।
ग्रहस्तस्य गृहीतौ तु नास्यान्तःपातिता तथा ॥३२॥

Since that[1] also falls (i.e. is included) in (general food), understanding only of that which is eaten by all is proper (i.e. reasonable). As against this, if only that is understood, it is not included in (general food) in the same way.[2] [32]

This is one more reason in support of the author's view.

[1]It means: the food for Vaiśvadeva.

[2]Read SP: *yathā sarvānnādye 'ntarbhūtaṃ vaiśvadevānnaṃ na tathā tasminn annāntaram ity arthaḥ*.

असृष्टाविनियोगत्वे प्राप्नुतस्तद्ग्रहे सति ।
सर्वप्राणिभिराद्यस्य तच्चानिष्टं प्रसज्यते ॥३३॥

If that[1] is understood (under reference to, or in connection with, that injunction), then there follow two faults: *asṛṣṭatva* 'not being created (by the father, viz. the sacrificer)', and *aviniyogatva* 'not being employed in the (relevant) ritual'. And that would invite the undesired contingency in respect of the food which is to be eaten by all beings. [33]

Yet another fault in the view of Bhartṛprapañca is introduced. This is further clarified in the next verse.

[1]Namely, food for Vaiśvadeva.

अव्यावृत्तिश्च पाप्मभ्यो वैश्वदेवान्नसंग्रहे ।
न न्याय्यं वचनं तस्य शास्त्रमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ॥३४॥

Also, not keeping from sins by accepting the food for Vaiśvadeva is not reasonable,[1] since that[2] has a basis merely in the Śāstra. [34]

This is yet further fault in the same view. The food for Vaiśvadeva is not eaten in ordinary way like any other *kāmya* 'what is desired' food.

[1]It means: not in keeping with the teaching of the scriptures.
[2]This refers to the food for Vaiśvadeva.

अल्पीयःपापहानिश्च नापि शब्दात्प्रतीयते ।
न स पाप्मन इत्यस्मादश्रुता न च गृह्यते ॥३५॥

Also it is not understood from the word (viz. injunction regarding Vaiśvadeva) that there is the removal of (only) a small sin. And that is not understood from the statement *na sa pāpmanaḥ* ... (for it is) not heard[1] there. [35]

[1]SP understands this as the two faults: *śrutahāni* and

aśrutakalpanā.

सर्वाद्यान्नगृहीतौ तु हेतुर्गमक इष्यते ।
असाधारणकारित्वं तस्य साधारणात्मनः ॥३६॥

And (*tu*) there is accepted here an indication (of) the reason[1] for understanding (by *sādhāraṇa*) all eatable food; viz. that it has the capacity to render food of common nature into uncommon food. [36]

This explains the purposeful use in BU of the word *miśra.* The word would be purposeless, if one accepted the view of Bhartṛprapañca. In BU, *sādhāraṇa* food is described as of *miśra* character also; cf. *miśraṃ hy etat.* This description indicates that the food, which is not commonly shared, also brings sin to the eater of it.

[1]Actually, the indication, the reason (used in apposition).

सर्वप्राणभृदन्नस्य तस्माद्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
उक्तौ युक्तिबलादत्र नान्यस्येति विनिश्चितिः ॥३७॥

Therefore it is desired to understand (in this context, only) that food for (i.e. which is eaten by) all living beings. (Thus) on the strength of reasons (stated), here (in the Upaniṣad) the decision is: there cannot (be the acceptance) of any other (food). [37]

This is the author's concluding remark.

पापानिर्मोकहेतूक्तिर्मिश्रमित्यभिधीयते ।
सर्वार्थस्य हि पापाय यतोऽसाधारणीक्रिया ॥३८॥

(In the use of) the word *miśra* is stated the cause for the non-removal of sin; since rendering uncommon that food which is meant for all is (to point to its) resulting into sin. [38]

This is reaffirming how the word *miśra* in BU goes against Bhartṛprapañca's view.

प्रक्षेपोऽग्नौ हुतं विद्यात्तत्पूर्वं बलिकर्म च ।
प्रहुतं चेह विज्ञेयं ते देवेभ्यो ददौ पिता ॥३९॥

[Verses 39-45 explain the meaning of the words *dve devān abhājayat.*]

One should understand that the offering (of food) into the fire as *huta* and that every (offering of) ritual oblation is preceded by that (*huta*). Also *prahuta* is understood here as that which the father (viz. the sacrificer) gave to (i.e.. intended for) the gods. [39]

देवेभ्योऽन्ने यतः प्रत्ते हुतप्रहुतलक्षणे ।
तानुद्दिश्य ततोऽद्यापि जुह्वति प्र च जुह्वति ॥४०॥

(And) since the two foods characterized as *huta* and *prahuta* were (in the yore) offered to the gods, therefore even today, they pour the oblation into the fire and also offer (some other outside the fire) intending (it) for them. [40]

This verse explains the word *tasmāt* in the Śruti.

यतः सूत्रपदे द्वित्वमविशेषेण चोदितम् ।
श्रौतस्मार्तविभागेन तत एतद्विकल्पितम् ॥४१॥
स्मार्तान्नानन्तरोक्तत्वात्स्मार्तत्वं स्याद्वयोस्तयोः ।
अग्निहोत्राभिसंबन्धात्स्यातां वा श्रुतिचोदिते ॥४२॥
मन्त्रे द्वित्वाविशिष्टत्वाद्धुतप्रहुतलक्षणे ।
श्रुत्यातस्ते विकल्प्येते श्रौते स्मार्ते हि तुल्यवत् ॥४३॥

[Here is now stated the purport of the Śruti statement *atho āhuḥ.* This is to explain the twofold mention of *juhvati* and *prajuhvati* in the previous verse.]

Since the twofold character (of oblations) is stated (lit. enjoined) in the Sūtra (i.e. in the Śruti-Mantra) without any specification,[1] therefore they are subjected to option viz. in the division: the Śrauta and the Smārta.[2] [41]

The two (foods *huta* and *prahuta* mentioned earlier) would have the character of the Smārta, since they are mentioned immediately after the Smārta food[1] or rather, (both these) can be regarded as 'those stated (i.e. enjoined) in the Śruti (Śrauta)' since they have a connection with the Agnihotra.[3] [42]

Since (the two divine foods), which are characterized as *huta* and *prahuta*, are described by the Śruti as being two, without any specification, they are subjected to option (by the opponent); for, (both) the Śrauta[4] and the Smārta (are) equal (in status). [43]

In verses 41-43 Sureśvara justifies the option regarding *hutaprahuta* foods and *darśapūrṇamāsa* foods. The reason for doing this is: In the Mantra portion *dve anne hutaprahute vā darśapūrṇamāsau vā*, there is no specification of the natures of the two foods and that gives rise to the sense of options. Verse 41 gives the reason for the option. Again, the foods are mentioned as *sādhāraṇa* and are therefore included in *smārtānna* and, further, they are mentioned immediately after *smārtānna*. Therefore they are *huta* and *prahuta* foods. But, since they are described as *devānne* 'foods for gods' and are thus mentioned in the nearness of the ritual of Agnihotra wherein are mentioned the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa *grahas* (i.e. foods), therefore the foods can be called *śrautānna* also. In verse 43, the word *tulyavat* points to the *tulyatva* which is the basis for option (*tulyatvaṃ vikalpahetuḥ*).

[1]That is, without any specific mention of the distinction between the two oblations.

[2]This gives the reason for optionally understanding the word *dve* as the Śrauta and the Smārta oblations, referring to the foods for gods as can belong to *huta* and *prahuta* varieties and

also to oblations in the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices. This option entails the first line of the next verse.

[3]This is another reason for holding two options. The commonly shared food is included among the Smārta foods.

[4]This refers to the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa foods.

दर्शश्च पौर्णमासश्च देवान्ने ते यतः श्रुते ।
प्रायस्ताभ्यां न कामाय यष्टव्यमिति गम्यते ॥४४॥

Since (the two foods) Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa are heard (i.e. enjoined) in the Śruti, therefore it is understood that one should not perform the sacrifice with those two foods for obtaining one's desire. [44]

This is based on the authority of the Śruti statement *tasmān neṣṭiyājukaḥ syāt.* The objector's argument is that *dve devān abhājayat* refers only to Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa foods. Therefore the option, mentioned in verse 41 above, cannot be entertained. This is barred by *na kāmāya yaṣṭavyam.*

नेहेष्टयो निषिध्यन्ते देवप्राधान्यसिद्धये ।
ताच्छीलिकोकञ्श्रवणात्तच्छीलत्वं निवार्यते ॥४५॥

Here,[1] *iṣṭis* (small rites performed with desires) are not negated owing (to the desire) to establish the principal significance of the god. By the mention (lit. hearing) of the suffix *ukañ*, which goes with (i.e. refers to) one's being in the habit of performing that (rite), is warded off the character (of the sacrificer) as being given to its performance. [45]

This explains the significance of the suffix *ukañ* in *iṣṭiyājuka* and also explains away the possible doubt that the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa rites are performed with the desire for heaven.

The author stresses on the significance of the form *iṣṭiyājuka* and points out that Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa rites, though performed with some desire, are not performed by mere habit. Thus only

the habitual performance of rites is warded off.

[1]That is, in the statement *neṣṭiyājukaḥ....*

प्रसक्तान्यपि नोच्यन्ते त्रीण्यन्नान्यत्र कारणात् ।
तेषां फलत्वादुक्तेभ्यः साधनेभ्योऽन्यता यतः ॥४६॥
सौकर्यप्रतिपत्तेश्च भूयोविषयतस्तथा ।
साधनैकसजातित्वादानन्तर्यमकारणम् ॥४७॥

Here (i.e. in this Brāhmaṇa), three foods, though contingent[1] for (good) reason, are not discussed (first) because of their character as the fruit (resulting) from those (i.e. the foods) mentioned (earlier) and (thus) there is their difference from those means (to fruits). [46]
Also (this is so done) for easy understanding (of the difference between the means and the end)[2] and also because they (i.e. the three foods) cover quite a large sphere of things. (The seventh food is mentioned together with the first three) because it has the same character as theirs, viz. that of a means (or cause). The immediately following of the three (*sādhya*) foods does not have any (specific) purpose. [47]

The Vārtika (of course, following the Bhāṣya) has proceeded to explain the seventh food (viz. *paśvanna*) immediately after the first three are explained and it has thus ignored, for the time being, the three foods which are mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa before that (viz. *paśvanna*)— this is, in other words, to explain the purpose of what is called *pāṭhakramātikrama* 'varying the sequence in the original text'.

This explains how the Vārtika and the Bhāṣya refer to the less authoritativeness of the *pāṭhakrama* than that of the *arthakrama* (i.e. the sequence of the purpose). It is an accepted principle that the *arthakrama* is stronger than the *pāṭhakrama.*

The purpose of Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa rites is attainment of heaven; it is not warded off.

[1]Cf. SP: *pāṭhakramāt kāraṇāt prāptāni.* Yet further, SP observes: *atha vā paśvannasya sādhanatvād uktasādhanatraye tasya*

buddhisāṃnidhyāc caturthatvena vyākhyānam, tato 'nnatrayavyākhyety ukte saukaryeṇa pratipattir ataś ca pāṭhānādara ity arthaḥ.

[2]The three foods, being of the nature of the Sūtra (i.e. Virāj), are of the nature of the end (i.e. result) to be achieved, whereas the others are the means to be employed, i.e. they cannot to be secured— they are infinite in their extent.

पयोऽन्नमेव प्रायेण मनुष्याः पशुभिः सह ।
भुञ्जते पय एवाग्रे तेषामन्नमतोऽस्तु तत् ॥४८॥
भुञ्जते पय एवाग्रे क्रमेणान्यत्तृणादि हि ।
अतोऽनुमीयते पित्रा तेभ्यः प्रत्तं पयः पुरा ॥४९॥

(The word) *payas* just means food; (for) generally human beings, along with (i.e. as well as) animals, consume (i.e. enjoy) only milk in the beginning; therefore let that (viz. *payaḥ*) be the food. [48]

They (viz. the animals) eat (i.e. enjoy) milk first and then subsequently (i.e. gradually) (begin to) graze (lit. eat) grass etc. For this reason, it is concluded[1] that the father gave them (i.e. men and animals) milk before (anything else). [49]

This explains *paśubhya ekaṃ prāyacchad iti tat payaḥ.*

[1]*anumīyate = dṛṣṭānusārāt kalpyate.* So it is understood on the basis of what is seen in the life of the humans and the animals (SP and NKL).

पशवः पय एवाग्रे भुञ्जते नापरं ततः ।
कथमेतद्विजानीम इत्येतदभिधीयते ॥५०॥

Animals[1] consume (i.e. enjoy) only milk first (and) not anything else than that. (In order to explain) how we are to know this, there is now stated (in the following verse(s)): [50]

[1]This refers to the humans as well as to the animals; because the Śruti considers both the bipeds and the quadrupeds.

यत एवमतो लोके कुमारं जातमग्रतः ।
जातरूपव्यवहितं लेहयन्ति घृतं जनाः ॥५१॥
तस्यानु तदभावे वा पाययन्ति स्तनं शिशुम् ।

[Verses 51 and 52ab explain *tasmāt kumāraṃ jātaṃ ghṛtaṃ vaivāgre pratilehayanti stanaṃ vānudhāpayanti.*]

Since this is so, therefore, in the world, do the people first make a new-born child lick ghee[1] in touch with (i.e. touched by or rubbed on) (a piece of) gold. [51]
Only after that (doing), or (even) in the absence of that, do they put the child on (the mother's) breast. [52ab]

[1]Since ghee is a product of milk, it is identified with the latter.

पशुष्वपि तथा जातं वत्सं कश्चित्प्रपृच्छति ॥५२॥
कियांस्ते वयसा वत्स इत्याचष्टे वयो यथा ।
अतृणाद इति तृणं नाद्याप्यत्ति मनागपि ॥५३॥
वर्तते पयसैवासावद्यापीत्यवसीयते ।

So also, in respect of the animals, (they do the same). In relation to a new-born calf, someone asks: [52cd]
'How old is your young one (here, the calf)?'. Thus (asked), one states the age in this manner: 'It is not yet an eater of grass; that is to say, it does not eat even a little of grass.' [53]
It subsists on only milk yet— so is this understood. [54ab]

प्राण्यप्राणि जगत्सर्वं तस्मिन्नेव प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥५४॥

(Indeed) all the world comprising living beings and non-living things[1] is supported on that (i.e. milk) only. [54cd]

[1]The word *prāṇyaprāṇi* literally means: whatever being that

breathes and whatever thing that does not breathe.

पयसीदं जगन्मग्नमित्येतद्गम्यते कुतः ।
प्रसिद्धेर्गम्यते न्यायाद्यतोऽसावभिधीयते ॥५५॥

'Whence is it understood that this world is supported by (lit. has merged in) only milk?', (asks someone). (The answer is:) 'So is it understood for a reason, viz. usage,[1] since that is (so) expressed (i.e. declared). [55]

[1]SP: *śrautī prasiddhir eva nyāyaḥ.* Read BU: *tasmin sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitaṃ yac ca prāṇiti yac ca ncti*; *payasi hīdaṃ sarvam pratiṣṭhitaṃ yac ca prāṇiti yac ca na.*

आहुतिः पय एव स्यादाज्यं वा पय एव वा ।
पय एवाहुतिः सर्वमित्येतच्च श्रुतेर्मितेः ॥५६॥

An offering into the fire should be of only milk, or of clarified butter or milk. All that is offering is but milk and this is (understood) from the Śruti, the authoritative means (of knowing). [56]

Here the Vārtika refers to the usage among the ritualists which, they hold, has come from some Śruti; viz. *ghṛtāhutiṃ vā payāhutiṃ vobhayaṃ tv etat paya eva* (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 2.2.4.4). Here, *miti* is for *māna* (i.e. *pramāṇa*), used in opposition to Śruti.

अथैषाज्याहुतिर्यज्ञे यद्धविः सर्वरूपकम् ।
पशुश्चाप्याज्यमेवैतत्करोतीत्यपि चागमः ॥५७॥

Now, this offering of clarified butter in a sacrifice is what is offerings in all forms. So also is the tradition that a sacrificer (while offering) an animal, does offer only this, viz. clarified butter. [57]

This verse paraphrases the Śruti which is cited above in the note on the previous verse. It supports the said known usage. It states the inference drawn from the Śruti; SP reads: *tatraiva śrutyantaram āha ... ājyāhutes tāvat payastvaṃ tadvikāratvād yac ca yajñe sarvarūpakaṃ puroḍāśātmakaṃ havir yaś ca paśur etat sarvam ājyam evābhighārasaṃskārāt karoti puruṣo na hi carvādy ājyānabhighāritaṃ homyam payaś cājyam iti sarvasya payastvam ity āgamaśāsanam ity arthaḥ.*

आज्याभिघारसंस्कारात्सर्वमेव पयो हविः ।
पयस्येव जगत्कृत्स्नमग्निहोत्रे प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥५८॥

Indeed all offering is but milk on account of its modification (i.e. purification) by the sprinkling of clarified butter on it. (Therefore) the entire world is thus supported in (or established in) only milk, viz. in Agnihotra.[1] [58]

[1]The Vārtika justifies this reference to the Agnihotra in the next verse.

ते वा एते इति तथा परिणामोऽखिलं जगत् ।
अग्निहोत्राहुतेः साक्षाच्छ्रुतावेव समीरितम् ॥५९॥

It is (so) stated in the Śruti itself, viz. in *te vā ete* ... that offering of the Agnihotra has as its result all the world.[1] [59]

Reference to the Agnihotra offerings in the preceding verse needed some support. Therefore this Vārtika points to the purport of the Śruti *te vā ete āhutī hute utkrāmatas te antarikṣam āviśataḥ* (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 11.6.2.6). This should not be taken to set aside *apūrva* or *adṛṣṭa* effected by the Agnihotra.

[1]The word *pariṇāma* here stands for 'effect' (*kārya* or *phala*).

अग्नौ प्रास्ताहुतिः सम्यगादित्यमुपतिष्ठते ।
आदित्याज्जायते वृष्टिर्वृष्टेरन्नं ततः प्रजाः ॥६०॥

He who has poured his offering into the fire well attends on the Sun. From Āditya proceeds rain, from rain food and thence the created beings. [60]

This is from *Manusmṛti* 3.66; for support to what is expressed in the last quarter, refer to *Gītā* 3.14.

पयोद्रव्याहुतेश्चैतत्परिणामोऽखिलं जगत् ।
एतच्च श्रुतितः सिद्धं विश्वमाहुतिकारणम् ॥६१॥

And[1] the entire world is but the result of the offering of the material, viz. milk; and this is established by (the statement in) the Śruti: All the world has offering as its cause. [61]

With reference to the two *ca*s, read SP: *apūrvasaṃgrahārtham ādyaś cakāro dvitīyaḥ smṛtisamuccayārthaḥ.*

यथोक्तदर्शनस्तुत्यै दर्शनान्तरकुत्सनम् ।
तस्मिन्सर्वमिति ह्यस्य दर्शनस्य विधित्सया ॥६२॥

(Now follows) the censure of another view in order to praise the already stated view, viz. in that (offering of milk) all (the world is) supported— indeed, this is done (only)[1] with a desire to enjoin (the adoption of the first) view. [62]

[1]'Indeed' and '(only)' are by the force of *hi*. Cf. SP: *na hi nindā nindyaṃ ninditum api tu vidheyaṃ stotum iti- nyāyadyotako hiśabdaḥ.* Also NKL: *paradarśananindā na niṣ- edhārthā, kiṃ tu atra vidhitsitopāsanastutyarthā ity arthaḥ.*

पयसैवाग्निहोत्रं हि जुह्वत्संवत्सरं द्विजः ।
जयत्येव पुनर्मृत्युं न भूयो मृतिभाग्भवेत् ॥६३॥
संवत्सरे प्रयोगाणामग्निहोत्रे हि संख्यया ।
षष्ट्युत्तराणि त्रीण्येव शतानीति विनिश्चितम् ॥६४॥
क्षपाहान्यपि तावन्ति संख्ययेह भवन्ति हि ।

शतानि सप्त संख्याताः प्रयोगार्धाश्च विंशतिः ॥६५॥
याजुष्मत्योऽपि तावत्य इष्टकाः स्युः प्रजापतेः ।
संवत्सराग्नेश्चित्यस्य पुंसो नाड्यस्तथैव च ॥६६॥
संपदैवाहुतीर्विद्वान्संपाद्याग्नेस्तथेष्टकाः ।
संवत्सरमवाप्नोति स्वनाडीसंख्यया नरः ॥६७॥
पुमान्संवत्सरोऽग्निश्च नाड्यहोरात्रयाजुषैः ।
संपदैते समाः सर्वे तस्मात्संवत्सरश्रुतिः ॥६८॥
संवत्सरात्मसंपत्त्या कालात्मानं समश्नुते ।
इत्येवंदृष्टयो धीरा यदाहुरसदेव तत् ॥६९॥

[Now is stated in details the other view; viz. *saṃvatsaram payasā juhvat apa punar mṛtyuṃ jayati.* And, finally, it is rejected.]

Indeed a twice born, who worships the Agnihotra with milk for a year, overcomes (lit. wins) a second death, i.e. he does not become subject to death again.[1] [63]
It is decided that there are, in a year, three hundred and sixty performances of Agnihotra in number. [64]
Indeed, days and nights also are as many in number (and therefore) the halves of the performances (of the ritual) are counted to be seven hundred and twenty. [65]
Also, as many are the bricks of Prajāpati[2] related to the Yajus Mantras and similar (i.e. equal in number) are (the bricks) of the fire to be worshipped throughout the year. So also are the veins (in the body) of a man (equal in number). [66]
By means of this very riches,[3] that is after making the offering (to Agnihotra fire) and the bricks (of the fire) equal in number with the veins in his own body, a person, who knows (the nature of Vedic ritual) obtains the year.[4] [67]
A sacrificer (lit. man), a year and the fire— these are all, by this riches, equal with what belongs to the Yajus (viz. Mantras of them, i.e. bricks), the veins and the days and nights. Therefore is there the hearing (i.e. mention) in the Śruti of a Saṃvatsara. [68]

Thus, by producing himself in the nature (or form) of a Saṃvatsara (i.e. Prajāpati) does (a sacrificer) attain the nature of Kāla (i.e. Prajāpati); all this, which the wise ones have thus held in their view, is false (i.e. wrong). [69]

[1]The purport is: The sacrificer under reference dies and does not become born or embodied again.

[2]It is identified with Saṃvatsara.

[3]This riches consists in the above said large number of them.

[4]Verses 64-67 have thus explained the idea of sacrificer's overcoming death. This view is typically ritualistic in character. The Agnihotra-Upāsanā has a basis in the Śruti passages: *tasya ha vā etasyāgnihotrasya sapta ca śatāni viṃśatiś ca saṃvatsare sāyamāhutayaḥ sapta caiva śatāni viṃśatiś ca saṃvatsare prātar-āhutayaḥ* and *tāvatyo 'gner iṣṭakāḥ*. The performance of the ritual produces, according to this view, the mystically significant similarity among the offerings, the different measures or units of time and the veins in a human body. This effects the attainment of Saṃvatsara (identical with Prajāpati) and deathlessness.

Verse 67 offers quite some difficulty of construe and translation.

पयस्यन्तर्हितं विश्वं पश्यन्नेवं पयो नरः ।
एकयैव स आहुत्या जगदात्मानमश्नुते ॥७०॥

[Now follows the refutation of the view just stated.]

Thus,[1] seeing the entire world as resting (lit. concealed) in milk (and worshipping the Agnihotra) with milk an individual obtains the Ātman of the world by means of just a single offering. [70]

This is to say: One does not have to keep on performing the Agnihotra ritual for one full year. Making only one offering of milk, one can attain one's goal, viz. becoming one with Prajāpati.

[1]That is, in accordance with the view earlier stated and

acceptable to Sureśvara.

तत्रैवं सति को मूढो द्राघीयांसं प्रतीक्षते ।
संवत्सरावधिं कालं सकृदाहुतिसाधने ॥७१॥

This being so, which fool would wait for the longer time of a year's duration while there is (available) the means of securing (the Ātman of the world) through only offering one? [71]

This emphasises why the author discards the other earlier mentioned view.

पयो द्रव्यं यथातत्त्वदर्शी चेच्छ्रद्धयान्वितः ।
यदैवाहर्जुहोतीत्थं हन्ति मृत्युं तदैव सः ॥७२॥
एकयैव स आहुत्या देवेभ्योऽन्नं ह्यशेषतः ।
प्रयच्छति यतो नातः प्रयोगान्तरमीक्ष्यते ॥७३॥
हुतमेवं जगत्कृत्स्नं नातोऽन्यदवशिष्यते ।
यथोक्तदर्शनात्तस्मात्सर्वाप्त्या मृत्युजिद्भवेत् ॥७४॥

If one who sees the truth as (discussed just before) offers on some one day the material, viz. milk, overcomes (lit. strikes down) death just then. [72]
Since he offers all food to the gods in (i.e. by making) a single offering (of milk), there is therefore no need of another performance (i.e. of making any more offering). [73]
Thus, in accordance with the view which we have stated, what is thus offered (viz. milk) is the entire world and there does not therefore remain anything (to be offered); therefore the sacrificer would become a conquerer (lit. overcomer) of death through his obtaining all.[1] [74]

Verse 72 is the explanation of the sentence *yad ahar eva* .... Verse 73 explains the sentence *sarvaṃ hi* ... and supplies the reason for the statement in verse 72 above.

Our text and translation of verse 73 follow the reading *-īkṣyate*

in the AnSS and the NKL editions. However, the variant reading *-īkṣate* given in the AnSS edition gives alternative translation, which is better; thus: One does not wait to make for another performance (viz. making an offering every day of the year).

Verse 74 sums up the reason for holding the view stated so far.

[1]This may refer to the whole world (*kṛtsnaṃ jagat*) which is the same as *saṃvatsara* 'Prajāpati'. SP, however, refers 'all' to becoming one with all gods which consequently results into absence of any further (birth and) death.

उक्तवद्धृदि संभाव्य वक्ष्यमाणान्यपि श्रुतिः ।
अन्नानि कस्मादित्याह प्रश्नवाक्यविवक्षया ॥७५॥

Now, having considered the (three) foods, which are (yet) to be stated, as similar to (those already) stated, the Śruti states (the question) *kasmāt tāni...*; (this) through a desire (to make) a statement in answer to the question. [75]

In BU the question *kasmāt tāni* occurs even before there is the statement of the three remaining foods. The author explains the purpose of this: The three foods to be stated are in nature similar to the earlier stated foods, viz. the creation of the sacrificer.

अद्यमानान्यथान्नानि यथोक्तान्यत्तृभिः सदा ।
कस्मात्क्षयं न संयान्ति यवपूर्णकुसूलवत् ॥७६॥

Now (a question arises:) The foods, that are thus stated, ever being enjoyed (lit. eaten) by the eaters, why do they not get exhausted (i.e. do not decrease) just like a granary full of barley (and other corn)? [76]

This explains the purpose of *kasmāt tāni* and is the paraphrase of the Upaniṣadic words *na kṣīyante 'dyamānāni.*

प्रश्नस्य कस्मात्तानीति श्रुत्यैवाचार्यभूतया ।
पुरुषो वा इति गिरा हेतुरुक्तोऽक्षये परः ॥७७॥

To the question *kasmāt tāni* asked by the Śruti, which has (as if) become a preceptor, is stated (in answer) the subsequent reason for the non-decrease (of food) in the word(s) *puruṣo vā* .... [77]

अद्यते चेत्सदैवान्नं जन्यते न तु तत्ततः ।
यथोक्तः स्यादयं दोषो न तु तन्नेह जन्यते ॥७८॥

There could be this fault which is mentioned (by the questioner), if food were ever eaten and not produced. But, that is not so, (for, in this context, it should be noted that) it is (ever) produced. [78]

अन्नाक्षयत्वहेतुत्वात्पुरुषोऽक्षितिरुच्यते ।
स हि धीहाप्रबन्धेन सर्वदान्नं करोत्यतः ॥७९॥

The sacrificer is called (one having) non-decrease, since he is the cause of the non-decreasing character of food— indeed, by the continuity of knowledge and performance (of the ritual),[1] he ever produces food. [79]

This explains the meaning of the word *akṣiti* according to *hetuhetumadbhāva.*

[1]The word *īhā* stands for *karman* as is warranted by the word *kriyābuddhi* in the following verse. Cf. BUBV 1.4.451.

क्रियाबुद्धिप्रबन्धेन यतो भोक्ताप्यहर्निशम् ।
तदन्नं जनयत्येव तस्मादन्नं न हीयते ॥८०॥

Since, by the continuity of knowledge and performance (of the ritual), the enjoyer on his part thus creates the food, therefore the food does not ever get exhausted. [80]

भोगदस्यैव भोगेन सृज्यमानत्वहेतुतः ।
अन्नाक्षयो भवेदेवं तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ॥८१॥

On account of the enjoyment of what yields enjoyment (and) owing to its being (continuously) created, there would be such (i.e. as described) non-decrease of food; this is thanks to the invariable[1] relation of the two (viz. enjoyment and what is enjoyed). [81]

We have followed the reading in the AnSS edition. NKL reads *bhogādasyaiva* in place of *bhogadasyaiva*. It is difficult to decide whether following the latter is correct. SP understands *avyatireka* as *mithoyoga* 'the inseparable relation' of enjoyment which employs the enjoyer.

[1]This is *avyatireka* 'inseparability'.

सुखदुःखादिसंवित्तिः फलं पूर्वस्य कर्मणः ।
रागद्वेषक्रिया तत्र स्यात्फलान्तरसिद्धये ॥८२॥

Experience of pleasure, pain etc.[1] is the result of the former performance(s); and the performance through attachment and/or aversion would produce another result. [82]

One performs ritual actions and thereby secures enjoyment and happiness which in turn produce attachment to and/on aversion for some thing(s) and this would produce continuity of action and the consequent production of food— this justifies *annākṣaya* mentioned in verse 81 above.

[1]The word etc. refers to various or particular forms of pleasure and pain.

रागादिपूर्वकं कर्म जायते फलवद्यतः ।
रागादिरहितं तत्तु निष्फलं सुप्तवागिव ॥८३॥

Since a performance which has proceeded from attachment etc.[1] produces (further) results (i.e. becomes fruitful); therefore

that which has not proceeded from any attachment etc. does not produce any result(s), like the chatter of a sleeper. [83]

This verse explains further the statement in the preceding verse. This explanation is a good example of the author's use of the *anvayavyatireka* method. On this method, cf. our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction.

को हेतुरक्षयत्वे स्यादिति पृष्टमथाधुना ।
तद्विदः फलसिद्ध्यर्थं भूयः प्रश्नोऽयमुच्यते ।
अक्षितित्वं कथं पुंस इत्येतच्चाधुनोच्यते ॥८४॥

Now it is asked: What is the cause of the non-decreasing character (of food)?– This question is asked once again with a view to establishing that there is a (positive) result for (the activity of) the knower of that.[1] And now it is later stated as to how there is the non-decreasing character of the man (viz. the sacrificer)[2] also. [84]

[1]This is rather *kriyābuddhiprabandha* of verse 80 above; cf. the next verse.

[2]Yet perhaps, as SP points out: *akṣayahetutvaguṇakasaptānnātmakaprajāpatipuruṣopāsaka* is meant.

स हीदमन्नं कुरुते तत्तत्कालप्रसूतया ।
धिया धिया हि पुरुषः कर्मभिश्चान्नमात्मनः ॥८५॥

Indeed, he produces this food by every (new) thought and activities[1] which have occurred to his mind from time to time; for, the man (viz. the sacrificer) produces food for himself by activities. [85]

[1]*dhiyā dhiyā* and *karmabhiḥ* refer to *kriyābuddhiprabandha*.

भुज्यमानान्यपि ततो न क्षीयन्ते प्रबन्धतः ॥८६॥

Therefore foods, though being continuously eaten, never get exhausted through the continuity (of their being eaten and produced). [86]

यथैव पुरुषोऽन्नानां भोक्तात्यन्तं तथैव सः ।
कर्ताप्यत्यन्तमेव स्यादन्योन्याव्यरितेकतः ॥८७॥

As the sacrificer is verily the enjoyer of the foods, so also is he verily the maker (of them), since the two (the sacrificer and the food)[1] have invariable association (with each other). [87]

[1]This refers to their nature, viz. *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva*, cf. SP.

एवं प्रबन्धरूपेण साध्यसाधनलक्षणम् ।
अविद्यापटसंवीतचेतसां स्थास्निववेक्ष्यते ॥८८॥

Thus, among those whose intellect (*cetas*) is enwrapped by the bondage (or band) of Avidyā, (the food) characterized as both the effect and the cause is understood[1] (lit. seen) to be permanent, as it were, in their continuity.[2] [88]

[1]Our text and translation follow the variant reading *-vekṣyate* and not the printed text of the AnSS edition. This is supported by the NKL edition and is better acceptable.

[2]NKL explains *prabandha* as *gaṅgāpravāhavat śrotorūpa.*

एतच्च भण्यते श्रुत्या पुंसो वैराग्यसिद्धये ।
संसारादविरक्तस्य मुक्तीच्छा नेह कस्यचित् ॥८९॥

And this is stated by the Śruti for establishing aversion (to worldly existence) on the part of the man who is not averse to transmigratory existence; for, there is not ever noticed here (in the case of such a man) the desire for liberation. [89]

फलहेत्वोर्मिथोऽत्यन्तं सर्वदाव्यतिरेकतः ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानादृते नास्ति तद्धेतूच्छित्तिकारणम् ॥९०॥

Thus, owing to the ever obtaining inseparable association of the cause and the effect (viz. the sacrificer and the food), there is not any means other than right knowledge[1] for the destruction of its cause.[2] [90]

This is to justify the second line of the preceding verse.

[1]This is about the nature of the Ātman; or perhaps about the nature of *kriyābuddhī* as leading to impermanence.

[2]This refers to *avirakti* 'absence of aversion to worldly existence' caused by Avidyā.

त्यक्त्वान्यत्सकलं तस्मात्सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य लब्धये ।
मनोवाक्तनुचेष्टाभिर्महान्तं यत्नमाचरेत् ॥९१॥

Therefore for securing right knowledge[1] (a man) should first abandon everything else and make very great effort by his *manas*, Vāk and body. [91]

This sets aside the notion that some performance (*karman*) is necessary, in addition to knowledge.

[1]See note 1 on the preceding verse.

पुंसोऽक्षितित्वं यो वेद तस्येदं फलमुच्यते ।
सोऽन्नमत्ति प्रतीकेन वृत्त्यान्नं मुख्ययात्ति सः ॥९२॥

Now is stated the result of (the Śruti statement:) 'He, who knows the non-decreasing character of the sacrificer in the statement *so 'nnam atti* ... 'he (i.e. the sacrificer) eats food by the mouth', in its (meaning conveyed by) its (i.e. the word's) primary function. [92]

नैवंविद्गुणतामेति ह्यन्नं प्रति कदाचन ।
प्रधानभूतः सन्भुङ्क्ते सर्वदान्नं स कामतः ॥९३॥

(The sacrificer) knowing thus does not ever become subordinate to food; being the principal (i.e. possessing greater importance), he ever enjoys the food, at (his) will. [93]

In this verse, the statement of the preceding verse is presented in the *vyatireka* form.

अपि देवान्स संयाति तथोर्जं चोपजीवति ।
प्रशंसैषा यथोक्तस्य विज्ञानस्येति निश्चितिः ॥९४॥

He unites with the gods and also lives on vital food (or on energy) (*ūrjam upajīva-*). This is the praise of the specific knowledge[1] which is stated (before)— this is the decision. [94]

The first line is the paraphrase of a *praśaṃsāpara arthavāda.*
[1]The word *vijñāna* is explained as *saviśeṣajñāna.* Cf. our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction.

अन्नत्रयं यदुत्कृष्टं तस्यायं निर्णयोऽधुना ।
शरीरकार्यसंस्थस्य वर्ण्यतेऽध्यात्मरूपकम् ॥९५॥

There is now the decision regarding that which is the excellent, viz. the triad of food, which abides in the subtle body and the gross one[1]— this is of the nature of the body.[2] [95]

This is to introduce, now after the discussion of four foods, the exposition of the ideas about the three foods *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa which remain in connection with gross and subtle bodies and the Ātman (as the principal or vital wind in the body).
[1]SP translates *śarīra* as *sūkṣma* and *kārya* as *sthūla.*
[2]The word *ātman*, meaning the principal wind in the body, refers to the body.

प्रयोगसमवायित्वं पूर्वेष्वन्नेषु वर्णितम् ।
भोक्तारश्चापि ये तेषां तेऽपि श्रुत्योपवर्णिताः ॥९६॥
प्रयोगसमवायित्वात्पूर्वेषां कर्मणां सताम् ।
मनआदित्रयं कार्यं तादर्थ्येनोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥९७॥

In respect of the earlier (stated) foods, there is described their character of being intimately connected with the performance (of ritual) and those also are described who are the enjoyers[1] of them (viz. the foods) in the Śruti. [96]
The earlier (stated foods) being the causes[2] (lit. actions), inasmuch as they are intimately connected with the performance (of ritual) and the triad beginning with *manas*[3] being the effect, (now proceeds) the subsequent (portion of the) Śruti to convey that meaning. [97]

[1]SP points out that these include *caṇḍāla* etc., Indra and other gods, and the animals.
[2]Sureśvara uses the word *karman* in the sense of *kāraṇa*.
[3]Namely, *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa.

Verses 98-154 are the discussion of BU 1.5.3.

उत्पाद्य त्रीण्यथान्नानि मेधया तपसा पिता ।
मनो वाचं तथा प्राणमात्मार्थे तानि चाकरोत् ॥९८॥

The father (i.e. the sacrificer), having first created by his thought and activity[1] the three foods, viz. *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa, put them to his own[2] use. [98]

[1]This is equivalent to *buddhikriyā* stated earlier in verse 80 and *dhiyā dhiyā* in verse 85.
[2]We have taken the word *ātmārthe* as equivalent of *svārthe;* that is, the word *ātman* is understood as a reflexive pronoun.

मनसोऽस्तित्वसिद्ध्यर्थं श्रुत्योपन्यस्यतेऽनुमा ।
सतश्च तस्य कामादिरूपाण्यपि च वक्ष्यति ॥९९॥

The Śruti has put forth an argument (lit. inferential statement) in order to establish the existence of *manas*; and now[1] it will state the properties[2] of even (*ca*)[3] that existing (*manas*),[4] viz. desire etc. [99]

This is the exposition of *anyatramanāḥ* ....

[1]This is the force of (*sataś*) *ca*.

[2]The word *rūpāṇi* refers to various *dharmas*; cf. reference to *dharma* in the immediately following verses.

[3]Cf. SP: *dharmiṇā dharmasamuccayārtham api cety uktam.*

[4]Existing means 'what is inferred' (as the word *anumā* signifies); cf. SP on *sataś ca = mitasya ca.*

अविद्याधिकृतावस्थां धर्मधर्म्यादिसंगतिः ।
अविद्याकार्यसंस्थैव न त्वसौ प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१००॥

(The Śruti means to convey that) the connection of properties and what has properties is (possible only) in the state which is governed by Avidyā, viz. it belongs to the effect of Avidyā and[1] it does not belong to the individual self (in its unaffected form). [100]

[1]*tu* is here almost for *ca*, yet alternatively 'however'. Then translate '... of Avidyā. However, it does not ...'

इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ।
मा भूत्कामादिधर्मित्वमात्मनीति प्रयत्यते ॥१०१॥

In order to convey (or explain) this,[1] the subsequent[2] portion (of the Śruti) is introduced. (Also) there is an effort made to the effect that the character of possessing properties such as desire etc. does not cling to (i.e. belong to) the Ātman. [101]

[1]That is, the meaning of *anyatramanāḥ* ....

[2]This refers to the arguments adduced for proving the existence of *manas*. Cf. NKL with note: *kim atra mānam*— note on this: *pratyagātmani dharmadharmisaṃgatyabhāve mānaṃ kim.*

पृष्टो जरद्गवं यान्तमद्राक्षीस्त्वमितीतरः ।
ततोऽन्यत्रमना आसं नातोऽद्राक्षं त्वदीरितम् ॥१०२॥

[Verses 102-107 are the exposition of the Śruti *anyatramanāḥ* ....]

Asked (by someone): 'Did you see an old bull going by?', the person says, 'My mind (*manas*) was elsewhere, therefore I did not see what you asked about.' [102]

The known worldly example in relation to the absence of *manas* is adduced as an evidence for proving the existence of *manas*! For explanation, read SP: *jaradgavadhīhetau viṣayādau saty api kadācid eva taddhīr jāyamānā hetvantaram ākṣipaty arthādi-sāṃnidhye kadācid eva jñānotpattir ity arthāpattir manaḥsādhikety arthaḥ.* Also NKL (with note): *jaradgavadhīhetu-* (note: *atra dhīpadena antaḥkaraṇavṛttir ucyate*) *-sākalye sati kadācid eva jāyamānajñānam, viṣayād vyatiriktahetusāpekṣaṃ, tasmin* (note: *-dhīviṣaye*) *sati kadācit jāyamānatvāt, yad evaṃ tad evam, yathā chedyādisamavadhāne kadācid eva jāyamānachidikriyā tadatiriktakuṭhārasāpekṣā ity anumānam ity arthaḥ.*

विषयान्तरसंबद्धं मनो दृष्टं घटादिवत् ।
आत्मैकसाक्षिकं तच्च ह्युक्तार्थापत्तिसंश्रयात् ॥१०३॥

manas is understood (lit. seen) like a pitcher etc., as connected with another object and it has only the individual self as its seer— this, by resorting to the contingency implied (lit. stated) before.[1] [103]

This refers to the worldly situation stated in the preceding verse.

[1]Cf. verse 102cd above.

अस्त्यात्मा चित्स्वभावोऽत्र चक्षुश्चाविकलं तथा ।
सप्रकाशं गवाश्वं च न च पश्यति चेतनः ॥१०४॥
अतोऽनुमीयतेऽस्त्यन्यद्यस्मिन्नसति नेक्षते ।
द्रष्ट्रादि संहतं सर्वं यस्मिंश्च सति वीक्षते ॥१०५॥

(Here[1]) there is the Ātman having the nature of sentience and also an eye which is not defective and, further, the bull and the horse have also light on them and yet the sentient (person) does not see it. [104]
Therefore it is concluded that there is something else,[2] which, not being there,[3] a person does not see and only while that exists there (in the ensemble), one can see all the things collected,[4] viz. the seer etc. [105]

In verse 102, there is no mention of a horse, but this is immaterial.

[1]In the case mentioned in verse 102 above.

[2]That refers to the Ātman, the seer as in verse 103 above.

[3]That is, not associated with a body.

[4]The word *saṃhata* stands for a collection of a seeing person, his eyes etc., the object and the light.

यत्तदस्ति मनस्तत्स्यात्प्रसिद्ध्या चास्ति तन्मनः ।
अभून्मम मनोऽन्यत्र यतो नाद्राक्षमित्यतः ॥१०६॥

Whatever it is is *manas* and that *manas* does exist (is understood) by the commonly known (incident, when it was said):[1] 'Since my mind was elsewhere, therefore I did not see (what you asked).' [106]

See verse 102 above.

SP refers *prasiddhi* to the well-known episode of the maker of arrows. The episode refers to a maker of arrows who did not notice the king who had passed by him. Consequently, when

he was asked if he had seen the king, he answered, 'Since my mind ... asked).' Obviously, his mind was completely engrossed in arrow-making and, therefore, did not have any connection whatsoever with other things or his surrounding. The stress here is on the engrossment of one's mind in one's doing. But Sureśvara uses this incident to emphasise that everything exists because *manas* exists there, as connected with it.

सदप्यात्मादिकं सर्वं दर्शनादावकारणम् ।
मनसैव यतो द्रष्टा गवादीह प्रपश्यति ॥१०७॥

All, viz. the self and others[1] being there (in the situation of seeing) though, they are not the cause of the perception (lit. seeing) (of an object), since the seer sees a bull etc.[2] only through *manas*. [107]

[1]Cf. note 4 on verses 104-105 above.
[2]The word etc. refers to a horse; cf. verse 104 above.

निःशेषप्रत्ययाधारधर्म्यस्तित्वं प्रसाध्य हि ।
कामादिधर्मसिद्ध्यर्थं काम इत्याद्यथोच्यते ॥१०८॥

[Now follows the exposition of *kāmaḥ saṃkalpaḥ....*]

Having (thus) established the existence of what possesses the properties (of seeing etc.) and is the support of entire perception, there is now stated (in the Śruti) *kāmaḥ* ... with a view to establishing the properties, desire and others. [108]

साधनान्येव मनसो बुद्धिकर्मेन्द्रियाण्यपि ।
सहैवायतनैः सर्वैः प्राधान्यं मनसस्ततः ॥१०९॥

Also, Buddhi 'intellect' and (various) organs of activity, together with their abodes (viz. their bases in the bodies), are only the means; therefore *manas* has the principal status among them. [109]

Buddhi and organs of activity can be the means for an individual only if they abide in a body; cf *cakṣuḥ* (*indriya*) is *kṛṣṇatārāgravartin.*

विषयाभिलाषः कामः स्यान्न विशेषेऽस्ति कारणम् ।
इन्द्रियालोचितार्थस्य स्यात्संकल्पोऽवधारणम् ॥११०॥

kama 'longing for objects' is desire— there is no reason for stating any specific example.[1] *saṃkalpa* is decision (about) the specific nature) of an object perceived by a sense-organ. [110]

[1]This is an instance where Sureśvara comments on what he thinks is an unnecessary or irrelevant explanation in the BU, viz. *kāma* as *strīvyatikarābhilāṣa.* Thus, this is an example of a Vārtika referring to *durukta* in the Bhāṣya. Read SP: *strīvyatikarābhilāṣa iti bhāṣye viśeṣoktir ayuktety āha.*

अनिश्चयात्मिका वृत्तिर्विचिकित्सेत्युदाहृता ।
आस्तिक्यबुद्धिः श्रद्धा स्यादश्रद्धा तद्विरोधिनी ॥१११॥

vicikitsā 'doubt' is explained as modification (of Buddhi 'intellect') which is of the nature of indecision (about the nature of the object perceived). *śraddhā* 'faith' is belief in (the existence of) the object perceived and *aśraddhā* 'want of faith' is what is opposed to it. [111]

धृतिश्रद्धे विना न स्युः कामाद्याः कारणादृते ।
यतोऽकामादयोऽप्यत्र ह्युक्ता एवार्थतो मताः ॥११२॥

There would not be *kāma* etc. without their cause, i.e. without *dhṛti* 'retention' and *śraddhā*, since, here (i.e. in this sentence of the Śruti), absence of *kāma* etc. are also accepted (as resulting) from (some) object.[1] [112]

[1]This is a very cryptic statement. The 'object' here stands for that about the existence of which an individual has some notion (lit. faith) or that from which he has to withhold himself (cf. the next verse). NKL states this in brief thus: *śraddhādhṛtyoḥ kāmādihetutvāt tayor abhāvoktyā tatkāryakāmādyabhāvo 'py arthād ukta evety arthaḥ.* The explanation in SP is however clearer, more lengthy though it is.

धारणं च धृतिर्ज्ञेया बुद्ध्योपात्तस्य वस्तुनः ।
विपर्ययोऽधृतिस्तस्या ह्रीर्लज्जेत्यभिधीयते ॥११३॥

And *dhṛti* is to be understood as retention (lit. holding) of an object grasped (or decided) by Buddhi; its opposite is *adhṛti.* (And) *hrī* is what is called (or known as) shame. [113]

विज्ञानं निश्चितं धीः स्याद्भयं भीरभिधीयते ।
एतत्सर्वं मनो ज्ञेयमिति तादात्म्यमुच्यते ॥११४॥

vijñāna is understanding that is decided (a definite notion about the nature of an object); *bhī* is called that what is fear—all this should be understood as (various forms of) *manas,* (since) here is stated the oneness (of cause and effect[1]). [114]

[1]The word 'effect' refers to *vṛttyantara* 'a modification' (in form) of *manas.*

बुद्धेश्च मनसश्चैक्यं विवक्षित्वोपसंहृतिः ।
इन्द्रियाण्यपि सर्वाणि स्वान्तस्यैव तु वृत्तयः ॥११५॥
यतः स्वकार्यनिर्देशः स्वान्तस्य स्पर्शनेन्द्रिये ।
मन एव ततो ज्ञेयं शरीरेन्द्रियसंहृतिः ॥११६॥

[Now follows the explanation of *tasmād api* ....]

There is then made, after the Śruti's having intended to convey the oneness of Buddhi and *manas,* the concluding statement: All the organs are but modifications of one's internal organ

(viz. *manas*), [115]
since, in respect of the sense of touch, there is the mention of the effect of one's internal organ. Therefore the ensemble of a body and the organs is to be understood as only *manas*. [116]

In these two verses, Sureśvara follows the Sāṁkhya use of the word *vṛtti* in the sense of modification of *manas*, viz. the effects and the causes.

In the first line of verse 116, Sureśvara has intended the Upaniṣadic illustration of a man touched by somebody from behind and his knowing about the same. Thus, actually an organ comes into contact with an object and it is *manas* that grasps it.

पुंसो भोगप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं वैचित्र्यं धीर्निगच्छति ।
देहेन्द्रियाद्यवस्थाभिरतो धीः सर्वमेव तु ॥११७॥

(Thus) *manas*[1] attains variety (of forms) in order that one (viz. the sacrificer or individual) secures enjoyment; therefore all is but *manas* appearing in various states of the body and organs. [117]

[1]In this verse, Sureśvara uses the word *dhī* in the sense of *manas*.

जिघ्रन्ती भवति घ्राणं पश्यन्ती चक्षुरुच्यते ।
शृण्वती भवति श्रोत्रमिति व्यासोऽप्यभाषत ॥११८॥
शुक्लं कृष्णमणु स्थूलमिति धीः कर्मणो वशात् ।
द्वैताधिकारमापन्ना वैश्वरूप्यं निगच्छति ॥११९॥

While smelling, (the same *manas*[1]) becomes (the organ called) *ghrāṇa*; while seeing, it is called *cakṣuḥ*; (and further) while hearing, it becomes *śrotra*— thus has Vyāsa also declared (i.e. explained).[2] [118]
manas, falling within the compass (i.e. province) of duality,

becomes white, black, subtle and gross thanks to (the variety of) *karman* 'object',— (and thus) it attains variety (of forms). [119]

Vyāsa is the author of the *Mahābhārata*. Sureśvara cites earlier authors for showing how his explanation is correct.

[1]Here also, *dhīḥ*=*manas*. See note under verse 117 above.

[2]Cp. the first quarter with *Mahābhārata* 12.240.5c (*jighratī* for *jighrantī*), the second quarter with 12.240.5b (with a little difference) and the third quarter with 12.240.4c.

प्रत्यक्चिद्देशभेदेन न हि शुक्लादिवस्तुनः ।
सत्ता संभाव्यतेऽन्यत्र प्रत्यग्वद्ग्राह्यवस्तुनः ॥१२०॥

Certainly it is impossible that there is existence of any object white etc. as apart from sentience in an individual in the same way as the inner self (that can obtain) elsewhere than in an object of our perception. [120]

Sureśvara affirms here that, really speaking, grasping various objects is owing to the appearance (*vivarta*) of the inner sentience. In other words, worldly knowledge is but Avidyā.

नातः शुक्लादिवस्त्वस्ति बुद्धिरेव क्रियावशात् ।
शुक्लादिरूपतामेति पुरुषार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥१२१॥

Therefore there does not exist (any) object white etc.; it is just *manas* which, owing to (various) activities (of the organs of activity), attains the character of white etc. for securing the end of an individual. [121]

Here Buddhi stands for *manas*; cf. *dhī* above.

धीर्विपर्ययरूपेयं यतः शुक्लादिरूपिणी ।
मन एवेत्यतः प्राज्ञाः सर्वरूपं प्रचक्षते ॥१२२॥

Since this *dhī*,[1] having the (various) forms white etc., is but *manas*, therefore the wise ones declare it as possessed of all forms. [122]

[1]*dhī* here appears to be *vṛttyantara* 'some modification' of *manas*. Cf. SP: *rūpadheyaṃ sarvaṃ dhīmātram ... dhīr eva sarvaṃ rūpam iti viduṣām paribhāṣā.*

आत्मार्थेनैव सत्यत्वं कृत्स्नात्मीयस्य वस्तुनः ।
तस्य तन्मात्रयाथात्म्यादिति पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥१२३॥

I have already stated[1] that the reality of all the belongings (lit. things) of one[2] is only by their being useful to[3] the individual self, since they have oneness with only that. [123]

This is to affirm again that *manas* is in reality the Ātman.
[1]In verse 120 above.
[2]That is, one's own, *ātmīya* < *ātman*, reflexive pronoun.
[3]Or, serving the purpose of.

अपि सर्वाणीन्द्रियाणि मन एव यतस्ततः ।
पृष्ठतोऽपि नरः स्पृष्टो मनसैव प्रपद्यते ॥१२४॥

Also, since all organs are only *manas*; therefore a man, when touched even from behind, understands (about it) by *manas* itself. [124]

This is the meaning of the Upaniṣadic statement *tasmād api*, though its purport was explained in earlier verses, cf. verses 117-119. This is clarified further in the following verses.

पराङ्मुख उपस्पृष्टः पाणेः स्पर्शोऽयमीदृशः ।
इति स्पर्शविशेषं ना मनसैव प्रपद्यते ॥१२५॥

A man, who is touched (by someone) from behind,[1] understands, the specific touch only with *manas* thus: 'This

kind of touch is that of a hand.' [125]

[1]It literally means: while he is facing away (from one who touches him).

त्वचोपस्पृष्टिमात्रेण स्पर्शमात्रं प्रपद्यते ।
स्पर्शनादिविशेषं तु मनसैव प्रपद्यते ॥१२६॥

He grasps by the sense of touch merely by the touch (lit. touching); but it is only by *manas* that he understands the specific character of touch etc.[1] [126]

[1]The word etc. indicates the functions of other organs similar to the sense of touch. *sparśana = upasprṣṭi* (*upa* does not modify the sense of the verb root *spṛś*).

मनसैव यतोऽशेषकरणस्वार्थधीभवः ।
सर्वं हि मन एवेति श्रुतिराह वचस्ततः ॥१२७॥

Since there is the rise of understanding of their own objects by all the organs, thanks only to *manas*, therefore the Śruti has declared 'All is indeed *manas*.' [127]

मनस्तावत्सुनिर्णीतं शरीरं चेन्द्रियाणि च ।
तदनन्तरतो वाचो व्याख्या प्रस्तूयतेऽधुना ॥१२८॥

[Now is introduced the discussion on Vāk (among the three foods).]

In the beginning (*tāvat*) is explained *manas*, so also the body and organs;[1] thereafter is now introduced the explanation of Vāk. [128]

[1]That is, the ensemble of them.

यः कश्चेत्यविशेषोक्तिर्नादवर्णपदोक्तिभिः ।

संयोगोत्थो वियोगोत्थो यश्चापि प्रत्ययात्मकः ॥१२९॥
वागेव स इति ज्ञेयः कुतो यस्मादियं सदा ।
समानयोने रूपस्य वाक्प्रमाऽतोऽवबोधिका ॥१३०॥

The statement in the Śruti *yaḥ kaś ca* is not a mention of some specific (function). (It means:) Whatever be it, viz. what is of the nature of some experience that has arisen from the combination or from the separation of sounds, syllables and words, it has to be known as Vāk. (One asks:) 'Why (is this so)?' (and the answer is:) 'Since it is ever Vāk that causes the (right) understanding of (any) form which arises from the same source.[1] [129-130]

[1]Cf. verse 119b and verse 122a above.

वागेव प्रत्ययादौ स्यादित्येतद्गम्यते कुतः ।
स्वाभिधेयावबोधस्य ह्या समाप्तेरियं यतः ॥१३१॥
यतोऽत्यर्थं प्रवृत्ता वाग्घटबोधे प्रदीपवत् ।
अर्थावबोधनं कार्यं वाचो नान्यदितोऽपरम् ॥१३२॥

(A question is asked:) Whence is it understood that it is only Vāk that is at the source[1] of perception? (The answer is:) (It is so) since this one (viz. Vāk) continues to be (i.e. to function) till one grasps the meaning[2] of its own expression. [131]

Since Vāk functions beyond (revealing) the object (which is to be known)[3] (*atyartham*), like a lamp in perceiving a pitcher, (therefore) the function of Vāk revealing the (nature of an) object[4] is not anything beyond this.[5] [132]

[1]Namely, the cause.

[2]The word *samāpti* refers to both the completion of the function and one's obtaining or grasping the meaning.

[3]Namely, the meaning of the word(s).

[4]Or alternatively, the meaning of its expression.

[5]Word and experience (caused by it), viz. *śabda* and *pratyaya*

are together the revealer of the meaning— they are not distinguished (or they do not differentiate themselves). Therefore the utterance of a word and one's grasp of its meaning are but one continued function (i.e. there is no relation of the cause and the effect). Cf. SP: *śabdapratyāv arthaprakāśakāv ato na tau vācas tattvato bhidyete.* It is in this sense that the simile of the lamp is to be understood; it is not to be understood in its limited sphere.

शब्दोच्चारणशक्तं हि ननु वागिन्द्रियं मतम् ।
कथं तद्विषयः शब्दो वागित्यत्राभिधीयते ॥१३३॥

Now, (one might ask:) They understand Vāk as the organ of speech which is capable of uttering a word; how is it then said that the word,[1] which is (but) its effect,[2] is Vāk? [133]

[1]Word is equivalent of *nāda* and/or *varṇa* in verse 129 above and is only one aspect of Vāk.

[2]This is for *viṣaya*, lit. an object; *artha* of a *pada*.

सत्यमन्यत्र तद्ग्राह्यं तस्य तत्रैव योग्यतः ।
इह त्वन्नत्रयस्यैव सर्वात्मत्वं विवक्षितम् ॥१३४॥

(The answer is:) True,[1] that is to be so understood elsewhere,[2] for it (viz. the word *vāk*) is used there to convey with propriety[3] only that (organ). Here, however, it is intended to convey that the triad of foods alone has the nature of as all.[4] [134]

[1]That is, the question is rightly asked.

[2]This refers to the organ of speech.

[3]*yogyataḥ = yogyatvataḥ.*

[4]This precludes the other possible meanings of the word *vāk*, in accordance with the maxim *śabdānām anekārthatvāt.* The meaning is thus restricted.

मनोऽन्तःपाति निखिलं रूपं यद्वद्विवक्ष्यते ।
तस्य प्रकाशकस्तद्वत्सर्वः शब्दो विवक्ष्यते ॥१३५॥

As all form, i.e. the entire (world of form), is sought to be expressed as included in (the meaning of) *manas*, so every word is desired (or understood) to be expressive of what illuminates that (viz. Vāk). [135]

प्रकाशस्यैव सर्वस्य शब्दत्वप्रतिपत्तये ।
एषा हि नेत्यतो वक्ति वागिन्द्रियनिवृत्तये ॥१३६॥

Therefore in order that one understands[1] every illuminator of all objects[2] as having the nature of sound and also for setting aside the sense of (mere) organ of speech, the Śruti states *eṣā hi na* .... [136]

[1]Alternatively, ... understands as word all that illuminates the objects, as ....
[2]This refers to 'all words (in the language)'.

रूपात्मकं यथा चक्षू रूपस्यैव प्रकाशकम् ।
वाक्च शब्दात्मिका तद्वच्छब्दस्यैवास्तु दीपिका ॥१३७॥

[Verses 137-142 are a short discussion of the view of Bhartṛprapañca on the meaning of the expression in the Śruti *eṣā hi na* .... This has no basis in the BUB. Therefore this is what one can regard as *anukta* by Śaṅkara.]

(One might hold:) As *cakṣus*, which is of the nature of the form of an object, is the illuminator only of the form,[1] so also should Vāk, which is of the nature of (all spoken) word, be taken as the illuminator of (lit. be a lamp for) the (spoken) word alone.[2] [137]

[1]The word *rūpa* is, in this context, *rūpāṇi* (*jātāv ekavacanam*).
[2]Supply: and not of its sense, or object signified by it.

इति चोद्यं समाशङ्क्य परिहारं प्रचक्षते ।
एषा हि नेति केचित्तु नेयं दीपादिवन्मता ॥१३८॥

Keeping this[1] objection in view, some offer an argument in answer: (The Śruti statement) *eṣā hi na* ... (conveys) that this one (viz. Vāk) is not understood as similar to a lamp etc.[2] [138]

[1]That is, what is stated in verse 137 above.
[2]Cf. note 5 (end of it) on verse 132 above.

श्रोत्रादिकरणग्राह्यं सर्वं तद्रूपमुच्यते ।
तस्य प्रकाशिकैवेयं न प्रकाश्या प्रदीपवत् ॥१३९॥

All, that is (to be) perceived by various organs, viz. ears and others, is called form; but this one (viz. Vāk) is the illuminator of that (viz. forms) and is not itself to be illuminated just like a lamp[1] (by anything else). [139]

[1]Cf. BSB 2.1.4 (p.441): *na hi pradīpau parasparasyopakurutaḥ.*

प्रकाश्यमेव चात्यन्तं मनो रूपं यथा तथा ।
प्रकाशिकैव चात्यन्तं वाग्रूपस्येति निश्चितिः ॥१४०॥

And, as *manas* is totally the forms which are to be illuminated (by it), so also does Vāk totally illuminate all forms— this is the decision. [140]

This is to emphasise that Vāk is 'illuminator'.

प्रकाश्यमेव रूपं स्यात्प्रकाशो वाक्तथैव च ।
विद्यादेतद्समासेन लक्षणं रूपसंज्ञयोः ॥१४१॥

Form is only what is to be illuminated and Vāk is, in the same way, (only) the illuminator (lit. light); this should be

known as the brief explanation of form and name. [141]

This is to distinguish Vāk, i.e. name, from the object, i.e. form, to be illuminated.

नामापि गृह्यमाणं सद्रूपं भवति शौक्ल्यवत् ।
रूपं च बोधयत्तद्वन्नामपक्षेऽवतिष्ठते ॥१४२॥

Further (*api*), name (i.e. Vāk), being grasped (by the individual self), is, like whiteness, a form and also (*tadvat*)[1] remains in the class (called) name.[2] [142]

Once again, it is stressed that Vāk is both '(what is) illuminated' and the illuminator.

[1] *tadvat = tathā ca.*

[2] *saṃjñā* in the verse is for *nāma*, i.e. (in reality) Vāk.

एवं वाङ्मनसे सम्यग्व्याख्याय प्रविभागशः ।
तयोर्विधरणः प्राणस्त्वनिरुक्तोऽथ भण्यते ॥१४३॥

[Now is explained the nature of Prāṇa.]

Having thus clearly explained Vāk and *manas* one by one (*pravibhāgaśaḥ*), the Śruti now explains Prāṇa, their supporter,[1] which is not explained (so far). [143]

[1] Cf. BU 4.4.22.

अन इत्यविशिष्टस्य वायोर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
स एव प्रादिसंबन्धाद्विशेषार्थो भवेदसुः ॥१४४॥

By the word *ana* is understood (lit. desired to be signified) wind which is unspecified; and the same, viz. Asu, has specified meanings owing to its connection with (*upasargas*) beginning with *pra*.[1] [144]

NKL points out that 'wind' in the body is called by names Prāṇa, Apāna etc., but *in reality* there is only one wind. Read: *prāṇādibheda anupādhikaḥ na svābhāvikaḥ.*

[1]The term *prādi* is used by Pāṇini and other grammarians for *upasargas*; here, they are used with *ana* mentioned in verses 145-149 below.

उत्सर्गो मुखनासाभ्यां पिण्डस्य प्रणतिस्तथा ।
प्राणो नाम मरुद्वृत्तिरपानस्त्वधुनोच्यते ॥१४५॥
अवाग्वायोरपश्वासो देहस्यावाग्गतिस्तथा ।
अपान एष कथितो व्यानः सांप्रतमुच्यते ॥१४६॥
वीर्यवत्कर्महेतुत्वं व्याप्य देहे च वर्तनम् ।
व्यानवृत्तिरियं प्रोक्ता ह्युदानाख्यापि कीर्त्यते ॥१४७॥
योद्यमादिक्रियाहेतुस्तथाभ्युदयकर्मकृत् ।
उत्कर्षहेतुर्देहे तु वृत्तिः सोदानसंज्ञिता ॥१४८॥
समाहरति वृत्तीर्यो हृद्देशे कीलवत्स्थितः ।
स समान इति ज्ञेयः सर्वकार्योपसंहृतिः ॥१४९॥

The movement outside by mouth and nostrils and also[1] the advancing of the body is called Prāṇa. It abides[2] in Marut 'the wind'. Now is explained Apāna: [145]
The downward movement of the wind in the body and also the downward movement of the body is called Apāna, Now is explained Vyāna: [146]
Being the cause of action which is full of strength and also the movement in (the whole of) the body is called the function[3] Vyāna. Now is explained (the function) called Udāna. [147]
That function, which is the cause of activities, viz. rising up etc., which brings about worldly prosperity and which is the cause of well-being, is called as the function Udāna. [148]
The one who conducts (the aforesaid) functions,[4] residing in the region of the heart,[5] like a (firmly driven in) nail, is to be known as Samāna, the one who accomplishes (or leads)

all (human) activities. [149]

[1]This is for *tathā*. But SP understands by *tathā* a reference to other places in the body where *prāṇa* functions, viz. *nābhi*, *stana* and *pādāṅguṣṭha*.

[2]*vṛtti* here seems to have derived from verb root *vṛt* 'to be', i.e. 'to abide'.

[3]Sureśvara specifically uses the word *vṛtti* in verses 147, 148 and 149 but not in verses 145 and 146.

[4]There is mention made of *vṛtti*s 'functions' which were understood in verses 145-148; this indicates that the words *prāṇa* etc. are functions as well as those that perform them (*vṛtti-vṛttimadabhedena nirdeśaḥ*).

[5]*hṛd* is indicative of *nābhi* and other regions of the wind.

यस्यैता वृत्तयः प्रोक्ता वृत्तिमान्सोऽन उच्यते ।
संपूर्यावस्थितो देहं शाकल्यप्रश्ननिष्ठितः ॥१५०॥

That is called Ana, the performer of functions, (that is to say) the one whose functions are thus stated; that one, having occupied the body, remains in the body— (the one) stated in conclusion (of the answer to the question) of Śākalya.[1] [150]

[1]This is a reference to BU 4.9.26: *kasminn udānaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ, samāna iti*. The mention of Ana as separate from Prāṇa etc. in the BU is thus explained.

प्राणशब्दः पुरा प्रोक्तो वृत्तिमात्राभिधायकः ।
अन्ते वृत्तिमदर्थः स्यात्सर्वं प्राण इतीरणात् ॥१५१॥

The word *prāṇa* which is used herebefore[1] is expressive of all functions,[2] but that (i.e. the same) occurring in the end refers to the one which performs those functions; (this is so) on the authority of the statement *sarvam prāṇaḥ*.[3] [151]

This verse justifies the note after verse 149 above.
[1]In the relevant portions of the BU and the BUBV.
[2]That is, all *vṛttis*.
[3]Cf. CU 3.15 also.

नाम रूपं तथा कर्म संहतं सत् त्रिदण्डवत् ।
मिथः संकीर्णवृत्तिस्थं देह आत्मेति चोच्यते ॥१५२॥

Name, form and activity— (this triad) holding together like three sticks,[1] (intermixing their) functions, is the body and also the Ātman.[2] [152]

[1]The sticks together are called *kuḍya* etc. 'roof, wall etc. of a thatched hut'. The number three is owing to the force of the triad of foods, though it is merely descriptive and stands for many.
[2]This stands as a synonym of *deha*.

एतावानेव संघातो देहः प्राणादिरूपकः ।
वाङ्मयोऽथ प्राणमयस्तथैव च मनोमयः ॥१५३॥

Only this much ensemble is called the body and has the form of Prāṇa etc.,[1] (and) that is made up of what is of the nature of Vāk, that of Prāṇa and also that of *manas*. [153]

[1]That is, *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa.

नामात्र वाङ्मयं सर्वं रूपं सर्वं मनोमयम् ।
तद्वत्प्राणमयं कर्म देहस्यास्यैष संग्रहः ॥१५४॥

In this (context), name is all that is made up of Vāk, all (that is called) form is what is made up of *manas* and similarly (all) activity is made up of Prāṇa— this is a brief statement[1] (i.e. description of the nature) of this[2] body. [154]

[1]The term *saṃgraha* technically stands for a statement of some

proposition in brief— a sort of summing up of the argument. [2]This is to say: the directly perceptible body.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.4-10. In verses 155-167 there is description of manas, Vāk and Prāṇa with reference to the ādhibhautika world. Sureśvara clarifies the matter of BU under the sphere of manas, Vāk and Prāṇa; it is to be noted that he does not follow the sequence of the readings in the BU.

अन्नत्रयविभागोऽयमध्यात्म उपवर्णितः ।
अथाधिभूतविषये विभागस्तस्य कीर्त्यते ॥१५५॥

(So far) is explained this division of the three foods, which is in relation to the body, and now is being stated (in the following) the division of that in respect of what belongs to matter. [155]

भूर्लोकं जानतग्वेदं देवा माता च वागियम् ।
अधिभूत इह प्रोक्ता विज्ञातं यच्च सा च वाक् ॥१५६॥

[In verses 156-160, Sureśvara explains what is called *paryāya-pañcaka* 'the five forms' for the worship of Vāk, *manas* and Prāṇa each. They are the five triads, viz. (i) *lokatraya*, (ii) *vedatraya*, (iii) *deva-pitṛ-manuṣya*, (iv) *pitṛ-mātṛ-prajā* and (v) *vijñāta-vijijñāsya-avijñāta*. This is based on the Śruti passage: *trayo lokā eta eva ... prāṇa enaṃ tad bhūtvāvati.*]

Know (this Vāk) as this world and the *Ṛgveda*. This Vāk which is described as abiding in the elements is the gods and the mother. And, further, what is objective knowledge (or, the knowledge of objects, viz. *vijñāna*) is also Vāk. [156]

अन्तरिक्षं यजुर्वेदः पितरश्च पिता तथा ।
इह यच्च विजिज्ञास्यं तन्मनोऽत्राधिभौतिकम् ॥१५७॥

The sky (i.e. the middle world), the *Yajurveda*, the manes and the father and whatever here (i.e. in the worldly dealings) is wished to be known,[1] all that is *manas* in respect of the material (or elemental) world. [157]

[1] *vijijñāsya* here is in contrast with *vijñāta* in the preceding verse.

द्युलोकः सामवेदश्च मनुष्याः प्रजया सह ।
यच्च किंचिदविज्ञातं प्राणोऽसावाधिभौतिकः ॥१५८॥

The heaven, the *Sāmaveda*, men together with offspring and whatever has been unknown are all that Prāṇa who is related to the material (or elemental) world. [158]

यत्किंचिदिह विज्ञातं तद्वाग्रूपं प्रचक्षते ।
मनोरूपं विजिज्ञास्यं प्राणस्याज्ञातमेव तु ॥१५९॥

Whatever is here (in the world) known is, they say, the manifestation (lit. form) of Vāk and whatever is wished to be known is the manifestation (lit. form) of *manas*, but (or and) whatever of Prāṇa is unknown. [159]

भूर्लोकादिषु सर्वेषु मनोवाक्प्राणलक्षणम् ।
यथासंभवमायोज्यमेकैकस्मिंस्त्रयं त्रयम् ॥१६०॥

All these three, viz. this triad having the nature of *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa, is to be connected with each one of all these regions beginning with this world,[1] according to suitability. [160]

[1] Referring to *bhuvaḥ-* and *svaḥ-* also.

अधिभूते यतोऽशक्या वक्तुं वागादिविस्तृतिः ।
यत्किंचेत्युपसंहारं लक्षणोक्त्या ततोऽकरोत् ॥१६१॥

As the extent of Vāk etc. in respect of the material (or elemental) world is impossible to state, (the Upaniṣad) stated, by way of conclusion, this general statement[1] *yat kiṃ ca.* [161]

[1]Cf. *lakṣaṇoktiḥ sāmānyavacanam* (SP).

लक्षणेनैव संसिद्ध आधिभौतिकसंग्रहे ।
त्रय इत्यादिकोक्तिस्तु नियमार्थेति निश्चयः ॥१६२॥

(Thus) after the brief statement of the material (or elemental) world is established by (i.e. in the form of) a general statement, the (subsequent) statement beginning with (the word) *trayaḥ* is for restricting[1] (its scope)— this is the decision. [162]

[1]SP explains thus: This refers to the meditation on these three foods as *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa and not to any other foods. Cf. *bhūrādyātmanā vāgādi dhyeyam iti niyantum.*

व्याख्याने प्रस्तुते त्वस्मिन्नविद्यायाः समन्ततः ।
कार्यकारणरूपेण तस्या एषोपसंहृतिः ॥१६३॥

While there was (thus) introduced an exposition on Avidyā all around, there is (here) this concluding remark (or brief statement) about it as one (appearing) in the form of causes and effects. [163]

Earlier there is stated the variety of the forms of Avidyā in their full extent, but now the same is briefly stated as having cause and effect relation among them.

.. प्राणात्मना तदज्ञातं ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ।
नामात्मना तु तन्मानं मनोरूपं च मीयते ॥१६४॥

In the form of Prāṇa is stated that Brahman which has been unknown, as the cause; the knowledge (*māna*) of it[1] however is grasped (*mīyate*)[1] in the form of a name and it is in the

form of *manas.* [164]

[1]*mīyate* means *viśeṣato jñāyate.* As a result, it has not been known as the real cause.

यतोऽविद्यैव सर्वेयं मनोवाक्प्राणलक्षणा ।
अतस्तत्तत्त्वसंबोधात्तां जग्ध्वामृतमश्नुते ॥१६५॥

Since all this, which is in the form of (i.e. is characterized as) *manas*, Vāk, and Prāṇa, is but Avidyā; therefore after having eaten up (i.e. overcome) that and having thus known the true nature of them[2] one attains immortality.[3] [165]

[1]Namely, Avidyā.
[2]Namely, *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa— these as the Brahman.
[3]*amṛta* is for *amṛtatva.*

विज्ञातादन्यदेवैतदविज्ञातात्तथा पृथक् ।
ब्रह्मैतदुभयं जग्ध्वा पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥१६६॥

This Brahman, which is quite distinct from what is known[1] and from what is not known,[2] overcomes both (of them), and (then it) remains only as full.[3] [166]

[1]This is used in the worldly way (*vyavahārabhūmau*).
[2]Cp. *Kenopaniṣad* 1.4ab: *anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhi.*
[3]Cf. *pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam ... pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate* (BU 5.1.1).

विज्ञातादिविदं भोगैर्वागाद्या देवता नरम् ।
विज्ञातादिस्वरूपेण तमवन्ति पृथक्पृथक् ॥१६७॥

The gods Vāk and others, each one of them severally, product (or favour)[1] the individual, the knower of them in their forms, which are known etc.[2] by (yielding to him) enjoyments. [167]

[1]This is vedic use of the verb root *av* in a double sense.
[2]The word etc. stands for *vijijñāsya* and *avijñāta.*

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.11 up to verse 177.

वागादयस्तावदुक्ताः संक्षेपेणाधिभौतिकाः ।
तेषामेवाधिदैवेऽथ व्याख्या प्रस्तूयतेऽधुना ॥१६८॥

So far, Vāk etc. in relation to the material (or elemental) world have been explained in brief and now is introduced an explanation of the same with respect to the sphere of the gods. [168]

This connects what follows, viz. *tasyai vācaḥ* ... with the preceding exposition.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च यस्या रूपं पुरोदितम् ।
अधिदैवविवक्षायां तस्या वाच इदं वपुः ॥१६९॥

That Vāk, whose manifestation (or form) with respect to the body and the material (or elemental) world has been explained earlier, has (now, it will be stated,) this form with respect to the sphere the gods. [169]

This is the meaning of *tasyai vācaḥ* ....

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च व्याख्याता यात्र वाक्पुरा ।
वाचा सर्वाधिदैविक्या संव्याप्ता साविभागतः ॥१७०॥

Among these (viz. Vāk etc.),[1] Vāk, which has been earlier explained with respect to the body and the material (or elemental) world, is wholly[2] covered by Vāk in relation to all their gods. [170]

This explains *tad yāvatī* ....

The twofold nature of Vāk, which is earlier explained, is the effect (*vṛttyantara*) of this Vāk which is to be explained now, i.e. it is really *kāraṇarūpā*.

[1]This is for *atra = madhye vāgādhīnām* (SP).

[2]Cf. *dvididhayā ādhidaivikyā kāraṇabhūtayā vācā tādātmyena vyāptā ity arthaḥ* (SP).

Here, Sureśvara introduces Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of vācaḥ pṛthivī ... which he appears to find acceptable. Bhartṛprapañca's view runs up to verse 177.

तामसं कठिनं चोर्वी शरीरं वाच उच्यते ।
अग्नेः प्रकाशरूपस्य साधारत्वेन संस्थिता ॥१७१॥

This earth is called the body of Vāk; it is full of darkness and is hard and that (earth) has remained as the support of Agni which is in the form of Light. [171]

SP reports Bhartṛprapañca's comment: *vāco 'dhidaivaṃ pṛthivī śarīraṃ kāṭhinyād ghanatvāt tāmasam.*

The second line explains *jyotīrūpam* ....

अग्निस्तु सात्त्विकं रूपमाधेयत्वेन स क्षितौ ।
वर्तते तामसे रूपे दैव्येवं द्विविधा हि वाक् ॥१७२॥

And Agni is that form (of Vāk) which is full of Sattva(guṇa) and it obtains in the earth, and remains in the form of darkness as what is supported. Thus, this divine Vāk (exists in a) twofold (form). [172]

This is the purport of Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya: *saiṣā dvividhena rūpeṇa pārthivena taijasena cāvasthitā* with reference to *ādhārādheyavibhāga.*

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च वागेकैवाधिदैविकी ।
सामान्यव्यक्तिभेदेन ह्येकानेका च सोच्यते ॥१७३॥

इत्येवं केचिदिच्छन्ति तथान्यादृगपीष्यते ।
तत्रैवं सति वाग्रूपे एवंव्याख्यातरूपके ॥१७४॥

In relation to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, there is Vāk, all alone, as related to it, and that[1] is described as one and also as many with respect to the distinction of (its one) common and particular forms.[2] [173] Thus think some[3] and, in this way is (that Vāk) understood to be of a different nature. That being so (understood),[4] these are the two manifestations (or forms) of that Vāk[5] thus explained (above). [174]

[1]The word *sā* refers to Agni (i.e. Vāk in this form)— SP.
[2]This refers to Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya *adhivaivaṃ ca sarvam agnir ekām devatām upādadad ekaikaḥ kṛtsnām devatām upādatte* on *sāmānya....*
[3]This is the conclusion in Bhartṛprapañca's view; cf. SP: *adhyātmādhibhūtādhidaiveṣu sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvavad avasthāvad-* (NKL: *avasthāvasthāvad-*) *-bhāvena aṃśāṃśibhāvena ca tair iṣṭā vāgdevatā.*
[4]What follows explains Bhartṛprapañca's word *tatra.*
[5]That is, in its common and particular nature.

यावत्येषा च वागुक्ता तस्या इत्येवमादिना ।
अध्यात्मादिपरिच्छिन्ना या वाक्सा तावती मता ॥१७५॥

And that Vāk of whatever extent (or measure)[1] that is explained there in the words *tasyai* etc. as (what is) delimited (or marked) by its relation to body etc.[2] is wholly (or, all of it) understood by the word *tāvatī* as related to gods. [175]

This explains Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya: *yāvaty eva vāg adhyātmam adhibhūtaṃ vā tāvatī* (SP).
[1]This has reference to *ekānekatva.*
[2]The word etc. refers to *adhibhūta.*

वागध्यात्मेऽधिभूते च तावत्येषाधिदैविकी ।
तेन तेन विशेषेण देवतैव यतो भवेत् ॥१७६॥

This (Vāk) in relation to the gods is also of as much extent (or measure) as that which is in relation to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, since it becomes that god with that particular characteristic of the same. [176]

In the previous verse was stated the oneness of *ādhidaivika* Vāk with *adhyātmādhibhūta* (viz. twofold) Vāk.

This explains *kiṃ kāraṇam* in Bhartṛprapañca's comment.

एकैकत्राधिकारेऽग्निः स एव व्यवतिष्ठते ।
पृथिव्यग्निस्वरूपेण क्वचिद्वागात्मना भवेत् ॥१७७॥

In respect of each sphere, there remains (i.e. abides) the same Agni, but, at some place,[1] it remains in the form of fire on earth and, at some other, as having the nature of Vāk. [177]

This explains *tāvan ayam agniḥ* in BUB. Bhartṛprapañca is in agreement, as his remark quoted by SP shows. Thus read: *uktaṃ hi— sa evāyam agniḥ pṛthivyātmanā vāgātmanā vaikaikasminn adhikārasthale* (=*-sthāne*) *kārtsnyena draṣṭavyaḥ.*

[1]This refers to the *adhidaivādivibhāga.*

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.12 up to verse 192.

यथोदितमिदं योज्यं मनःप्राणात्मनोरपि ।
दैव्यां वाचि यदुद्दिष्टं तुल्यव्याख्यानहेतुतः ॥१७८॥

This (explanation), which is (earlier) offered, in respect of divine Vāk, is to be held (or accepted) in respect of *manas* and Prāṇa also, on account of the similar explanations.[1] [178]

This refers to the BU passage *athaitasya manaḥ* ... in whose

explanation Sureśvara holds both Śaṅkara and Bhartṛprapañca to have adopted the same method as in that of Vāk, i.e. while explaining the words *tasyai vācaḥ* ... and *tāvatī* ... in verses 168ff.

[1]It refers to the similarity in explaining the earlier and subsequent passages. In other words, Sureśvara sees unity of purport in them. Cf. SP: *pūrvottaravākyānām* to be supplied after *tulyavyākhyānahetutaḥ.*

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च प्रजा गीर्मनसोर्यथा ।
अधिदैवेऽपि तद्वाच्यमित्यर्थः पर आगमः ॥१७९॥

As (there has been described) the offspring (or effect) of speech (Vāk) and *manas* with respect to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, so also has it to be described with respect to the sphere of the gods— with this purpose proceeds the subsequent Śruti. [179]

This refers to *tau mithunam ... 'jāyata.* SP and NKL here clarify thus: *mana evāsyātmā vāg jāyā prāṇaḥ prajety adhyātme mana eva pitā vāṅ mātā prāṇaḥ prajety adhibhūte ca vāṅ-manasayoḥ prāṇasya prajātvam uktaṃ tathādhidaive 'pi tasya prajātvaṃ vācyam ityevamarthā śrutiḥ.*

मनसश्चन्द्रभावो हि सर्वत्र श्रूयते स्फुटः ।
तस्यादित्येन संबन्धः कस्मादत्राभिधीयते ॥१८०॥

(A question arises:) Indeed, everywhere[1] (in Upaniṣadic passages) *manas* is clearly heard to become the moon; therefore how is here stated its relation[2] to Āditya? [180]

In verses 180-182, Sureśvara's wording appears to be somewhat puzzling! The words *sambandha, saṃdhatte* and *abhisambandha* point to connection and not to origination.
The word *prasava* seems to show affinity with the verb *pracodayāt* in the well-known Gāyatrī (i.e. Savitṛ) Mantra. Also, cf. the usual ritual formula: *devasya tvā savituḥ prasave* ... However, *candra-*

bhāvaḥ (*sarvatra śrūyate sphuṭaḥ*)– cf. the citation in SP (quoted above)– possibly acceptable to Bhartṛprapañca would justify the word *anugrahavyapekṣā* in the following verse. The correctness of the translation is therefore doubtful.

[1]This refers to BU 3.1.6: *brahmaṇārtvijā manasā candreṇa* and *Ṛgveda* 10.90.13= *Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā* 31.12: *candramā manaso jātaḥ*. Cf. SP quoting thus: *uktaṃ ca sarvatra hi manaś candro bhavatīti*– possibly Bhartṛprapañca.

[2]This is identity of the two.

विवक्षितत्वादैक्यस्य मनोबुद्ध्योरतः श्रुतिः ।
आदित्येनैव संधत्ते मनश्चन्द्रमसा न तु ॥१८१॥
प्रसवाधिकृतेश्चात्र सावित्रः प्रसवस्ततः ।
सवित्रैवाभिसंबन्धो मनसस्तेन शस्यते ॥१८२॥

(The answer is:) Since there is intended the oneness of *manas* and Buddhi, therefore does the Śruti relate *manas* only to Āditya and not to Candramas. [181]
Also since there is here the topic of origination,[1] therefore the origin (of *manas*) is from Savitṛ; thus there is (here) praised the close connection of *manas* only with Savitṛ (=Āditya).[2] [182]

The question in verse 180 is answered in the light of the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca. Read SP: *manobuddhyor abhedenātmabhūtatvād iti bhartṛprapañcabhāṣyeṇa pariharati*. Read in this context: *manobuddhyor aikyaṃ vivakṣitam, tayoś ca pradhānam buddhir niścayātmatvād ato buddhidevatayaiva manaḥ saṃdhatte śrutir na tu candramasā, tadabhedam abhidatte savitā buddhidevateti hi gāyatrīvidām maryādeti bhāvaḥ*. The reason for so doing by the Śruti is given in verse 181. Verse 182 states another reason for the close connection of *manas* with Āditya.

[1]The basis of this is the Śruti: *tataḥ prāṇo 'jāyata*.

[2]Read SP: (*prāṇasya manaso janmocyate*) *tac ca sarvaṃ savitṛhetukaṃ savitṛpadasya sarvaprāṇiprasavahetau pravṛtter atas tenaiva manasas tādātmyena saṃgatiḥ*.

अनुग्रहव्यपेक्षायां मनसश्चन्द्रमा भवेत् ।
अधिदैवं तथादित्यश्चक्षुषो देवता मता ॥१८३॥

With a help (lit. favour) in view,[1] Candramas is (lit. becomes)[2] (the god) of *manas* and (*tathā*) Āditya is accepted as the god of eye, with respect to the sphere of gods.[3] [183]

This verse answers a query as to the purport of the Śruti passages which speak about the relation between Candramas and *manas* and also that between eye and Āditya.

The verse keeps in view the objector's question which is stated in verse 180 above. It refers to the relation between *manas* and Candramas. Possibly the questioner has in mind the sentence *brahmaṇartvijā manasā candreṇa* (BU 3.1.6)— this is quoted in the note on verse 180. Sureśvara has in mind the relation beteen *manas* and Candramas and also that between *cakṣus* and Āditya in BU and BUB 3.1.6 and 3.1.4 respectively. In BUB 3.1.6 has the following (which explains the first line): *tena candramasā manasāvalambanena karmaphalaṃ svargaṃ lokam prāpnoty atimucyate iti bhāvaḥ* and also *adhyātmaṃ yajñasya yajamānasya yad idam prasiddham manaḥ so 'sau candro 'dhidaivam.*

BU 3.1.4 runs thus (only some part is quoted): *kena yajamāno 'horātrābhyāṃ atimucyata ity adhvaryuṇartvijā cakṣuṣādityena ... tad yad idaṃ cakṣuḥ so 'sāvādityaḥ* .... This implies *cakṣus* as *adhyātma* and Āditya as *adhidaiva.*

Yet see SP: *yathāhuḥ— yatra hi manas ca buddhiś ca bhedena vivakṣyate tatra kāmasaṃkalpādiviṣayasya manasaś candramā devatātha punar yadā kriyāprasavādiṣu vyāpriyate tadā prasava-karma vyāpnuvan manaḥ savitṛdaivatam bhavatīti.* (Possibly from Bhartṛprapañca?) Possibly SP has the following to convey: *anugraha* is *upakāra* which has the nature of *preraṇa.* When Candramas and *manas* are not accepted as identical, such an *anugraha* is expected by *manas* and Candramas is the impelling god for *manas.* So also, Āditya is impelling god for *cakṣus.* But

this is with respect to the sphere of gods as conveyed by *adhidaiva* in the second line. It implies the non-difference between *manas* and Buddhi, though the latter is of principal importance. Then *buddhyadhiṣṭhātṛdevatā* is identified with *manas* and that further implies: the *ādityātmaka manas* is connected with *agnyātmaka vāk*. Possibly SP has the following to convey: *anugraha* is *upakāra* which has the nature of *preraṇa*. When Candramas and *manas* are not accepted as identical, such an *anugraha* is expected by *manas* and Candramas is the impelling god for *manas*. So also, Āditya is impelling god for *cakṣus*. But this is with respect to the sphere of gods as conveyed by *adhidaiva* in the second line. It implies the non-difference between *manas* and Buddhi, though the latter is of principal importance. Then *buddhyadhiṣṭhātṛdevatā* is identified with *manas* and that further implies: the *ādityātmaka manas* is connected with *agnyātmaka vāk*. Our translation and notes thereon show difference from SP.

[1]Refer to BU 3.1.6. The note above has a reference to *vyavahārabhūmi*, i.e. ritual and therefore the sacrificer wins the favour of Candramas.

[2]The word *adhidaiva* in the last part of the quotation above is the basis for this. Also, *bhavet* is for *bhavati*.

[3]This argument is like that in note 1 above and clarifies the relation between *cakṣus* and Āditya.

From verse 184 onwards will be offered another explanation of tau mithunam ... which was explained in verses 179ff. It will be shown that Prāṇa originates from Agni and Āditya which are Vāk and manas in the sphere of gods.

अग्निरेव यतः सर्वप्रकाशो जगतीष्यते ।
रूपाणां प्रविभागश्च त्वष्टृपाकनिबन्धनः ॥१८४॥

Since only Agni is accepted (lit. desired) in this world as the illuminator[1] of all (creation) (and) the distinction of (various) forms (i.e. manifestations) is also dependent (only) on illumination (lit. heating) by Tvaṣṭṛ[2] (i.e. Savitṛ or Āditya),

(therefore all creation originated from Āditya). [184]

[1]Agni, here the terrestrial fire or the Sun, illuminates (i.e. is the light on) the various objects in the world. This means: it is the originator of those objects— this is in relation to the material (or elemental) world. Read *Praśnopaniṣad* 1.5: *athāditya udayan ... yat sarvam prakāśayati*, also *Jaiminīyopaniṣad* 1.34.8: *imām ekām pṛthivīm vasta eka ity agnir ha saḥ.*

[2]God Tvaṣṭṛ called as Savitṛ or Āditya is the illuminator (or originator) of all manifest forms— this is in relation to the world of gods. This is understood from *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 6.15: *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe kālaś cākālaś ca ... atha ya ādityādyaḥ sa kālaḥ sakalaḥ ... kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni.*

तयोर्गीर्मनसोरेवं प्रकाशप्रसवात्मनोः ।
प्राग्यथोक्तात्मनोर्योगात्प्राणोऽभूदन्तरिक्षगः ॥१८५॥

[This is the meaning of *tataḥ prāṇo 'jāyata.*]

Thus it is from those two, viz. Vāk and *manas*, who are of the nature of light and origination (and) whose nature has been described before, that there originated Prāṇa who moves about in the sky.[1] [185]

[1]This refers to god Āditya— thus distinguished from the earthly fire or the Sun.

प्राणोऽभवद्यथाध्यात्मे प्रजा वाक्स्वान्तयोस्तथा ।
प्राणस्यैवाधिदैवेऽपि प्रसवोऽयमिहोच्यते ॥१८६॥

As Prāṇa became the offspring of Vāk and *manas*, in relation to what is abiding in a body; so also, in the sphere of the gods, this[1] is the birth (or origination) of Prāṇa. [186]

[1]That is, owing to the union of Vāk and *manas*. This is the conclusion of the thought which continued from verse 179 above.

नान्नत्रयं व्यपेक्ष्येह जन्म प्राणस्य कथ्यते ।
किंतु पाङ्क्तक्रियापेक्षं प्राणजन्माभिधीयते ॥१८७॥

Here (i.e. in this sentence that is explained), the origin (lit. birth) of Prāṇa is not stated, in view of the three foods; but this origin of Prāṇa is stated in view the performance of Pāṅktakarman (=ritual activity). [187]

This explains how *tataḥ prāṇo 'jāyata* is not a repetition of *mano vācam prāṇam* in BU 1.5.3 earlier.

स यथाध्यात्मिके देहे प्राणस्तद्वत्प्रजापतेः ।
अन्तरिक्षगतः प्राणः स एष परमेश्वरः ॥१८८॥

As, in relation to the body,[1] Prāṇa (was born) from Prajāpati, so also was it born (from the divine Vāk and *manas*, in the sphere of gods).[2] That Prāṇa, which abides in the mid-region is this overlord. [188]

[1]This stands for *adhibhūta* 'elemental world' also.
[2]Translation is based on SP.

यतोऽसपत्नस्तेनायमिन्द्र इत्यभिधीयते ।
ननु वाङ्मनसे स्तोऽस्य तत्कुतोऽस्यासपत्नता ॥१८९॥

As this one is without any opponent,[1] therefore it is called Indra.[2] Here (one might ask:) But there are Vāk and *manas* (beside Prāṇa); how then can it be without any opponent? [189]

[1]This refers to Parameśvara in verse 188 above. The intended meaning is: one without a second.
[2]Vāyu, i.e. Indra, who is thus mentioned, is the overlord of the gods.

नैवं वाङ्मनसे यस्मात्प्राणवृत्त्यैव जीवतः ।
यदनेनान्नमत्तीति तस्मादेत इतीरणात् ॥१९०॥

(The answer is:) This cannot be so, since Vāk and *manas* continue to be (lit. are) alive owing only to the function of Prāṇa— (this is said) on the authority of the statements *yad anenānnam atti* and *tasmād ete.*[1] [190]

[1]Read: *yad annenānnam atti tenaitās tṛpyanti* (BU 1.3.18) and *tasmād ete etenākhyāyante prāṇāḥ* (BU 1.5.21).

प्राणस्यैव यतो वृत्ती उक्ते वाङ्मनसे अपि ।
प्राणस्यातोऽद्वितीयत्वं ततश्चेन्द्रत्वमेव च ॥१९१॥

Since it is said that Vāk and *manas* also are the modifications of Prāṇa itself, therefore Prāṇa has singular nature[1] and has, as a consequence, the nature of the moon. [191]

[1]It is literally, being one without a second.

न सपत्नो भवत्यस्य योऽसपत्नं विवेद हि ।
असपत्नमुपासीनः ससपत्नः कुतो भवेत् ॥१९२॥

He, who knows (this one) as having no opponent, does not have any opponent. How can one have an opponent (for oneself), who (lit. when he) is devoted to that who has no opponent. [192]

This is an Arthavāda *nāsya sapatno bhavati.*

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.13 up to verse 202.

उक्ता पाङ्क्तानुरोधेन वाङ्मनःप्राणसंश्रया ।
अन्नत्रयविभागेन प्रक्रिया त्वधुनोच्यते ॥१९३॥

So far has been explained (the result) related to Vāk, *manas*

and Prāṇa, in accordance with the Pāṅkta(karman). Now is explained the result (of their worship)[1] in accordance with the division of the three foods. [193]

What now follows is for explaining away the apparent contradiction involved in first accepting Vāk and *manas* to have originated from Prāṇa and as its subordinates and later in accepting them as its equal— cf. *te ete sarva eva samāḥ*. The earlier explanation referred to *pāṅkta karman* which implied the *guṇapradhāna* relation of Prāṇa and *vāṅmanase*. Now, the same relation is not accepted. There is equal status of them all, in connection with Upāsanā.

[1]The word *prakriyā* means *phalam* 'result'; cf. SP: *tatphalasya pāṅktatvaṃ vaktum*. NKL agrees. Also, see verse 203 below.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च तथा चैवाधिदैवतम् ।
उक्ता वागादयः सर्वे समा एवेति गृह्यताम् ॥१९४॥

Vāk etc. are explained in relation to the body and the material (or elemental) world and also in relation to the world of the gods (as subordinate to Prāṇa); (but) let it be accepted that all (the three) of them are just equal (in status). [194]

This is the explanation of *ta ete sarva eva samāḥ*.

साम्यं केन प्रकारेणेत्यनन्ता इत्यतोऽवदत् ॥१९५॥

(In answer to the question:) 'In what way is there equality (among them)?', the Śruti has stated *anantāḥ* .... [195]

नन्वध्यात्मेऽधिभूते च परिच्छिन्नाः पुरोदिताः ।
वागादयस्त्विह कथमनन्ता इत्युदीरणम् ॥१९६॥
नैतदेवं यतोऽनन्ताः सर्वे भावा यथोदिताः ।
वाचा सर्वाधिदैविक्या लोकादेरप्यनन्तता ॥१९७॥

(On this, one would ask a question:) But it was (earlier) stated

that, in relation to the body and to the material (or elemental) world, Vāk etc. are delimited; how then is there the statement that they are *ananta* 'endless'? [196]
(The answer is:) This is not so, since all those things (lit. becomings) that were enumerated are endless; the regions etc.[1] also have endlessness thanks to the Vāk[2] being related to the entire world of gods. [197]

This objection is based on the contradiction involved between the earlier and later statements. It is explained away in the following verse. The answer is given: The endlessness of Vāk etc. follows from their being related to gods.

This is one reason for saying Vāk etc. are infinite.

[1]Cf. SP: *bhurādilokānāṃ tadantasthadevādināṃ ca* for the explanation of the word etc.

[2]The word *vācā* implies *manasā prāṇena ca.*

अधिकारपरिच्छेदे सर्वं यस्मात्समाप्यते ।
नासंहतायाः कर्तृत्वं देवतायाः स्वतोऽपरैः ॥१९८॥
स्वाधिकारविनिष्पत्तौ देवता देवतागणम् ।
सर्वमेवात्मसात्कृत्वा तत्तत्कार्यं करोति हि ॥१९९॥

Since all[1] is put together[2] (by one) in the accomplishing of some function (or activity);[3] (and) there is no agency on the part of the divinity which is not contained (or delimited) by itself or by others;[4] [198]
for,[5] in accomplishing its own function (or activity),[6] (every) god gets united with[7] the entire group of gods and (only) then it can produce every effect.[8] [199]

[1]This stands for *vāgādi.*

[2]That is, put within limits.

[3]*adhikāraparicchedа = vyāpāranirvṛttiḥ* (SP), (*-niṣpattiḥ* NKL); cf. *svādhikāraviniṣpatti* in the next verse.

[4]The divinity is all, viz. Vāk, *manas* and Prāṇa, together; this togetherness is not effected by anyone else. As a result, it is

capable of producing effects which are infinite in number. The next verse clarifies this thought.

[5]This is because of *hi*. This is according to SP which cites a line (possibly from the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca, cf. the note by the editor of NKL). It appears that Bhartṛprapañca has based his explanation of the relevant Upaniṣadic passage on Madhu Brāhmaṇa (NKL). Read: *yathāhuḥ– yat pṛthivyā ānantyam devatāyās tad ekaikasminn ādhyātimika ādhibhautike cādhikāra-paricchede parisamāpyata iti.*

[6]Alternatively, while producing its own effects.

[7]It literally means: containing the entire group of gods within itself.

[8]Or, each of the various effects.

आभूतसंप्लवस्थानमानन्त्यं चेह गृह्यते ।
कर्मकार्यस्य हि सतो मुख्यानन्त्यं न युक्तिमत् ॥२००॥

And, in this (sentence), endlessness[1] is understood as the existence of the entire ensemble (of these gods) up to the (absolute) merger of (all) beings.[2] But (one might observe:) Indeed, endlessness in its principal sense cannot stand to reason,[3] when it is an effect of (some) function. [200]

[1]Cf. note in the NKL edition: *deśataḥ kālataḥ vastutaś ca paricchedaśūnyatvam* (unlimitedness).

[2]Cf. *ā saṃsārāt sthitaḥ* in BUBV 1.6.40.

[3]That is to say: it is not reasonable since it involves opposition to Śruti statements regarding the perishable nature of whatever is born (or produced).

एवं सतीह योऽनन्तानुपास्ते सततोद्यतः ।
सोऽनन्तमेव वागादिलोकमाप्नोति मानवः ॥२०१॥

This being so, (a person) who, ever agile, worships the endless (Vāk etc.) obtains in this (worship)[1] the region of Vāk etc. which is only endless. [201]

This explains *sa yo haitān* ....
Here is understood the endlessness of the region of Vāk etc. [1] *vāgādyupāsanā* which is *adhikṛtā*. The words 'ever agile ... (worship)' refer to *aparicchinnatva* of *deśa-kāla-vastu*.

उपास्तेऽन्तवतो यस्तु सोऽन्तवन्तमवाप्नुते ।
लोकं यतस्ततोऽनन्तमेत्यनन्तात्मभावनात् ॥२०२॥

But he, who worships (Vāk etc.) which have an end (or a limit), obtains only that region which has an end (or limit). (Therefore the Śruti means:) A man will attain to the infinite world, by being devoted to (or meditating on) (Vāk etc.) as endless. [202]

SP clarifies this thus: *aparicchinne 'nnatraye sūtrātmany ātmatādhyānād iti yāvat.*

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.14 up to verse 216.

अधिकारो द्वयोरत्र प्रकृतः पाङ्क्तकर्मणः ।
प्रक्रियान्नत्रयस्यापि विभागः प्रकृतस्तथा ॥२०३॥

So far (*atra*) is discussed the sphere of the two.[1] (Now), there is introduced (in this section) the division of the results and of the three foods in relation to the Pāṅktakarman. [203]

[1]Namely, Upāsanā and its result.

तत्राधिदैवमुक्तानि त्रीण्यन्नानि विभागशः ।
सोपासनानि पाङ्क्तस्य वक्तव्यमवशिष्यते ॥२०४॥

In that context have been stated the three foods, in relation to the sphere of the gods as in distinct divisions,[1] together with the worship of the same. There now remains to be stated (the result of those three) in relation to Pāṅkta(karman). [204]

[1]It means: as *dhyāna* (or Upāsanā) and its result (in the case of each).

अधिदैवे त्रयं तूक्तं मनोवाक्प्राणलक्षणम् ।
पाङ्क्तस्य कर्मणः कार्यं नोक्तं वित्तं च कर्म च ॥२०५॥

In relation to the sphere of the god has been already stated the triad (of foods), characterized as *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa; but the result of the Pāṅktakarman, viz. wealth (*vittta*) and performance (*karman*), has not been stated. [205]

manas, Vāk and Prāṇa have been stated as *mātā*, *pitā* and *prajā*. But *vitta* and *karman* were not stated, i.e. the character of the Pāṅktakarman had not been stated in its fullness.

पाङ्क्तस्य कर्मणः कार्यं न तावदवगम्यते ।
पाङ्क्तत्वसिद्धये यावन्नोच्येते वित्तकर्मणी ॥२०६॥

Indeed, the result of the Pāṅktakarman cannot be understood so long as the *vitta* and *karman* of it are not stated for establishing its character as Pāṅkta. [206]

The subsequent section describes the Pāṅkta character of the result by describing *vitta* etc.

लोककालात्मको देवो विराट्संज्ञः प्रजापतिः ।
तस्याधिलोकमात्मोक्तो योऽयमन्नत्रयात्मकः ॥२०७॥

Prajāpati, (otherwise) called as Virāj, is the god having the nature of the region(s) (*loka*) and time (*kāla*). His nature in relation to the regions has been (already) described, i.e. as of the nature of the three foods. [207]

अधिकालं तु योऽस्यात्मा सोऽयं चन्द्रमसोच्यते ।
पक्षमासर्तुवर्षादेः स कर्ता कर्मणोऽनिशम् ॥२०८॥

But (or, And) that which is his nature as related to time is here conveyed by (the word) *candramas*; he is incessantly (lit. day and night) the agent of the *karman* (result), viz. of a fortnight, a month, a season, a year etc. [208]

This explains why Prajāpati is called Kāla. The second line expresses the *karman*, i.e. the result of its activity.

हानिवृद्धिस्वभावेन वित्तं चाप्यत्र लक्ष्यते ।
कलाकाष्ठालवाद्यात्मा विश्वं विपरिणामयन् ।
प्राणपिण्डात्मकः काल आ महाप्रलयात्स्थितः ॥२०९॥

Also, in this context,[1] *vitta* 'wealth' is understood (lit. characterized) by its nature of gradual waning and waxing. This Kāla, having the nature of Prāṇa and body[2] and having the nature of *kalā*, *kāṣṭhā*, *lava* etc.,[3] has remained up to the absolute merger, modifying[4] all (the world). [209]

[1]That is, in relation to Candramas.

[2]That is, being Sūtrātman and Virāj.

[3]This means division of time. In this respect, NKL states the following: *lavādilakṣaṇam anyatroktam*; *nalinīdalasaṃhatyāṃ sūkṣmasūchyabhivedhane*, *dale dale tu yaḥ kālaḥ sa kālo lavavācakaḥ* (1) *lavaiḥ truṭiḥ syāt triṃśadbhiḥ kalāṃ tāvattruṭiṃ viduḥ*, *kāṣṭhā tāvatkalā jañeyā tāvatkāṣṭhā nimeṣakaḥ* (2).

[4]In other words, effecting changes. In BUB it was stated: *jagadviparināmayitṛtvam karma*— this needed to be explained. Therefore this is stated, i.e. continued existence and modifying the world.

यैकावशिष्यते तस्य कला पक्षक्षये तथा ।
प्रविश्य प्राणभृत्सर्वं पक्षतो जायते पुनः ॥ २१०॥

That small part (or digit) of it (viz. *kalā*), which remains even when a full fortnight[1] has passed— this one, bearing *prāṇa*

'life', enters into all and (gradually) waxes (lit. becomes born again and again) in the second fortnight.[2] [210]

[1]This stands for the dark fortnight of a month.

[2]This refers to the bright half of the month. The variant reading given in AnSS edition and mentioned by SP is *pakṣatau*; it sounds better as it is in apposition to *pakṣakṣaye* in the first line. Both are terms of Locative. For this, SP's explanation is useful. Read: *strī pakṣatiḥ pakṣamūlam iti hi paṭhanti, jāyate dvitīyakalāyukto bhavatīti yāvat.*

रात्रौ यस्मात्स एतस्यां प्रविश्यास्ते प्रजापतिः ।
प्राणभृन्निखिलं तस्माद्धिंसां तस्यां परित्यजेत् ॥२११॥

Since Prajāpati, bearing all life within,[1] (first) enters into this night[2] and remains (i.e. continues to be there); therefore one (i.e. the sacrificer) should abandon (all) killing in that (night).[3] [211]

This explains *tasmād enam* ....

[1]This, under the lead of the preceding verse. Yet, in accordance with SP on verse 213 below, it may be possible to take this phrase as a qualifier of 'one' (i.e. the sacrificer). However, this explanation by SP does not appear to be right.

[2]Namely, *amāvasyā*.

[3]The word 'night' stands for both day and night. There is here reference to the ritual performance on the new moon day.

कलाभिरस्तः कृत्ताभिः कृकलास इति स्मृतः ।
हिंसां न कुर्यात्तस्यापि किंन्वनारब्धहिंसनम् ॥२१२॥

(Prajāpati) who is given up (lit. discarded) by the digits which are cut off, (one by one) is known as *kṛkalāsa*[1] 'a chameleon'. One should not (therefore) kill (or, cause injury to) even that. What then to say about such killing as has not been undertaken (lit. is not begun)? [212]

This is the meaning of *api kṛkalāsasya*; *yaugikārtha* as NKL puts it.

[1]This stands for 'a chameleon' which is supposed to be an evil animal. Cf. NKL: *kṛkalāsaśabdasya prāṇiviśeṣe rūḍhim āśrityāha*. Read BUB: *kṛkalāso hi pāpatmā svabhāvenaiva hiṃsyate prāṇibhir dṛṣṭo 'py amaṅgalaḥ* (on BU 1.5.14, at the end).

सामिप्रमापितस्यापि रात्रौ तस्यां विवर्जयेत् ।
प्राणभृद्धिंसनं यत्नात्किन्वनारब्धपीडनम् ॥२१३॥

On that night,[1] one should give up with care even what is half killed.[2] What to say then about causing harm to any live animal which has yet to be undertaken? [213]

[1]It stands for the new moon day.

[2]Namely, the killing of what still bears life. This in view of *sāmipramāpitasya = ardhahiṃsitasya* (NKL) which justifies the word *yatnāt*; *yatna* is correctly explained by SP as *hiṃsānimitte saty api tannivṛttiḥ*. We have taken *prāṇabhṛddhiṃsanam* as one word and as the object of the verb. However, SP connects *prāṇabhṛt* with the agent of *vivarjayet*. Note by the editor of NKL also points out: *prāṇabhṛd iti bhinnam padaṃ kartṛvācakam*.

कृकलासे प्रसिद्धा या हिंसा प्राणभृतां स्वतः ।
तामप्यत्र न कुर्वीत किमु वक्तव्यमन्यतः ॥२१४॥

The killing of a chameleon is only naturally known among those who bear life (i.e. men)[1] — (but) one should not undertake even that at this time (*atra = amāvasyā*). What to say then about some other (killing)? [214]

[1]Here, Sureśvara uses the word *prāṇabhṛt* in a different sense.

एतस्या एव पूजायै देवताया निषेधनम् ।
प्राणभृद्धिंसनस्येह नान्यदस्य प्रयोजनम् ॥२१५॥

(This) prohibition points to the worship of this very god (viz. Prajāpati).[1] There is not any other purpose here (in this mention) of the killing of what bears life.[2] [215]

Killing of beings has been prohibited by the well-known dictum *na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni* [... *maitrāyaṇagataścaret* (*Mahābhārata* 3.203.45; 12.269.5; 12.316.18), or ... *nānṛtaṃ vā vadetkavacit* (*Kūrma Purāṇa* 553.7(2.16); *Padma Purāṇa* 1.55.1; *Saura Purāṇa* 18.1)]. Therefore there can be the question as to why there should be this specific prohibition. This question is answered in this verse.

[1]See verse 212 above.

[2]This justifies our acceptance of *prāṇabhṛddhiṃsanam* as one word in verse 213 above.

स्मृतावपि निषिद्धेयं हिंसा पर्वसु कर्मिणाम् ।
विशिष्टफलसंगत्या इहोक्तिः सत्यवद्भवेत् ॥२१६॥

In the Smṛti[1] also, this (or such) killing during the *parvans* has been prohibited for the ritualists. The statement (of it) here would be like truth on account of connection of the ritual(s) with specific result(s).[2] [216]

[1]Read: *vanaspatigate some yas tu hiṃsyād vanaspatīn, ghorāyāṃ bhrūṇahatyāyāṃ yujyate natra saṃśayaḥ* (1) and *vīrudho ghātayed yas tu vīrutsaṃsthe niśākare, patraṃ vā pātayed ekam brahmahatyām sa vindate* (2); quoted by both SP and NKL. Quotations not traced. Yet cp. the first line of the second verse with *chinatti vīrudho yas tu ... niśākare* in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 2.12.10.

[2]SP points out in this context the Mīmāṃsā method: *vidhir vā saṃyogāntarāt* and remarks: *satyavacanaviśeṣeṇa vihitam api kratvartham viśeṣeṇa vidhīyate tathāviśeṣeṇa niṣiddhāpi hiṃsāmāvāsyāyaṃ viśeṣeṇa niṣiddhyate pāpakṣayādiviśiṣṭaphalasiddhyartham iti.*

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.15 up to verse 220.

केवलज्ञानमात्रेण मा भूत् त्र्यन्नात्मकं फलम् ।
परात्मज्ञानवत्तस्मात्तस्योपासनमुच्यते ॥२१७॥

Lest it might mean that the fruit in the form of the triad of foods would result from merely knowing (about the food),[1] even as from the knowledge of the highest (Ātman),[2] therefore the worship[3] of that (viz. the three foods) is now stated here. [217]

This explains the purport of the following Śruti *yo vai saṃvatsaraḥ* ....

[1]The *kevalajñāna* does not refer to *kevalātmajñāna*. *kevala* means 'only' or 'merely' and *jñāna* means *annatrayasvarūpajñāna* and which precludes any ritual performance.

[2]This is *vyatirekadṛṣṭānta* 'contrary example'.

[3]By worship one should not understand meditation on Prajāpati. Here we refer to being 'attached to or in pursuit of' (the three foods). This is by being devoted to the same.

वित्तमेव कला मे स्युः कल्पयित्वा ध्रुवां स्वयम् ।
इत्युपासीत यः सोऽथ कलात्मानं प्रपद्यते ॥२१८॥

He, who, (having the thought)[1] 'May the digits (of Prajāpati) be my wealth',[2] and considering himself[3] to be the (sixteenth) permanent digit, would worship (or be devoted to) Prajāpati, will attain the nature of the (sixteenth) digit. [218]

This explains the purpose of *tasya vittam eva*.

[1]*kalpayitvā* connects itself with *vittam ... syuḥ* and with *dhruvāṃ svayam* in keeping with *dehalīdīpanyāya*.

[2]Cf. SP and NKL: *svavitte pañcadaśakalādṛṣṭiṃ kṛtvā*.

[3]This refers to the individual self of the worshipper.

यथोक्तगुणकं विद्वानुपासीत प्रजापतिम् ।

आरोप्यात्मशरीरेऽस्मिंस्तत्साधर्म्येण संततम् ॥२१९॥

A knower should ever worship Prajāpati, whose qualities have been stated, after superimposing him (=Prajāpati) on this his own[1] body with the notion of similar properties. [219]

The nature of worship in verse 218 is further clarified.
[1] *ātman* in *ātmaśarīra* is a reflexive pronoun, meaning (*sva-*).

वित्तमेव कलास्तस्य तद्धान्युपचयौ क्रिया ।
ध्रुवास्य देह एवायं जीवन्स्यात्षोडशी कला ॥२२०॥

His (i.e. the worshipper's) own wealth itself is the digits of him (viz. Prajāpati), the decrease and increase of the same are (Prajāpati's) activity,[1] and his own living body is this one's (viz. Prajāpati's) sixteenth digit. [220]

The idea of the similarity mentioned in the preceding verse is clarified in this verse.
[1]That is, his modifying the various forms in the world.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.16 up to verse 261.

सोऽकामयत जायेति साधनान्येव नः श्रुतिः ।
अब्रवीन्न तु तत्साध्यं तदुक्त्यर्थं परा श्रुतिः ॥२२१॥

[A view may be held thus: In the earlier part of the Upaniṣad the result has been already declared, viz. a sacrificer's becoming Prajāpati, therefore the Śruti *atha trayo vāva lokāḥ* ... would become meaningless. Therefore in order to refute that view there follow verses 221-224.]

In the words *so 'kāmayata jāyā* ... (BU 1.4.17), the Śruti declared to us only the means, but it did not declare what is to be achieved thereby. (Therefore) the subsequent Śruti (proceeds) to state the same. [221]

This points out the purposefulness of the subsequent Śruti.

साधनोक्त्यैव तत्साध्यं यदि नामावसीयते ।
विशिष्टफलसंबन्धो न तथापि प्रतीयते ॥२२२॥

If (it is held that) indeed what is to be achieved can be understood by a mere statement about the means, even then their connection with any specific result is not understood.[1] [222]

[1]There is a statement of mere *sādharmya*, but the result is not stated in the usual words *idam asya phalam* .... For this reason the subsequent Śruti is to be added.

पुत्रादिसाधनानां स्यादुत्पत्त्यादिसमन्वयात् ।
साध्यं लोकत्रयमतस्त्रयो वावेति च श्रुतिः ॥२२३॥

(One would say:) The three worlds[1] could be (achieved) by the means, viz. a son etc.,[2] on account of their invariable relation to origination etc.[3] Therefore the Śruti proceeds (to state) *trayo vāva* .... [223]

[1]Sureśvara hints at liberation which also could be achieved by these means.
[2]The word etc. refers to *jāyā*, *vitta* and *karman*.
[3]The word etc. refers to *sthiti*, *pralaya*.

त्रय एव यतो लोकाः साध्याः पुत्रादिसाधनैः ।
तन्मुमुक्षुरतो मुक्त्यै त्यजेत्सर्वैषणा यतिः ॥२२४॥

[Here, Sureśvara introduces in the second line the view of an objector to the view of Bhartṛprapañca.]

Only these three worlds would be achieved by the means, namely the son etc.; therefore one who is desirous of liberation,

(i.e. one who is going to be) a mendicant, should give up all hankerings in order to achieve liberation. [224]

अन्यथैवाभिसंबन्धं केचिदत्र प्रचक्षते ।
ज्ञानादेव पुमर्थाप्तेर्निष्फले सुतकर्मणी ॥२२५॥

In this respect,[1] some[2] explain the connection (of *trayo vāva* ... with the preceding portion) in quite a different way.[3] (But the objector's view is:) Since the end of human life[4] can be achieved by mere worship of the three foods (lit. by knowledge of it);[5] therefore (having) a son etc. and doing the performance of rituals are futile. [225]

[1]That is, with reference to the words *trayo vāva* ....

[2]Bhartṛprapañca.

[3]Bhartṛprapañca has first anticipated an objector's view which Sureśvara states in verses 225cd and 226. Then he states Bhartṛprapañca's own view in verse 227ab. After that, he states the objector's view in full from verse 227cd up to verse 232c.

[4]This is becoming Prajāpati that has the nature of the three foods.

[5]*jñāna* is here (*annatraya-*)*upāsanā*.

निःशेषफलसंप्राप्तेर्दर्शनादेव केवलात् ।
सुतादिना न तर्ह्यर्थो नापि स्यात्पाङ्क्तकर्मणा ॥२२६॥

Since by mere understanding (lit. seeing)[1] that there results the acquisition of complete fruit, there would not be any use of (having) a son etc.[2] and so also by (the performance of) any Pāṅktakarman. [226]

The view of the objector is further clarified in this verse.

[1]This is *jñāna* mentioned in verse 225.

[2]The word etc. refers to wife and others mentioned earlier; cf. BU 1.4.1840: *ātmajāyāprajāvittavidyāḥ*.

तयोरिहार्थवत्त्वाय त्रयो वावेति भण्यते ।
परीक्ष्यैतत्परिग्राह्यं न तु निर्युक्तिकं बुधैः ॥२२७॥

(But the view of Bhartṛprapañca is:) The statement *trayo vāva* is made with a view to (justifying) the meaningfulness of the two.[1] the objector's answer to Bhartṛprapañca is:) This (idea of combination) can be accepted by the wise only after (properly) examining (the utility of the same) and (*tu*) not when it is without any reason. [227]

The first line restates (in brief) the view of Bhartṛprapañca and from the second line begins its refutation which continues up to verse 232c.

[1]Namely, having a son and performing the ritual in combination with the knowledge (about rituals) and their results.

स्वफलेऽन्यानपेक्षाणां साधनानां समुच्चयः ।
न युक्तो निरपेक्षत्वाद्गमनेक्षणयोरिव ॥२२८॥

It is not proper to posit a combination of such means as are, in regard to their own results, independent (i.e. not expectant) of any others, in the same way as (the combination of the activities of) going and seeing are independent (of each other). [228]

SP points out that a blind man and a lame man do not combine, if they do not expect help of each other.

अन्यापेक्षाणि चेद्दद्युः कर्मैकत्वं तदा भवेत् ।
समुच्चितिर्न चैकस्य रुद्रेणापि समर्थ्यते ॥२२९॥

If (the means), depending on other(s) would produce unity of action, then there could be combination. No (such combination) would be justified by even Rudra.[1] [229]

The idea of verse 228 above is further clarified here.

[1]The exact significance of the mention of Rudra cannot be guessed. Is it perhaps to signify the most mighty and capable god, the one who can achieve what is impossible.

तन्तुवीरणमृद्दारुसाधनानां पृथक्त्वतः ।
पटादिकार्यनिष्पत्तौ न तेषां स्यात्समुच्चयः ॥२३०॥

Since threads, straws, clay and (pieces of) wood are such means as have a distinction from one another,[1] there could not be a combination of them for producing such an effect as (one) piece of cloth etc.[2] [230]

[1]That is, they are wholly unrelated to one another.
[2]The word etc. stands for a pitcher or a hut and others.

तुरीवेमशलाकादेः स्वकार्येऽन्योन्यसंहतेः ।
समुच्चितिरयुक्तेयं तदाप्येकत्वहेतुतः ॥२३१॥

To posit the combination of wem and woof and a wooden pin of the spindle etc. in producing their effect (or product) by combining together[1] would be unreasonable for the reason that they have oneness as the means. [231]

The last quarter should have been *tadāpyaikatvahetutaḥ*. (?)
[1]A combination does not effect oneness; the things mentioned here together form just one means towards producing a piece of cloth.

लोकत्रयस्य संप्राप्तिर्विद्ययैवेति चेन्मतम् ।
तस्याः सर्वाप्तिहेतुत्वान्नैतदेवं पृथक्त्वतः ॥२३२॥

If it is held that there results the aquisition of the three worlds only through the knowledge,[1] since it is the cause of obtaining all results; (Bhartṛprapañca says:) That is not so. They, viz. the means, are distinct from one another.[2] [232]

[1]The word 'knowledge' refers to *annatrayasvarūpajñāna*. NKL reads: *samuccayāyogāc ca*.

[2]Bhartṛprapañca's refutation of the objector's view begins here. SP adds here: *uktaṃ hi— vidyayaiva sarvabhāvāpattyā lokatrayāptir iti na pṛthakkāraṇatvād iti*; possibly this is from Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya.

प्रत्येकं भिन्नसाध्यं हि पुत्रकर्मादिसाधनम् ।
एकाकिन्या न तत्साध्यं विद्ययैवेति निश्चितिः ॥२३३॥

Since (*hi*) each means, viz. a son, ritual activity etc. has a different purpose, only through knowledge cannot be achieved (all) that[1]— this is the decision. [233]

[1]That is, the purposes of all of the means, or rather *sarvāpti*.

पुत्रेणैवेत्यतो वक्ति साधनान्तरनिह्नुतिम् ।
ज्योतिषेत्यत्र संचोद्य परिहारं प्रचक्षते ॥२३४॥

(Here, the objector states:) In (the words) *putreṇaiva*,[1] the Śruti affirms the denial (lit. concealment) of any other means (to the winning of the world of men) and (also) raising an objection (to this) in (the words) *jyotiṣemam*, they state the solution (of the same) thus: [234]

Thus, Bhartṛprapañca's objector points out that the emphasis (on *putreṇa*) by *eva* cannot be accepted in view of *jyotiṣemam* which is contrary to what is stated with emphasis on *eva*. The solution to these two apparently contradictory Śrutis is stated by them (who agree with him).

प्राप्त्यतिक्रमसंभित्तेर्विषयप्रविभागतः ॥२३५॥
नैतदेवं यतो नेह पुत्रोत्पत्त्यतिरेकतः ।
साधनान्तरजय्योऽयं लोकोऽतश्चोदितं न सत् ॥२३६॥

This is so, since there is distinction (*sambhitti*) made between

winning and conquering (*prāpti* and *atikrama*); that is, there is division of the results (obtained by the two).[1] [235]
(Bhartṛprapañca replies:) This is not so, for it is not (stated) here[2] that this world has to be conquered by another means which is distinct (or apart) from one's begetting a son. Therefore (what is called) objection is not valid. [236]

Verse 236 explains what SP calls *avadhāraṇasādhaka*, viz. *na hi putrotpādanād anyena manuṣyalokajayo 'sti*; (SP and NKL seem to take these words as of Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya). This sets aside the idea of objection in *jyotiṣemam*.

[1]*prāptya* ... and *viṣayapravibhāgataḥ* stand in apposition.

[2]Namely, in this passage *so 'yam manuṣyalokaḥ* ....

ज्योतिष्टोमेन संप्राप्तिर्भोगायैव तु तत्कुतः ।
सुतेनातिक्रमोऽप्राप्तेः प्राप्तो निर्विषयस्ततः ॥२३७॥

Through (the performance of) a Jyotiṣṭoma, there is the winning of the world only for enjoyment, how then can there be the transcending (of it) by (begetting) a son? Since that (viz. winning etc.) has not followed (having a son) would have no scope.[1] [237]

Thus Bhartṛprapañca clarifies his idea.

[1]This would involve the fault 'meaninglessness of the Śruti'. This suggests the wrong in the objector's view.

यद्येवं तर्हि संत्याज्यं ज्योतिषेति वचः श्रुतम् ।
मैवं मनुष्यलोकस्य यतस्तत्राप्तिरिष्यते ॥२३८॥
प्राप्तस्य ज्योतिषा तस्य पुत्रेणातिक्रमो जयः ।

(Yet an objection is raised:) If this is so, then the statement heard in the Śruti viz. *jyotiṣā* ... is to be given up. (Bhartṛprapañca answers:) Do not say so, since there is accepted in the sentence the winning of the world of men. [238]

(There, in that context) winning means the conquering of what is obtained through a Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice by means of (begetting) a son. [239ab]

This explains the BUB *kim idānīm tat pratiṣedhyate.* The objector's argument is based on one and the same meaning of the words *jaya* and *atikrama* in the two sentences *putreṇaiva ... jayyaḥ* and *jyotiṣemaṃ ... jayati.* Also, this would mean: Like the word *gau*, the word *jaya* also has more meanings than one. This should, according to him, render the latter statement redundant.

This is explained in the next verse.

Yet read SP: *tatra* (i.e. in *jyotiṣṭomena ...*) *manuṣyalokaprāptir jayo 'bhipreta iha* (i.e. in *putreṇaiva ...*) *tu tato vyāvṛttir iti viśeṣa iti* (*bhartṛprapañca*)*bhāṣyenottaram.*

इति निर्युक्तिकं कैश्चिद्व्याख्यानं यत्नतः कृतम् ॥२३९॥

Thus, an explanation is given by some,[1] with (great effort). [239cd]

This is now Sureśvara's reply; here begins his refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view regarding *putreṇaivāyaṃ loko jayyaḥ.*

[1]That is, Bhartṛprapañca.

जय्य एव सुतेनायं लोक इत्यवधार्यते ।
ज्योतिषापि स चेज्जेयो जीयतां न निषिध्यते ॥२४०॥
नरलोकः सुतेनायं जय्य एवेति गण्यते ।
एवेत्ययोगावच्छित्तौ नान्ययोगव्यपेक्षया ॥२४१॥

[Now follows a detailed treatment of Bhartṛprapañca's view.]

It is emphasised that this world (of men) has to be conquered (only) through (begetting) a son.[1] (And) if that is to be won even through (the performance of) a Jyotiṣṭoma (sacrifice), let it be won; that is not declined (by us).[2] [240]

It is stated (in the Śruti) that this world of men is indeed to be conquered through (begetting) a son. (In this sentence, the emphasis on ... the particle) *eva* is for excluding connection of (any) other (means) with it. [241]

The purport of the argument is: The supposed opposition between *prāpti* and *atikrama* (cf. verses 234-235 above) is not warranted. If more means can help the winning, there is nothing unwelcome.

[1]In *putreṇaiva*, the emphasis is on that no other means can ever conquer the world, i.e. the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma would help in only attaining it and not in conquering it. Read NKL: *avadhāraṇena anyayogavyavacchedārthena virodhāt jyotiṣo na tat-phalatvam.*

[2]Here Sureśvara uses the word *jeya* beside the word *jayya*. The first indicates the utility of Jyotiṣṭoma in winning the world, whereas the second emphasises one's conquering (lit. transcending) it. The performance of Jyotiṣṭoma can be useful thus in addition to begetting a son. There is no objection to the help derived by its performance.

अतिक्रमो जयार्थश्चेत्सामर्थ्यादेव सिद्धितः ।
पितृलोकाद्यसंप्राप्तेस्तत्रातिक्रमगीर्वृथा ॥२४२॥

(It may be held:) the word *jaya* has the meaning of *atikrama* for the reason that the accomplishment (of the desired result) follows from the *sāmarthya* 'capacity (of the word) for conveying that[1] meaning'. (But this is obviated by the answer: No, that cannot be accepted) since, in that case, there would not be acquisition of the world of the manes (as well) and this would render the (Śruti's) use of the word *atikrama* meaningless.[2] [242]

This is a reply to the argument in *prāptasya jyotiṣā* ... (verse 239) above.

[1]One might understand the word to convey the sense of enjoyment of the world and (also the) consequent conquering

of it as well– this, through the (peculiar) capacity of word– and, as such, there follows the acquisition of the end (*jaya*). Therefore *putreṇaiva* is redundant.

[2]The answer is: The argument of the objector would apply to the acquisition of the world of the manes as well and then the Śruti statements *karmaṇā pitṛlokaḥ* and *vidyayā devalokaḥ* would demand the use of the word *atikrama* in the proposed sense and that is undesirable, or opposed to the meaningfulness of the Śruti.

नापुत्रस्येति निःशेषलोकाप्तौ साधनं सुतः ।
श्रूयते मन्दपालादि तथा चात्र निदर्शनम् ॥२४३॥

In the Śruti statement *nāputrasya* ...[1] is heard that (begetting) a son is the means towards securing all the worlds; (and), in that context, there are illustrations seen (in the stories of) Mandapāla[2] and others. [243]

[1]Cf. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7.13.12: *nāputrasya loko 'stīti tat sarve paśavo viduḥ, tasmāt te mātrāpi mithunībhavanti.*

[2]SP quotes three verses from the *Mahābhārata* and NKL other two verses. Cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.220.7ff.; yet read verse 12 in particular: *tad apākriyate sarvaṃ yajñena tapasā sutaiḥ, tapasvī yajñakṛd vāpi na tu te vidyate prajā.* To explain *ādi* after *mandapāla*, NKL refers to another person called Citraketu and SP to Pāṇḍu.

श्रुतं साध्यं समुल्लङ्घ्य नातोऽन्यत्कामजं फलम् ।
प्रत्यग्विविदिषान्यत्र कर्मणां श्रूयते फलम् ॥२४४॥

Therefore (one should not think of) a result which arises from one's desire, after setting aside what is heard (in the Śruti) as (the one) to be achieved.[1] The desire to know the one within (*pratyak*) is heard to be the result elsewhere and not (in the context of) rituals.[2] [244]

[1]This line seeks to reject an objector's view that 'begetting a son can be considered as useful for attaining to all the worlds as well', the reason for rejection being 'this view is not heard in the Śruti'.

[2]This sets aside another view of the objector: 'As the Siddhāntin gives up *svargādi* which is described in the scriptures as what is to be achieved and accepts the desire to know sentiency within to be the result, so should he discard the notion of merely attaining the worlds and then accept the winning (*atikrama*) of the same. These situations are similar in respect of the two faults *śrutahāni* and *aśrutakalpanā*.' The Siddhāntin's answer is that the two faults suggested by the objector with respect to *putreṇaiva* etc. refer to one portion of the Śruti, viz. ritualistic. As against this, the Siddhāntin gives up what is said in one section and accepts what is taught in another; there do not therefore occur the two faults.

किंच भुक्त्वाथवाभुक्त्वा ज्योतिष्टोमफलं नरः ।
अतिक्रामेदिमं लोकं नोभयत्रापि युज्यते ॥२४५॥

And what is more, a man may or may not have enjoyed the result of (the performance of a) Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, but he might yet win this world.[1] But, in the context of both, (the statement:) '(Through begetting a son) one wins this world' does not get (properly) construed.[2] [245]

This states another reason as to why the word *jayya* cannot have the sense of *atikrama*.

[1]This expresses a possible view that the word *jayya* does not mean *atikrama*.

[2]This is explained in the following two/three verses.

भुक्त्वातिलङ्घनं तावद्विनापि सुतजन्मना ।
निःशेषकर्मकार्याणां भोगेनैव समाप्तितः ॥२४६॥

Even when there is not the birth of a son, there can be

transcending of the world after enjoying (the result of Jyotiṣṭoma), since all the effects (i.e. results) of all the activities are completely consumed after their enjoyment. [246]

This refers to the first alternative suggested, viz. *bhuktvā.*

परब्रह्मात्मविज्ञानजन्मनापि हि कर्मणाम् ।
नाभुक्त्वा फलमाप्नोति निर्वृतिं परमां नरः ॥२४७॥

Even by the rise of the specific knowledge about the highest Brahman, i.e. the Ātman, a man cannot obtain the highest delight, unless he has experienced (lit. enjoyed) the results of the ritual activities (which he has performed earlier). [247]

This refers to the second alternative, viz. *abhuktvā.* The argument is: The knowledge about the highest Brahman does not (or cannot) destroy one's activity that is already performed– and naturally the results of that activity also– since the activity and its result(s) get exhausted only through the enjoyment of the latter. For this, see the statement of the Śruti: *kṣīyante cāsya karmaṇī* (cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.9). This holds good in the next Adhyāya of the Upaniṣad, (*cāturthika*, as SP describes it). Note also the oft-quoted line *prārabdhakrmaṇām bhogād eva kṣayaḥ.* And this argument is in conformity with Bhartṛprapañca's theory of the combination of knowledge and ritual activity.

नैरर्थक्यप्रसक्तिश्च ज्योतिष्टोमादिकर्मणः ।
न चेद्भुक्तं फलं तस्य तदभावेऽपि चात्ययः ॥२४८॥

And (therefore) there is the contingency, viz. futility of the ritual activities[1] (such as) the performance of a Jyotiṣṭoma,[2] if the result of it (viz. the worlds) is not enjoyed. In the absence of that[3] also, (there follows the contingency, viz.) transgression (of the Śruti). [248]

[1]This is *jātāv ekavacanam.*

[2]The word 'and' in the beginning shows how this is an additional argument against the first alternative which would appear acceptable. But against this, it can be pointed out: This alternative would invite the fault of considering the Śruti *jyotiṣemam* ... meaningless and therefore unauthoritative.

[3]The argument in the last part of the verse is very cryptic; it has two parts: (a) *tadabhāve 'pi=jyotiṣṭomaphalābhāve 'pi* 'even it it were held that the Jyotiṣṭoma does not produce any result'; this entails the view that there need not be any consideration of the result of the *nitya* 'obligatory' performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma. (b) It would mean 'transcending of the world is possible, even if a son were not begotten,' and that would be transgression of (i.e. opposition to) the Śruti: *putreṇaiva* ... Transgression consists in yet another way: the result of the performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma gets exhausted through the enjoyment of the world and as such the inutility of the Jyotiṣṭoma remains in this case also.

चन्द्रलोकादिसंप्राप्तिः श्रूयते कर्मणः फलम् ।
पुण्यलोका भवन्तीति तथा च श्रुतितः स्फुटम् ॥२४९॥

It is heard that the result of ritual (activity)[1] is the attainment of the region of the moon[2] etc. So also, (it is) clearly (heard in the Śruti) that (the performers of rituals) will be (the dwellers) of the holy worlds.[3] [249]

This affirms that even *nitya karmans* must bear results (refer to (b) in note 3 above).

[1]Cf. *karmaṇā pitṛlokaḥ* (BU 1.5.16) which sets aside the possible argument that ritual activity might not produce a result.

[2]Cf. BU 6.2.16; also *Gītā* 8.25.

[3]See the clear Śruti *sarva ete puṇyalokā bhavanti* (CU 2.23.1).

सुतजन्मादिभिश्चेत्स्यात्सर्वकर्मफलात्ययः ।
परब्रह्मैकविज्ञानं निष्फलं वः प्रसज्यते ॥२५०॥

If there can be transcending of the results of all the rituals through the birth of a son etc.,[1] then, in your view, a contingency would follow, viz. the specific knowledge (about the nature) of the highest Brahman would be fruitless. [250]

This is yet another argument against Bhartṛprapañca.

[1]The word etc. stands for *jyotiṣṭomādikarman* and *sarva-karmaphala* for the *atikrama* of the worlds of men, manes and gods.

अनुच्छित्तिश्च भोगेन स्पष्टं श्रुतिवचः श्रुतम् ।
धिया धियेति वाक्येन भोगादेव क्रियोत्थितेः ॥२५१॥

There is a clear statement of the Śruti heard, viz. that there is no cutting off (of the worldly bondage) through enjoyment; for, by the sentence *dhyā dhyā* ... (there is already stated) the beginning (or undertaking) of rituals for (securing) enjoyments.[1] [251]

The argument is: Enjoyment of one result creates a longing for some other object of enjoyment which, in turn, gives rise to yet another ritual activity.

Here ends Sureśvara's refutation of the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

[1]This is against the argument: Enjoyment of the results would render the birth of a son inutile.

Now follows the exposition of na karmaṇā pitrlokao vidyayā devalokaḥ.

कर्मणा पितृलोकाप्तिर्नाश्रुतेरन्यसाधना ।
कर्मैवोपास्तिरूपं यत्तद्विद्येत्यत्र भण्यते ॥२५२॥
देवलोकाप्तिसंबन्धाद्देवताविषयैव सा ।
विद्या न तु निरस्तान्यप्रत्यङ्मात्रैकगोचरा ॥२५३॥

The attainment of the world of the manes is effected through ritual activity; it is not dependent on any other means, since

there is no hearing of that (in the Śruti). What is here called Vidyā is but ritual activity that has the nature of meditation (*upāsti*). [252]
That Vidyā has for its object only gods, since it is related to attaining the world of the gods; but it is not that which is within a body (*pratyak*) and has completely set aside every other (object). [253]

This means that *vidyā* in this context does not mean *brahmavidyā*.

मनुते यन्न मनसा मनो येन मतं सदा ।
तदेव विद्धि ब्रह्मेति न त्विदं यदुपासते ॥२५४॥

Know only that as the Brahman, namely that which one does not ponder over in one's mind, that through which, the mind is ever known (or understood); and not that which they worship (or meditate on). [254]

This is the paraphrase of *Kenopaniṣad* 1.6. This is given here for setting aside the notion of any Upāsanā/Dhyāna; for that would involve opposition to Śruti.

उपासिक्रियया व्याप्तिरब्रह्मत्वस्य लक्षणम् ।
इति श्रुत्यैव निर्दिष्टं नोपास्यं ब्रह्म तेन नः ॥२५५॥

It is declared by the Śruti itself that the attainment (of something) through the activity of meditation is but a characteristic of what is non-Brahman; therefore the Brahman cannot be for us an object of meditation. [255]

This is confirming the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* passage paraphrased in the preceding verse.

विद्यया देवलोकाप्तिः श्रुतत्वादेव कारणात् ।
नैवकाराभिसंबन्धादेवेत्यत्र न संगतिः ॥२५६॥

[In verses 252-255, Sureśvara seems to explain Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya: *karmaṇā agnihotrādinā kevalena pitṛloko jetavyo na putreṇa nāpi vidyayā tayā devaloko na putreṇa nāpi karmaṇā* with reference to *karmaṇā pitṛlokaḥ* and *vidyayā devalokaḥ*. Here the relevant portion of BUB is: ... *yathā ca putreṇa jetavyas tathottaratra vakṣyāmo nānyena karmaṇā vidyayā veti vākyaśeṣaḥ karmaṇāgnihotrādilakṣaṇena kevalena pitṛloko jetavyo na putreṇa nāpi karmaṇā*. But it seems that Sureśvara does not feel happy with BUB because Śaṅkara appears to insert *eva* after both *vidyayā* and *karmaṇā* and then explain the two sentences. Therefore (perhaps) with dissatisfaction, Sureśvara discusses the *durukta* in BUB; cf. SP and NKL.]

That there is attainment of the world of gods through Vidyā (is accepted) only because it has been so heard; not because of the connection (of the word *vidyā*) with (the word) *eva*. Indeed, in this context, *eva* does not construe well (with the words *vidyayā* etc.[1] [256]

[1]Sureśvara has in mind verse 279; cf. SP and NKL.

Now follows the exposition of devaloko vai lokānām ....

भूयःफला यतो विद्या पूर्वाभ्यां तेन सादराः ।
विद्यामेव प्रशंसन्ति न तथा पुत्रकर्मणी ॥२५७॥

Since in comparison with the former two (viz. begetting a son and performing an activity) Vidyā has greater fruit (to yield), therefore they (viz. the seers), full of respect for it, praise only Vidyā, not so (begetting) a son and (performing) an activity. [257]

लोकानां श्रेष्ठ इति च न चेदाप्तिर्विवक्षिता ।
सर्वलोकेष्विदं वाक्यमत्यये दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥२५८॥

If it were not intended in the statement *lokānāṃ śreṣṭhaḥ* that there is attainment (of *loka* etc.), then this statement would be, for all the people, difficult to understand well in (relation to the world) *atyaya*. [258]

The purport is to refute the view that: the words *lokānāṃ śreṣṭhaḥ* are in praise of the world of gods. But that would not be correctly understandable, if the notion of *atyaya* as equivalent of *jaya* is borne in mind.

अत्ययश्चेदभिप्रेतः पुत्रोत्पत्त्यादिभिस्त्रिभिः ।
अपास्तर्णोऽथ स कथं कर्मस्वेष नियुज्यते ॥२५९॥

If 'winning' is understood to result from (lit. to be effected by) the three,[1] viz. those beginning with begetting a son, how then would a man, who has paid off his three debts,[2] be enjoined to perform rituals?[3] [259]

[1]If begetting a son etc. were understood to effect the winning of the worlds, that would mean loss of body (both gross and subtle bodies), non-performance of sacrifices, and consequently non-paying of the well-known three debts (which ought to be paid by an individual). Where was the need for him to perform rituals then?

[2]That is, *pitṛ-ṛṇa, ṛṣī-ṛṇa, deva-ṛna*. This is understood from a quotation Kullūka's commentary on *Manusmṛti* 3.36 (Nirnayasagar Press, 1946) = *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 6.3.10.5: *jāyamāno vai brāhmaṇas tribhir ṛṇair ṛṇavā jāyate yajñena devebhyaḥ prajayā pitṛbhyaḥ svādhyāyena ṛṣibhyaḥ*. Also cf. note 2 on BUBV 2.4 (see our book [Vol.1:1982] p.89).

[3]Cf. *saṃkrāmītmabhāvo 'pi nāgnihotram parityajet* (quotation in SP untraced).

ऋणानि त्रीण्यपाकृत्य मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत् ।
इति पूर्वाश्रमे वासो ध्वस्तर्णस्य निषिध्यते ॥२६०॥
यथानपाकृतर्णस्य मोक्षेच्छा वार्यते तथा ।

अनधीत्य द्विजो वेदानित्यादिवचनान्मनोः ॥२६१॥

As in the case of one who has paid off the (three) debts, there is denied (or prohibited) the acceptance of the former order of life[1] in (Manu's) words 'Having paid off the three debts, one should fix one's mind on liberation', [260]
so also is prohibited one's desire for liberation in the case of one who has not paid off the (three) debts as expressed in the words of Manu *anadhītya dvijaḥ* ....[2] [261]

This has a basis in *Manusmṛti* 6.37 and goes against what is said in the preceding verse. The fault in Bhartṛprapañca's argument is its being opposed to the teaching of Manu.

Here ends the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view which demanded attention.

[1]Namely, the state of a householder.

[2]*Manusmṛti* 2.168: *yo 'nadhītya dvijo vedān anyatra kurute śramam, sa jīvann eva śūdratvam āśu gacchati sānvayaḥ.* Also see note 2 on verse 259 above.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.17 up to verse 327.

इष्ट्वेति च तथा क्त्वान्तश्रवणात्पूर्वकालता ।
नीत्वा समाप्तिं कर्माणि फलवन्त्यफलानि च ॥२६२॥
शुद्धधीः प्रव्रजेत्पश्चाद्विरक्तः कर्मणां फलात् ।
इत्यनुक्रमसंन्यासे संप्रत्तिरुपदिश्यते ॥२६३॥

[Here and in the following verses (up to verse 273) there is a discussion on matters (or doubts/queries) related to renunciation (liberation).]

So also, since there is heard the form *iṣṭvā*, which ends in the suffix *ktvā*,[1] there is (understood the time of the ritual which is to be performed) before (seeking liberation)— that is to say, having completed the performance of rituals, be they fruitful or otherwise, [262]

a man with purified intellect should renounce and later become averse to the results of rituals; thus, there is prescribed the rite of Sampratti 'entrusting (the ritual duties) to the son'[2] at the time of renouncing (worldly life) in the due order of one's religious duties.[3] [263]

[1]This is based on the word *iṣṭvā* in *Manusmṛti* 6.36: *adhitya vidhivad vedān putrān utpādya dharmataḥ, iṣṭvā ca śaktito yajñair mano mokṣe niveśayet.*

[2]Otherwise called as *sampradāna*, in *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 2.15.

[3]For details of this, see SP.

योऽनुक्रमेणेति तथा श्रुतौ स्पष्टमिदं वचः ॥२६४॥
अननुक्रमसंन्यासे न संप्रत्तिक्रियेष्यते ।
पुत्रे सत्येव सा यस्मान्नास्त्यसौ ब्रह्मचारिणः ॥२६५॥

In this respect (*tathā*), there is a clear statement in the Śruti *yo 'nukrameṇa ....*[1] [264]
But (or, And) the rite of Sampratti is not desired (i.e. accepted) when there is no renunciation in the due order of one's religious duties, for that (rite of Sampratti) is possible only when a son was born to one. (Therefore) that (rite) is not (possible) in the case of a celibate. [265]

[1]SP reports it to be a passage from the *Kāṭhaka Śruti* (mentioned by some as *Kaṭhaśrutyupaniṣad*) whereas NKL reports it as from the *Kauṣītaki* and Sureśvara also refers to *Kauṣītaki* in verse 309 below. Yet what is quoted in both SP and NKL does not agree with the passage in the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad.* However, cf. *Kaṭhaśrutyupaniṣad* (and also *Saṃnyāsopaniṣad*) 1.1.

यद्यपुत्र इति वचः संभवे सति युक्तिमत् ।
निरस्तदारसंबन्धे न तु स्याद्ब्रह्मचारिणि ॥२६६॥

The words 'if one does not have a son'[1] would be reasonable, if there is the possibility (of one's renouncing). But, in the

case of a celibate who has (already) kept from (lit. discarded) the relation to a wife, it would not be (reasonable). [266]

This argument proceeds from someone's query about the purpose of the sentence *yady aputraḥ* ... in relation to renunciation. Sureśvara points out that it also refers only to a householder, thus confirming what is said in the preceding verse.

[1]SP reports the complete sentence: *yady aputro bhavaty ātmānam eva sarvaṃ dhyātvānapekṣamāṇaḥ prācīm udīcīṃ vā diśam pravrajet*; NKL reports it as from the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad*, but it is not there.

ब्रह्मचर्यादेवेत्यादिवाक्यानि शतशः श्रुतौ ।
श्रूयन्ते तु ऋणवचो विरोधात्स्यादपस्मृतिः ॥२६७॥

Sentences such as *brahmacaryād eva* ... are heard in the Śruti many (lit. hundreds of) times and (*tu*) the statement regarding the debts would be a wrong Smṛti,[1] on account of its opposition (to the teaching of the Śruti). [267]

This is an answer to the doubt: 'Renunciation is prescribed only for a householder, may or may not he have a son; as for the celibate, he cannot renounce.' But that cannot be taken as authoritative, for the Śruti has at several places prescribed renunciation even for a celibate. Refer to *Jābālopaniṣad* 4 which prescribes renunciation even from the student's stage. Therefore the Smṛti's import regarding the debt to be repaid by a celibate, which is directly opposed to the Śruti, is unauthoritative. As indicated by SP, read in this context SV 436cd and 437ab: *pratyakṣavedavacanaprāmāṇyādyāśrayatvataḥ, ādau saṃnyāsasaṃsiddher ṛṇānīti hy apsamṛtiḥ.*

tu ṛṇavaco is an instance of absence of Saṃdhi.

[1]*apasmṛtiḥ* could be wrong Smṛti, i.e. it is authoritative. Translation holds *apasmṛtiḥ* as a complement of *ṛṇavacaḥ*.

वेदाहमितिमन्त्रोक्तेस्तमेवेत्यवधारणात् ।

निषेधान्नान्य इत्युक्तेर्न मुक्तिः सुतजन्मतः ॥२६८॥

There cannot be liberation obtained through the birth of a son (for the following reasons: viz.) because there is a statement in the Mantra *vedāham* ...[1] (in the beginning), because there is an emphatic statement in (the words) *tam eva* ...[2] (later) and also because there is a (clear) denial of it (understood) from the statement *nānyaḥ* ....[3] [268]

This is for clearing away the notion that renunciation is not necessary for achieving liberation, since it can be obtained by merely begetting a son. But renunciation is a means towards (*brahma-jñāna*).

[1] *vedāham etam puruṣam* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.12.8.)

[2] *tam evam vidvān amṛta iha bhavati* (*Ibid*). And also, *tam eva viditvātimṛtyum eti* (*Ibid*).

[3] *nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya* (*Ibid*).

न तत्र दक्षिणा यन्ति विद्ययैव तदाप्यते ।
इति न्याय्यं श्रुतेर्वाक्यं कस्मान्नाद्रियतेऽञ्जसा ॥२६९॥

Why then not accept regardfully the statement from the Śruti which follows reason, viz. *na tatra dakṣiṇā yanti*[1] and *vidyayaiva tad āpyate*?[2] [269]

Here is stressed the insignificance of rituals and the effectiveness of Jñāna.

[1] Cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.5.4.16.

[2] Citation not traced.

संन्यासमेवोपक्रम्य संप्रत्तिः श्रूयते श्रुतौ ।
यथान्यत्र तथेहापि कस्मान्नाभ्युपगम्यते ॥२७०॥

(One would ask:) As there is heard elsewhere[1] in the Śruti (the statement regarding the rite of) Sampratti, in the words beginning with *saṃnyāsam eva*, why is it not, in the same

way, accepted here[1] also?[2] [270]

This argument is based on what is known as *sarvavedānta-pratyaya* 'unity of thought in the Upaniṣads'.

[1]This refers to the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad*, cf. note 2 on verse 263 above.

[2]The questioner has in mind one who is about to die and therefore perform the rite of Sampratti. He means: that rite should not be understood as ancillary merely to renunciation.

सर्वकर्मनिवृत्तिर्हि जीवतोऽत्र विधीयते ।
एकमेव व्रतमिति संन्यासिन्येव युक्तिमत् ॥२७१॥
लब्धत्र्यन्नात्मकफलो भावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः ।
संन्यस्ताशेषकर्मा सन्बोध्यतेऽजातशत्रुणा ॥२७२॥

(This is not so) because, here (i.e. in BU 1.5.23), cessation from all performances (of duties) is prescribed in the case of one who is alive (and) statement *ekam eva vratam* is reasonable only in the case of one who has renounced. [271]
(For example, Gārgya) who had obtained the result which was in the nature of the acquisition of the three foods by means of his devotion, knowledge and performances and had given up all religious performances was enlightened by Ajātaśatru.[1] [272]

This is in answer to the question in verse 270 above.

[1]This has reference to BU 2.1 which contains the dialogue between Gārgya Bālāki and Ajātaśatru.

नामरूपक्रियादेहः सर्वोऽस्मीत्यभिमानवान् ।
अतत्त्वज्ञोऽधिकार्यत्र विद्याया उपवर्ण्यते ॥२७३॥

(For) in this context is described a person who is entitled (to undertake renunciation)— he who is possessed of a notion 'I am all this, viz. what is made up of name, form, activity and body' and is thus one not knowing the reality (in respect

of the true nature of the self). [273]

अयं लोकश्च पुत्रेण यादृशेन च जीयते ।
तादृक्पुत्रोऽत्र वक्तव्य इत्यारब्धोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥२७४॥

[In verses 265-273 Sureśvara had given his own idea about the connection of the sentence *athātaḥ samprattiḥ* in BU 1.5.17 to the preceding passage. Now in verses 274-278 he states that connection which is stated in BUB.]

The subsequent Śruti, viz. *athātaḥ samprattiḥ*, has therefore begun with the intention to speak of such a son as through whom this world (relevant here in this situation) (and also others)[1] can be won. [274]

[1]This is the force of *ca*; it refers to Pitṛloka and Devaloka.

पुत्रकर्मापरज्ञाननृपित्रमरलोकतः ।
व्याख्यातो नियमोऽन्योन्यं फलसाधनसंगतेः ॥२७५॥

Here is explained the invariable rule regarding the mutual relation of the results and their means, viz. a son, ritual performance(s), worldly knowledge and the worlds of men, manes and gods.[1] [275]

[1]The three, viz. the son, (*apara*)*jñāna* and ritual are the means and the other three, viz. the worlds, are the results.

पुत्रकर्मार्थमात्रत्वान्न पृथक्साधनान्तरम् ।
जाया मानुषवित्तं च कर्मैकार्थत्वकारणात् ॥२७६॥

And a wife is not (mentioned as) a distinct means, since she is helpful only for (begetting) a son and for (performing) ritual activity;[1] and a man's wealth also (is not so mentioned) since it is helpful merely for the (performance of) ritual activity.[2] [276]

[1]A wife is in these two ways indirectly related to *loka-trayaprāpti.*

[2]Wealth is subservient to the ritual performance(s).

स्वरूपलाभमात्रेण साधनत्वं निगच्छतः ।
कर्मज्ञाने सुतस्तस्य साधनत्वं व्रजेत्कथम् ॥२७७॥

Ritual performance(s) and knowledge about the same come to have their character as the means (to the attainment of the three worlds) only by coming into existence, how then could a son become the means (towards that)? [1] [277]

[1]SP clarifies the thought thus: *putraś tu manuṣyalokajaye na tathā* (i.e. like Vidyā and *karman*) *hetuḥ, dravyatvāt*; *na hi dravyaṃ kriyānāviṣṭam sādhanaṃ dṛṣṭam.* That is: a son is *dravya* which is useful in the performance; by himself he cannot bring about *manuṣyalokajaya.*

इत्येवमभिसंबन्धो वक्तुर्भाष्यकृतः स्फुटः ।
अस्मदुक्ताविरोधीति तेन नेहातियत्यते ॥२७८॥

This is the clear connection (of Sampratti with *lokajaya*), (as given by) the writer of the Bhāṣya. (And) since it is not opposed to what we have said, there is no special effort made (*atiyatyate*) here (to discuss it further). [278]

Mention was made in verse 256 of BUB's insertion of *eva* in the sentences *karmaṇā pitṛlokaḥ* and *vidyayā devalokaḥ.* That demands some discussion, since the preceding verse states the non-opposition between Sureśvara and Śaṅkara regarding the explanation of the relevant section. Verses 279-281 serve this purpose.

पुत्रश्चेदनुशिष्टः स्याल्लोकस्तेनैव जीयते ।
नान्येन कर्मणात्रार्थो नृलोकजयसिद्धये ॥२७९॥

पुत्रस्यैवावधृतय एवकारो भवेदयम् ।
पितृदेवलोकसंप्राप्तिः श्रुतेहान्यैश्च साधनैः ॥२८०॥

If a son has been instructed,[1] only then is won through him the world (of men); there is not any purpose (served here[2] by) any other (means, viz.) ritual performance(s) in achieving the conquest of the world of men; [279]
as such, this specification by the insertion of (the word) *eva* is only in respect of a son— and, (as for) the attainment of the worlds of the manes and the gods, it is heard (to occur) through other means.[3] [280]

The idea is: A son can win for his father the *manuṣyaloka* by performing the remainder of his duties and by the enjoyment of the result of the performance (*bhoga*). But this latter is secured by the father through the performance of Jyotiṣṭoma also— not necessarily through his son.

The third quarter of verse 280 is metrically faulty— one letter more in the line and the fifth letter is long.

[1]Supply: regarding the duties unperformed (or, which were yet to be performed) by the father.

[2]This word (*atra*) refers only to *manuṣyaloka*.

[3]The idea is: The winning of the world of the manes is not dependent only on the obligatory ritual performance; it can be secured through a *saṅkalpa* for it— this involves Śrutivirodha and renders the insertion of *eva* purposeless; cf. *saṅkalpād evāsya pitaraḥ samuttiṣṭhanti* (CU 8.2.1). This implies similar inutility of *eva* in respect of the world of gods also; cf. *nāpi vidyayaiva devalokajayaḥ* (understood) *saṃnyāsād brahmaṇaḥ sthānam*, quotation not traced.

व्याख्यानमिदमेवात्र विदोषं दोषवत्परम् ।
इदमेव ततो ग्राह्यं न तु यद्दोषवन्मतम् ॥२८१॥

Only this explanation (regarding the insertion of the word *eva* which is given by me) here is faultless; the other is faulty.

Only this much is to be accepted from that (viz. BUB), but not that which is considered (by me) as faulty. [281]

अथानन्तरमेवोक्तात्कर्मोपासनचेष्टितात् ।
अतस्तत्फलनिष्पत्तेः संप्रत्तिः संविधीयते ॥२८२॥

[Now follows the explanation of the BU sentence *athātaḥ samprattiḥ*, after the connection of that sentence with Sureśvara's own comment and BUB has been thus stated.]

atha means now, i.e. 'immediately after this statement about the performance(s) of the ritual(s) and meditation,' as also for securing the result of that there is prescribed the ritual of Sampratti.[1] [282]

[1] *karmopāsanaceṣṭita* mentioned in the first line. Commentators add that the ritual of Sampratti is an ancillary to Kramasaṃnyāsa which is related to Upāsanā by securing its result.

यतो मनुष्यलोकोऽयं विशिष्टसुतसाधनः ।
तस्मात्संप्रत्तिकर्मेह वक्तव्यं तत्फलार्थिने ॥२८३॥

Since this world of men has a specifically qualified son as its means there is to be stated the ritual of Sampratti for one who is desirous of its result. [283]

This is considered by Sureśvara as another meaning of the word *ataḥ*. The word 'therefore' conveys the sense of 'desire for a son and (through begetting him)' for the result.

विदुषैव तु कर्तव्या संप्रत्तिर्नाविपश्चिता ।
यतोऽतः सूत्रिता नेयं सूत्रकृद्भिरनित्यतः ॥२८४॥

Since the ritual of Sampratti has to be undertaken by a knower[1] and not by one who is not a knower; therefore it has not been stated by Sūtrakāras in their (Śrauta) Sūtras,

owing to its non-obligatory character. [284]

[1]That is, one who knows the purpose of Sampratti ritual, as only an ancillary to renunciation.

संप्रत्तिरिति नामैतदात्मसंस्कारकर्मणः ।
प्रतिपत्तिक्रिया वा स्यादातुरन्यासदर्शनात् ॥२८५॥

Sampratti is the name of a performance of some rite for one's own Saṃskāra. Or, it is[1] an action of entrusting[2] as noticed from the transferring (of his own duties) by an afflicted person. [285]

[1]*syāt = asti.*
[2]*pratipatti* is the meaning of *sampratti.*

प्रैष्यन्निति च कालोऽस्य कर्मणोऽत्र विधीयते ।
जातकादिपरिज्ञानाज्ज्ञातुं कालोऽपि शक्यते ॥२८६॥

And in the word *praiṣyan* is prescribed here the time (for the performance) of this rite. And time also,[1] it is possible to know from one's knowledge of a horoscope etc.[2] [286]

[1]The word 'also' implies the time of death (beside the future happenings in a man's life). Cf. SP: *sampadādijñānaṃ dṛṣṭāntayitum apiśabdaḥ.*
[2]The word etc. stands for an omen or a dream which is indicative of the ensuing death.

मुमूर्षुश्च पिता पुत्रमथाहूयानुमन्त्रयेत् ।
त्वं ब्रह्मेत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैः सोऽपि प्रत्याह बोधितः ॥२८७॥

Now,[1] a father, who is about to die, should first call his son (to himself) and then instruct him in the sentences such as *tvam brahma* ...[2] and he (viz. the son) also, thus instructed, answers him (in the words *aham brahma* ...). [287]

[1]This is introductory 'Now' for *atha*. Or *ca* has, according to SP, the purpose of excluding any other doing.
[2]This is BU 1.5.17.

कर्मभ्यः प्रव्रजिष्यन्वा प्रैष्यन्नित्यभिधीयते ।
धातूपसर्गयोर्मुख्यस्तथार्थोऽप्याश्रितो भवेत् ॥२८८॥

Or, perhaps, the word *praiṣyan* is stated (in the Śruti) in the sense of '(when one is) about to renounce ritual performances'. In that way also, the principal meaning of the root and the preposition, understood (together), would be accepted (lit. be resorted to). [288]

अहं ब्रह्मेति पितरं पूर्वमेवोपशिक्षितः ।
प्रतिवक्तुं न शक्तः स्यान्न चेत्प्राक्शिक्षितो भवेत् ॥२८९॥

(The son) should answer in the words *aham brahma* ... 'I am Brahman,' being already instructed.[1] (But) he would not be able to answer, if he were not instructed before. [289]

[1]Supply: by the father, even long before he is about to renounce or die.

पुत्रानुमन्त्रणस्यार्थं व्याचष्टे स्वयमेव नः ।
श्रुतिस्तिरोहितार्थत्वान्मन्त्राणामित्यतोऽवदत् ॥२९०॥

The Śruti itself explained to us the meaning of what is to be instructed to the son, since the meaning of the Mantras is concealed; so has he (viz. the Bhāṣyakāra) said. [290]

In this, he intends to explain *yad vai kiṃ ca* .... Here, Sureśvara points out his agreement with Śaṅkara.

अनूक्तं यदधीतं स्याद्यच्चाध्येतव्यमिष्यते ।
यच्चानधीतं तस्योक्तौ ब्रह्मेत्यत्रैकता भवेत् ॥२९१॥

anūkta means what is studied[1] and also what is desired to be studied and is not studied; (therefore) in the mention of that,[2] there is unification in the Brahman. [291]

[1]It literally means: that which is repeated (after the teacher has, in the course of his lessons, uttered).
[2]This refers to *anūkta*.

त्वं ब्रह्मेतीह वाक्यार्थो ह्ययमत्र विवक्षितः ।
अध्येतव्यार्थनिष्पत्तिस्त्वनिष्पत्त्या मया कृता ॥२९२॥

This[1] one is the intended meaning here,[2] i.e. of the sentence *tvam brahma* .... I have explained here what is to be studied, because it was not explained (before). [292]

This is what the father says to the son.
The second line of the verse appears somewhat difficult. Even the variant readings in the AnSS edition do not help.
[1]The word 'this' means: what is stated in the preceding verse.
[2]The word 'here' refers to the explanatory prose sentence in BU *yad vai kiṃ ca tasya sarvasya brahmety ekatā* together with the Mantra *tvam brahma* ....

यावन्मत्कर्तृकं किंचिन्मानेन प्रतिपाद्यते ।
त्वत्कर्तृकं तदस्त्वत्र पितुरेवं विवक्षितम् ॥२९३॥

[Now follows the exposition of *ye vai ke ... yajña ity ekatā*.]

Such is the father's intended (meaning): Whatever is prescribed by the authoritative means (viz. the Śruti) as what is to be undertaken by me should now be what is to be undertaken by you. [293]

This explains the prose in BU: *ye vai ke ca yajñaḥ ... lokāḥ ity ekatā*.

लोकोक्त्यैव हि यज्ञानां तत्फलत्वाद्ग्रहे सति ।
नित्ययज्ञगृहीत्यर्थं के च यज्ञा इतीरणम् ॥२९४॥

And the statement (*ye vai*)[1] *ke ca yajñāḥ* is for understanding obligatory sacrifices, lest by the very mention of the word *loka* there is the acceptance (or understanding) of the sacrifices as having the same[2] as their result. [294]

[1]We have supplied these words in the round brackets, for they occur in the Śruti and which, for the sake of metre, Sureśvara has omitted.
[2]The word *tat* is expressive of *loka* as the result.

ब्रह्मेत्यादिपदार्थोऽयमुक्तस्तावत्समासतः ।
त्वं ब्रह्मेति तु वाक्यार्थः श्रुत्येदानीं विभाव्यते ॥२९५॥

So far, the meaning of the word *brahma* etc.[1] has been explained in brief. Now[2] is explained by the Śruti the meaning of the (entire) statement *tvam brahma* ... (*loka ity ekatā*). [295]

[1]Namely, *tvam brahma*, *tvaṃ yajñaḥ* and *tvaṃ lokaḥ*.
[2]This is for introducing the exposition on *etāvad vā* as on the 'sentence'.

एतावदेव कर्तव्यं गृहिणेहाधिकारिणा ।
वेदा यज्ञाश्च लोकाश्च नातोऽन्योऽर्थोऽवशिष्यते ॥२९६॥

Only this much[1] has to be undertaken here[2] by a householder who is eligible for it; (this is to say:) the Vedas (are to be studied), sacrifices (are to be performed) and the worlds (are to be attained);[3] there remains nothing else (to undertake). [296]

This is the meaning of *etāvad vā idaṃ sarvam*.
[1]Namely, all this which has been enumerated.

[2]Namely, in respect of ritual activity.

[3]Supply *adhyetavyāḥ*, *yaṣṭavyāḥ* and *jetavyāḥ* after *vedāḥ* etc. respectively.

यथोक्तार्थचिकीर्षुः संस्तन्मयस्तत्क्रतुः स्वतः ।
इतोऽधिकारबन्धान्माऽभुनजत्पालयेदिति ॥२९७॥
चेतस्याधाय वाक्यार्थमिममाह पिता सुतम् ।
त्वं ब्रह्मेत्यादिवाक्यानां नातोऽन्योऽर्थो विवक्षितः ॥२९८॥

Himself being desirous of performing the ritual activities as are stated (in the scriptures), being devoted to them and having the intention to perform the same and having kept in mind the thought: 'May (this son) release me, i.e. protect me, from this, the bondage of responsibility (lit. the state of being enjoined to do all that is mentioned above)', the father has conveyed to the son this meaning of the sentences, viz. *tvam brahma* ....[1] No other meaning is intended. [297-298]

[1]Hereby is denied any other meaning of the sentences.

यत उक्तं चिकीर्षुः सन्ननुशिष्टश्च तादृशः ।
अतो लोकहितार्थं तं पुत्रमाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥२९९॥
अनुशिष्टो यतः पुत्रः पित्रैवैति समर्थताम् ।
अनुशिष्टमतो लोक्यं पुत्रमाहुर्विपश्चितः ॥३००॥

The wise ones have called him a son, who is desirous of doing what is told (him by his father),[1] who is instructed in that way,[2] and who has therefore become helpful (to the father), (securing) for the benefit (of the acquisition) of *loka* 'the world of men'. [299]

Since the son is instructed by the father himself for his entitlement (to do what is required of him), the learned call this thus instructed son as useful for (effecting the attainment of) the world (of men). [300]

This is the meaning of the Śruti: *tasmāt putram anuśiṣṭam*

lokyam āhuḥ, tasmād enam anuśāsati.

[1]This refers to his asking him to continue to undertake what he did earlier.

[2]That is, what he was told in the rite of Sampratti, viz. *tvam brahma tvaṃ yajñas tvaṃ lokas tvaṃ sarvam ....*

पितरश्चात एवैनमनुशासति सत्सुतम् ।
अनुशिष्टेन पुत्रेण लोक्यः स्यामिति यत्नतः ॥३०१॥

Just for this, do the fathers[1] instruct their good sons[2] with the thought (lit. carefully) 'Let me be fit for (the attainment of) the world (of men) through this son who is instructed by me.' [301]

[1]Namely, those who undertook their religious duties (mentioned earlier).

[2]*sutam* is for *sutān* (*jātāv ekavacanam*).

संक्रामितात्मभारोऽपि नाग्निहोत्रं परित्यजेत् ।
इत्येतत्कर्मरागोक्तं निष्प्रमाणं न गृह्यते ॥३०२॥

[Verses 301-312 refute the view of Bhartṛprapañca regarding continuous performance of Agnihotra till the end of one's life, even though the rite of Sampratti has been performed.]

The statement which pertains to attachment to ritual activity, viz. 'A person should not give up (the observance of) Agnihotra, even if he has transferred (or entrusted) his own responsibility (to the son)', is not accepted as one devoid of any authority. [302]

This verse states in brief the view of Bhartṛprapañca and marks the beginning of its refutation also. The words in inverted commas are the view of Bhartṛprapañca. SP cites his words: *sa eṣa samprattiṃ kṛtvā yāvaj jīvati na tāvad agnihotram utsṛjet.* The word *iti* after *saṃkrāmitātma- ... parityajet* seems to show the

passage is a quotation— this is untraced.

संप्रत्तिलिङ्गात्संन्यासविधिरत्र विवक्षितः ।
निःशेषोपनिषन्मानमेकं ज्ञानमितीष्यते ॥३०३॥

Here is intended (to prescribe) the injunction regarding renunciation (as is clear) from its indication, viz. the ritual of Sampratti.[1] (Indeed) it is desired that knowledge has (only) one authoritative means (for it), viz. all the Upaniṣads.[2] [303]

[1]The *Kāṭhaka Śruti* (cf. note 1 on verse 265 above) has prescribed it as an ancillary to renunciation.

[2]This refers to *sarvavedāntapratyayanyāya*. It is intended to bring out that the Upaniṣads teach the pursuit of the Brahman, the knowledge about the nature of it, and also the attainment of the same, but not the performances of rituals as understood by Bhartṛprapañca. Therefore it is to be accepted here that they prescribe only renunciation.

त्र्यन्नात्मभावसंप्राप्तेर्जीवतैव कृतत्वतः ।
साधनानां फलान्तत्वात्संन्यासः किं निवार्यते ॥३०४॥

Why then reject (the prescription of) renunciation,[1] if one can have achieved, in one's life-time,[2] oneness with (lit. the nature of) the three foods[3] in accordance with the rule that the means[4] culminate in (acquiring) the results? [304]

[1]Supply: immediately after the performance of the Sampratti ritual. Here there is reference to Bhartṛprapañca's view; see note under verse 302 above.

[2]Or, while one is continuing to live.

[3]This is the same as becoming (one with) Prajāpati (or Sūtra).

[4]Namely, Upāsanā.

यावज्जीवश्रुतिप्राप्तेर्न चेत्तत्त्याग इष्यते ।
प्रयोगावसितेर्नैवं जरिणोऽधिकृतिर्न च ॥३०५॥

प्रातर्देशावसानत्वादग्निहोत्रादिकर्मणः ।
नित्यानामपि संन्यासः कर्मणां स्यात्तदैव तु ॥३०६॥

If it is understood (lit. desired) that, since there is a Śruti regarding (the performance of rituals by one) till the end of one's life, renunciation is not to be resorted to; it is not to be so accepted, for there is (possible) the cessation of the ritual[1] and there is no eligibility of one who has grown old.[2] [305]

(And) since the rituals of Agnihotra etc. conclude at the end of the duration of the morning and in specific regions, non-performance of obligatory rites[3] (has to resorted to) at that very time.[4] [306]

One more objection is understood, viz. *kurvann eveha karmāṇi* ... (*Īśopaniṣad* 2) is a Śruti that is opposed to renunciation. That is answered.

[1]This is in the case of one who is unable to perform ritual activity in its entirety on account of weakness.

[2]Cf. *jīrṇo vā viramet* (quotation in NKL, not traced).

[3]Agnihotra etc. are obligatory rites to be performed.

[4]This suggests one's giving up of rituals when one wishes to renounce.

संक्रामितात्मभारस्य त्वं ब्रह्मेति वचोऽर्थवत् ।
तदा स्यात्सर्वकर्माणि यदि संन्यस्य तिष्ठति ॥३०७॥

If a person continues to live after having renounced all ritual activities, only then would the statement (of the Śruti) *tvam brahma* ... be meaningful in the case of him who has transferred his own responsibility to the son. [307]

This is one more argument in favour of renunciation immediately after the performance of the Sampratti ritual.

सर्वात्मकार्यनिचयपुत्रसंक्रामितत्वतः ।

न चेत्तित्यक्षितं सर्वं प्रतिप्रसवगीर्भवेत् ॥३०८॥

If it were not intended that all (ritual performance) should be renounced after the entire mass of one's ritual activity was transferred to the son, then there would have been (in the Śruti) the prohibitive injunction (to activity). [308]

कौषीतकिश्रुतौ तद्वद्गृहस्थस्यैव जीवतः ।
संन्यासः श्रूयते स्पष्टः पुत्रैश्वर्ये सुखं वसेत् ॥३०९॥

In the same way[1] there is in the *Kauṣītaki Śruti* a clear (injunction regarding such) renunciation even while a householder is alive, (viz.) 'May he stay happily while the son is in prosperity.' [309]

In the discussion of renunciation and the ritual of Sampratti, BUBV refers to the *Kauṣītaki Śruti* by name, whereas SP has mentioned (in the same context) the *Kāṭhaka Śruti*, cf. SP on verses 264-265 and 303 above! Here also, SP points out the agreement between the *Kāṭhaka* and the Vārtika. We were unable to trace the quotation *putraiśvarye vā vaset* (though Jacob quoted in his Concordance) only *vṛddhāśraṃ vā gacchet* which is cited by SP. This seems to be *Kaṭhaśrutyupaniṣad* (not verified by us). But see *Manusmṛti* 6.95 for *putraiśvarye* ....

[1]That is, to the same effect, viz. supporting what is said in the preceding verse.

संन्यस्य सर्वकर्माणि सर्वदोषानपानुदन् ।
इत्यादि मनुनाप्युक्तं तद्विरुद्धं च भण्यते ॥३१०॥

And also a statement made by Manu, viz. *saṃnyasya sarvakarmāṇi sarvadoṣān apānudan* ...[1] where there is said what is in opposition to that.[2] [310]

[1]The NKL edition reads *apānudet* (not so in *Manusmṛti* 6.95). SP points out that Manu also accepted *kramasaṃnyāsa* as seen

from his long quotation of Manu's verses, viz. 6.92-96.

[2]This refers to the objection which is understood in verses 305ff.

उपास्तिफलमेवास्य पितुर्यद्वदिहोच्यते ।
प्रतिप्रसूयते कस्मान्नाग्निहोत्रादिकं तथा ॥३११॥

(We wish to ask:) As here[1] is stated only the result of that worship[2] in favour of the father,[3] why is not the ritual activity of Agnihotra etc. prohibited (in an injunction) in the same way? [311]

This reaffirms what is stated in verse 306cd above. The objector's argument is: In the sentence regarding the ritual of Sampratti, renunciation of all (ritual) activity is not intended. The answer is: As there is no prohibitive injunction in regard to Agnihotra, so it is not here also.

[1]That is, in *pṛthivyai cainam* ... (BU 1.5.18).

[2]This implies that no other ritual is prescribed.

[3]He who has transferred his own duties to the son.

एकमेवेत्यवधृतेर्युक्तं प्राणव्रतं पितुः ।
संस्कारकत्वात्तस्यैव न तदन्यदिहेष्यते ॥३१२॥

(Also) from the specification (in the Śruti statement) by (the words) *ekam eva*, it is proper to understand (the observance of) the *prāṇavrata* in the case of the father,[1] since that is for effecting a Saṃskāra on him. There is nothing other than that[2] to be accepted (or desired). [312]

This sets aside a possible counter-argument that *ekam eva* ... is prohibitive of *prāṇanādivyāpāra* 'the function of breathing'. The argument against that is: that function is understood to be necessary in the observance of *prāṇavrata*.

[1]Supply: who has performed the Sampratti ritual and is renouncing.

[2]That is, *prāṇavrata.*

म्रियते स यदैवंवित्पुत्रसंक्रामितक्रतुः ।
क्रत्वञ्जितैस्तदा प्राणैः सह पुत्रं विशत्ययम् ॥३१३॥

When such a person, who, knowing this, has transferred his thoughts[1] (about the performance of sacrifices)[2] to the son, dies, and then enters into his son with his *prāṇas*, which are marked (lit. annointed) by his thoughts (as said above). [313]

This explains *sa yadaivaṃvid* ....
[1]That is, his resolve.
[2]Supply: and other duties.

प्रागात्मक्रतुसंक्रान्तेरभूद्यादृक्क्रतुः पिता ।
स तादृक्क्रतुबिम्बोऽस्य संक्रान्तः स्वसुते पितुः ॥३१४॥

Possessed of whichever thought (regarding ritual activity) be the father before the transfer of his own thought (to the son), that (thought), with a reflection similar to it, will be transferred into the son. [314]

The objector could question about the nature of the father's entry into his son, which is mentioned in the preceding verse—'Could it be similar to the entry of a serpent into a hole?' The answer is: The body of a person cannot enter into another's; there is only a metaphorical entry! It is the transfer of the thought about ritual performances. This is clarified further in the next verse.

जलार्कस्येव संक्रान्तिः स्वाभासभ्रमकारणात् ।
परोपाधिनिमित्तैव कौटस्थ्यात्प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥३१५॥

This reflection (lit. entry) is like (that of) the Sun in water on account of the error about its own appearance;[1] (that reflection) is caused by the limiting adjunct of another, owing

to the immutability of the inner self. [315]

This clearly shows that the rite of Sampratti etc., all of them, fall in the sphere of Avidyā. The truth is that there is only the appearance of the inner self in the body of the son and so on.

In this context, SP makes some worth-noting observations: (we give them somewhat briefly though— perhaps at the cost of clarity!) At first, an objector raises the question: Does the *saṃkrānti* mean that of the *upādhi* 'delimiting adjunct', viz. the body, or alternatively that of the inner self? The first alternative is discarded, for the body of the father cannot get into that of the son. So also, the entry of the father's inner self into the son is not possible. What appears to be the case is that the father's thought regarding rituals only appears (i.e. is taken) to enter into the son much in the same way as the Sun seems to enter water. And finally, the consequence is that the inner self appears to have entered into the son! Real entry is impossible, for the reason that the inner self is immutable.

[1]This is an incidental reference to the Ābhāsa theory of Sureśvara.

क्रत्वञ्जितधियो यद्वत्स्वात्मदेहस्य साक्षिता ।
तद्वत्पुत्रादिदेहेषु मोहान्नानात्मविभ्रमः ॥३१६॥

As one's own body has the ability to perceive (i.e. experience) the thoughts marked by some sacrifice, so also there (is that ability to perceive) in the bodies[1] of the son etc. The various appearances of the Ātman, (i.e. the father's inner self) are caused by ignorance. [316]

[1]This is a reference to the variously acting body of the son.

स्वाधिकारसुतावेशात्पितैवाविशतीत्यतः ।
स्वयं निरधिकारस्तु दैवप्राणोऽवतिष्ठते ॥३१७॥

Since it is that by transferring unto his son his own eligibility the father himself enters into (the son) and (*tu*),[1] as such, being (now) bereft of his own eligibility,[2] he himself stays in the form of the divine Prāṇa.[3] [317]

This reaffirms the thought in the preceding verse.

[1]Or alternatively, but.

[2]Supply: for performing ritual activity.

[3]This refers to the result of his Upāsanā, viz. oneness with Prāṇa.

आध्यात्मिकेन देहेन न्यूनकार्यसमाप्तये ।
पिता पुत्रेण कुर्वाण आस्ते तत्फलभुक्स्वयम् ॥३१८॥

(Thus), for accomplishing lesser activity the father stays on with a body which is (wholly) resting in (or, fixed on) the Ātman and keeps on doing the same (activity) through his son, (but) himself enjoying the result of the same. [318]

The father who has transferred to his son the eligibility for the performance of rituals continues to live, doing small activities through the son and enjoying the fruit of the same.

दैवसाधनसंपन्नः पुत्र एवावतिष्ठते ।
पिता तु तत्फलात्मैव न तु साधनरूपभृत् ॥३१९॥

Being possessed of the divine means, the father stays in the son; the father is, however, in the form of the result (of Sampratti and renunciation), but not bearing a form that is a means.[1] [319]

This is to explain away any supposed duality of bodies, viz. the body of the son and the divine body (i.e. *daiva-prāṇa-yukta* body) of the father.

[1]SP offers two alternative explanations of this verse; our translation is based on the second alternative (this seems to

be adopted by NKL also). The first alternative of SP is: The father has entered into the son by having the state of one who causes the performance of the ritual activity (*kārakakoṭiniviṣṭa*) but does not stay there as the agent of the ritual activity (*sādhanarūpa*); he has at the same time continued to be of the nature of the (known) result, viz. Sūtrarūpa. This is to say: *hetuphalabhedād dvirūpaḥ.*

नाकारि कार्यं यत्पित्रा स्वाधीत्यादि प्रमादतः ।
तत्पूरणात्पितुस्त्राणात्पुत्र इत्यधिधीयते ॥३२०॥

By completing whatever of the father's study of the Veda etc.,[1] that was not done by him through some fault, and thus protecting him thereby is the son signified (by the noun) *putra.*[2] [320]

[1]The word etc. stands for performance of rituals.
[2]This is a typical Brāhmaṇic derivation in BU— viz. derivation of one noun from two verb roots *pṝ* and *trai.*

संपूर्णस्वात्मकार्योऽयं पिता दैवात्मना स्थितः ।
पितुः सामिकृतं कार्यं पूरयन्वर्तते सुतः ॥३२१॥

[Now there is the exposition of the Śruti passage *sa yady anena* ....]

This father,[1] who has accomplished all of his duties, now remains in the divine body[2] (and the son) keeps on completing the incomplete (lit. half-done) activity of the father.[3] [321]

[1]Namely, one who has performed the Sampratti ritual.
[2]Cp. *daivaprāṇaḥ* in verse 317 above.
[3]This is in support of the derivation of the word *putra* offered in the preceding verse.

मृतेरुच्छिद्यते लोकः साधनोच्छित्तिहेतुतः ।

पितुरित्यपि नाशङ्का कार्या यस्मात्स एव तु ।
पुत्रेणैव शरीरेण कुर्वन्नास्ते नवं नवम् ॥३२२॥

Further, an objection should not be raised that, in the case of the father, the world (of men) gets lost (lit. destroyed) by his death, viz. by the cause of the destruction of the means,[1] since he himself keeps on doing the rituals, one after another,[2] through his body, verily the son. [322]

This explains *sa putreṇaivāsmil loke* ....

[1]This indicates the body, *jāyā*, *putra*, *dravya* etc. which belonged to him in his life-time.

[2]This is a free rendering for 'whatever remained to be done' (lit. every new activity).

पुत्रेणैवेत्यतो वक्ति नित्याधिकृतिसिद्धये ।
जयतीमं पिता लोकमेवंभूतेन सूनुना ॥३२३॥

Thererfore, the Śruti states (the words) *putreṇaiva*, in order that the obligatory entitlement to duty is established. (Indeed) a father wins this world through a son who has become thus (i.e. as instructed). [323]

न त्वात्मलाभमात्रेण जयः स्याज्ज्ञानकर्मवत् ।
पुत्राधिकारनुत्त्यर्थमथशब्दः प्रयुज्यते ॥३२४॥

But, the winning (of the world of men) would not result merely from the son's being born, in the same way as from knowledge and activity.[1] The word *atha*[2] is (now) used for setting aside the topic of the son. [324]

In verses 322-323 was explained the purport of the Śruti *sa putreṇa* .... The first line of this verse (i.e. 324) states the difference between a son (i.e. begetting him etc.) and *vidyā-karmaṇī* (i.e. *jñānakarmaṇī*). Now a new sentence begins with the word *atha* and starts a new topic, viz. the discussion of

the meaning of *evam* which does not refer to a son.

[1]As these two, only on being produced, become instrumental in the attaining of the worlds of the manes and of the gods.

[2]In *athainam ete devāḥ prāṇā amṛtā āviśanti.*

कृतसंप्रत्तिकं दैवाः प्राण वागादयः समम् ।
पितरं संविशन्त्युक्ताः सदा तद्भावभावितम् ॥३२५॥

The divine Prāṇa, Vāk etc., which have been mentioned,[1] all of them, enter together into (a father) who has performed the Sampratti ritual and who has ever considered himself to become the same.[2] [325]

[1]Supply: as *amṛtāḥ.*
[2]Namely, Śrauta Prāṇa.

पृथिव्यै चैनमित्यादि तद्व्याचष्टे यथा तथा ।
हेत्वर्थो वाथशब्दोऽयं यस्मात्संक्रामितक्रतुः ॥३२६॥

As the Śruti has explained that (viz. father's entering into the son) in the sentence *pṛthivyai cainam* ..., so (is there stated) the word *atha* to convey the sense of the reason, viz. Prāṇas, since the father has transferred his own thoughts (of rituals unto the son). [326]

The preceding verse referred to the entering of Prāṇa, Vāk etc. into a father who has performed the Sampratti ritual; now in this verse is explained the nature of that entering, i.e. transference of thoughts etc.

तद्वियोगादतो दैवा आविशन्ति यथोदिताः ॥३२७॥

Therefore, at the separation from that,[1] the divine Prāṇa etc., which are already described,[2] enter (into the son). [327]

[1]The word 'that' stands for the father's intention to perform

the ritual duties. Separation stands for transference.

[2]Supply: as *amṛtāḥ.*

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.18 up to verse 346.

श्रुतिस्था या हि वाक्तस्याः पञ्चमीयं परा भवेत् ।
ततो लब्धात्मलाभायाः प्रथमा जन्महेतुतः ॥३२८॥

That Vāk[1] which has been (relevant in this discussion) in the Śruti is (now mentioned) subsequently (by the word *vāk*) in the Ablative case and (later, the same word is put) in the Nominative case signifying (that Vāk)[2] which has come to exist from that (earlier mentioned Vāk) since that is the source of its origin. [328]

Here is an answer to some ticklish question: The word *vāk* occurs in the sentence *pṛthivyai cainam agneś ca daivī vāg āviśati*— first as *pṛthivyai* in the Ablative (the Dative standing for the Ablative, owing to case attraction in *agneḥ*— a Vedic peculiarity) and later in the Nominative. How is one to account for the two cases?

The verse is explained by SP thus: *yā śrutidṛṣṭā prakṛtā grāhyā vāk pūrvasiddhopāsyasūtrarūpā tasyāḥ parastāt pṛthivyā agner iti cāpādānapañcamī; ādhārādheyabhūtopāsyasūtravāgrūpād apādānāt prāptaprakṛtopāsakaphalabhūtavācaḥ parastād daivī vāg iti prathamety arthaḥ.*

The exactness of the translation is doubtful!

[1]This is Sūtrarūpa Vāk which one has to worship (or meditate on).

[2]This is diviṇe Vāk which is the result obtained by the worshipper.

वाचं संश्रुत्य वाक्यस्थां चिनुते भावनामयीम् ।
उपादानमतः श्रौती स्याद्वाणी भावनात्मनः ॥३२९॥

Having heard (i.e. known) the Vāk (of the nature of the

Sūtrātman) which is conveyed by the sentence (of the Śruti),[1] he adopts (that speech) which is full of devotion[2] (to the Sūtrātman) as the means.[3] Then there will follow the (divine Vāk), mentioned in the Śruti (in the father) who has been (intensely) thinking (about Sūtrātman). [329]

This explains why it is said in the preceding verse that Vāk has come into existence.

[1]This is the Vāk that is in the nature of the Sūtrātman.

[2]*bhāvanāmayī* refers to the devotee's (i.e. Upāsaka's) speech which is full of devotion to the Sūtrātman— it is consequently capable of bringing about a change in his nature, i.e. he becomes the Sūtrātman.

[3]It is that *vāṇī* which is explained in the preceding note— as a means it is naturally beneficial to the devotee, since thereby he attains the nature of the Sūtrātman. The adoption of this Vāk by the devotee means its coming into existence.

न हि वस्तु स्वतःसिद्धमन्यत्स्यात्परमात्मनः ।
सदेवेत्यादिकं शास्त्रं बाधितं स्यात्तथा सति ॥३३०॥

Verily, the thing, which is self-established, cannot be other than the highest Ātman. If it were there,[1] the scriptural text beginning with the words *sat eva* ... would be opposed.[2] [330]

This answers an objection by Bhartṛprapañca.

It is time and again mentioned in previous verses that the Sūtrātman is *svataḥsiddha* 'self-established'; therefore there is an objector's argument here. The devotee's speech, becoming one with the Sūtra-vāk, would then be *svataḥsiddha*, i.e. it has to be considered as 'unborn'!

[1]This is to suggest the acceptance of the Sūtrātman as *svataḥsiddha*.

[2]This is then the consequence of the preceding.

धिया धियेति कार्यत्वं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः स्वयम् ।

श्रुत्यैव स्पष्टमाख्यातं नातोऽभिव्यक्तीरिष्यते ॥३३१॥

In the words *dhiyā dhiyā* it is clearly stated by the Śruti itself that the entire world is but an effect;[1] therefore the manifestation of the same[2] is not acceptable (lit. desired). [331]

The verse rejects a statement possibly in the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca: *bhinnaghaṭapradīpaprakāśavad abhivyaktimātraṃ vācaḥ* as reported by NKL(note) in the comment on verse 330.

[1]This means it is not *svataḥsiddha*, since, like every effect, it is produced.

[2]*abhivyakti* means the appearance of what has been already existing.

आर्तश्रुतेश्च प्राणादि वाचारम्भणशास्त्रतः ।
नात्मवत्स्यात्स्वतःसिद्धमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतेस्तथा ॥३३२॥

Prāṇa etc. cannot be self-established like the Ātman (as it is evident) from the statement regarding an *ārta* 'what is an effect/perishable', from the text about the (world as mere) activity of Vāk and also from the scriptural statement regarding their origin etc. [332]

This answers the preceding argument: Vāk etc. cannot be *svataḥsiddha.*

[1]Cf. *ato 'nyad ārtam* (BU 3.4.2; 3.5.1; 3.7.23); *vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam* (CU 6.1.4) and *etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3).

कर्तृभिः क्रियते तस्माद्भावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः ।
त्र्यन्नात्मकमिदं विश्वं नातोऽभिव्यक्तिरिष्यते ॥३३३॥

Therefore this world, which is of the nature of the three foods is produced by the performers (of rituals) through their devotion, knowledge and activity. Consequently, manifestation of the same is not acceptable. [333]

This gives some more reasons as to why *prāṇa* etc. are not said to be self-established.

ब्रह्मैवेदं तथात्मैव पुरुषश्चेति चागमः ।
एवं सत्यर्थवान्नः स्यादन्यथा स्यादनर्थकः ॥३३४॥

And the Vedāntic tradition (i.e. Vedāntic instruction): '(all) this is only Brahman,[1] also the Ātman[2] and Puruṣa[3] as well' would be for us meaningful, only if this is accepted;[4] otherwise, it would be meaningless. [334]

[1]Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.12.
[2]Cf. CU 7.25.2.
[3]Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.4; *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.15.
[4]This refers to the non-acceptance of the manifestation, mentioned in verses 331-332.

पुत्रकर्मापरज्ञानसाधनान्यपरे जगुः ।
मनुष्यलोकपित्रमरलोकेभ्यः स्युर्निवृत्तये ॥३३५॥
एवं मोक्षार्थतां तेषां पुत्रादीनां प्रचक्षते ।
लोकव्यावृत्तिमार्गेण श्रुतिस्तेषां निषेधकृत् ॥३३६॥
काम्यमेवाखिलं पाङ्क्तं कर्मेत्येवं प्रकृत्य तु ।
पुत्रादीनां स्वसाध्यार्थविनियोगोपसंहृतेः ॥३३७॥

Others have held (lit. sung): The means, viz. the son, the ritual activity and lower (lit. other)[1] knowledge, (lead to liberation);[2] (these are) for the attainment of the worlds of men, the manes and the gods.[3] [335]
Thus they hold (lit. speak) that the son and others serve the purpose of (attaining) liberation, in such a way that the (three) worlds come to cease.[4] (But) the Śruti decries (or censures) them, [336]
for, beginning with the remark that the entire Pāṅktakarman is but caused by desire, it has concluded with the injunction regarding the son etc. (to be used) towards the (effecting)

of the (desired result). [337]

[1]Supply: than the knowledge of the Brahman. Or, *vijñāna* 'subject-object oriented knowledge'.

[2]This is on the authority of the Śruti and the Smṛti regarding the removal of death— this is the view of Mīmāṃsakas.

[3]This is the view of Bhartṛprapañca who holds that this attainment of the worlds, when combined with the knowledge of the Ātman, would lead to liberation.

[4]This means: They are transcendent. (According to both the Mīmāṃsakas and Bhartṛprapañca.)

संसारफलतैवातः पुत्रादेर्गम्यते श्रुतेः ।
अविद्वद्विषयैवात ऋणश्रुतिरपीष्यते ॥३३८॥

Therefore it is understood from the Śruti that the son etc. have the nature of producing (only) transmigratory existence as the result. Therefore the statement regarding the debts[1] is also understood as referring to a non-knowing person.[2] [338]

[1]Cf. verses 259 and 260 above.

[2]That is, the non-knower of the Ātman.

प्रजया किं करिष्याम इत्येवं च प्रवक्ष्यति ।
नातो विदितवेद्यस्य कथंचित्स्यादृणश्रुतिः ॥३३९॥

Further, (the Śruti) will state (lit. say) *prajayā kim kariṣyāmaḥ*;[1] therefore there would not ever be a statement regarding the debts in the case of one who has known what is to be known.[2] [339]

[1]BU 4.4.22.

[2]This refers to the Brahman.

व्यावृत्त्यर्थानि नैतानि पुत्रादीनि यथा तथा ।
पृथिव्यै चैनमित्याद्या स्वयं निर्वक्ति नः श्रुतिः ॥३४०॥

The Śruti beginning with *pṛthivyai cainam* itself explains to us as to how these, viz. a son etc., are not for the cessation (of the world). [340]

In verses 337-339, Sureśvara refuted the view of Mīmāṃsakas and thereby some part of Bhartṛprapañca's argument also. Now, in verses 340-346, he refutes the view of Bhartṛprapañca in other respects.

न च त्र्यन्नात्मसंप्राप्तिः कैवल्यमिति युज्यते ।
तस्या मेधातपोजत्वात्पौनःपुन्येन तच्छ्रुतेः ॥३४१॥

Also, it is not reasonable (to hold) that the acquisition of the three foods means (attaining) *kaivalya* 'uniqueness',[1] because that[2] is repeatedly[3] heard to be (resulting) from *medhā* and *tapas.*[4] [341]

[1]That is, Brahmanhood (*brahmatva*).
[2]Namely, acquisition of the three foods.
[3]Cf. the repetition in *dhiyā dhiyā.*
[4]The reason is: what is produced cannot be permanent (and here Brahman).

तथा क्षयश्रुतेस्तस्य यद्धैतदितिवाक्यतः ।
पृथिवी शरीरमित्युक्तेः शरीरित्वं प्रजापतेः ॥३४२॥
नामरूपक्रियात्वेन मोहकार्योपसंहृतेः ॥३४३॥

In the same way, by hearing about its decrease from the Śruti sentence *yad dhaitat*[1] (and) from the statement *pṛthivī śarīram,*[2] (it follows that) Prajāpati is possessed of a body, [342]
(and also) from the concluding remark[3] about the effects of ignorance which have the nature of name, form and activity. [343]

This means: the three foods which are but this world are perishable. That is becoming the three foods (Sūtrātman) is not liberation.

[1]Cf. BU 1.5.2.
[2]Cf. BU 1.5.11.
[3]Cf. BU 1.6.1.

करयचिन्मुक्तयेऽलं स्यात्कस्यचित् त्र्यन्नवित्तये ।
सकृच्छ्रुतं वचोऽशक्तं विधातुं द्वयमञ्जसा ॥३४४॥

If a statement is understood (once) to be for effecting liberation of someone[1] (and at another time) to be for his attainment of the form of the three foods,[2] it is then to be pointed out that the statement heard only once cannot smoothly yield two meanings.[3] [344]

This is in answer to one who might hold one and the same Śruti statement to serve (more than one, i.e.) two purposes in the same way the Sun or water serve many purposes.

[1]Some hold that in the case of one who has become averse to ritual performances can, by being possessed of the nature of the three foods (the same as *sūtrātmatva*), attain liberation.

[2]This is in the case of one who is not averse to ritual performances. This one becomes the Sūtrātman but is not liberated.

[3]This is considered as the fault called Vākyabheda. In Śruti, a sentence can yield only one sense, not two. See SP's citation: *ekasya vākyasya sakṛcchṛtasya nānekārthatvam, bhidyate hi tathā vākyam.*

भूर्यर्थता प्रकाशादेः प्रत्यक्षादेव कारणात् ।
न त्वागमैकगम्येषु तथात्वमवसीयते ॥३४५॥

It is on account of the direct perception of light that it has (the capacity to reveal) many objects; but that sort of capacity[1] cannot be accepted (viz. understood) in respect of matters

to be known only from the Śruti. [345]

[1]Namely, *bhūryarthaprakāśatā.*

श्वेतोऽसौ धावतीत्यादेरनेकोक्तित्वकारणात् ।
अनेकार्थावसायः स्यान्न त्वेवमिह युज्यते ॥३४६॥

In the statements like *śveto 'sau dhāvati* and others, there can be understanding of more meanings than one (lit. not (only) one meaning), since (in that statement) there can be the state of expressing more meanings than one; but such a happening is not reasonably accepted here.[1] [346]

Here ends Sureśvara's refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.
[1]This means: in the case of the Śruti.

Now follows the exposition of the sentence sa evaṃvit ... in BU 1.5.20. (Sureśvara has left out commenting on BU 1.5.19, since that kaṇḍikā does not appear to make any specifically new/additional argument.)

निःशेषभूतात्मैकः सन्नधिदैवात्मना स्थितः ।
भूतपापैरसंकीर्णो दैवं सुखमुपाश्नुते ॥३४७॥

Having become the Ātman of all beings, this one alone[1] stays in the form of the superior divine being (viz. Prajāpati) and, being unaffected[2] by the sorrows (lit. sins) of beings,[3] he enjoys happiness. [347]

This is the purport of the sentence *sa evaṃvit sarveṣām bhūtānām ātmā bhavati yathaiṣā devataivam.*

[1]Becoming one with Prajāpati means not expecting anything else, for there exists none other.

[2]How he is unaffected will be clarified later in verses 353-361 below. Here, *pāpa* is used in opposition to *sukha.*

[3]*bhūtapāpaiḥ asaṃkīrṇaḥ* explains away a doubt arising from

becoming *sarvabhūtātmā* which would bring to him the sins of all beings.

सर्वभूतात्मभूतोऽसौ सर्वानन्यत्वदर्शनः ।
जगदुत्पत्तिसंहारैः क्रीडन्निव विचेष्टते ॥३४८॥

The one, who has become the Ātman of all beings and the seer of the non-distinction of all,[1] keeps on doing (various) activities, viz. creation and destruction of the world, enjoying sport as it were. [348]

This explains the meaning of the sentence taken up for discussion.

[1]Non-distinction of all from himself (who is now Prajāpati), therefore not seeing himself as different from all things in the world.

वाक्च सा सर्वभूतानां श्रोत्रं त्वग्रसनं मनः ।
घ्राणपादादयः सर्वे सर्वोपादानकारणात् ॥३४९॥

And that Vāk is the ear of all beings, the sense of touch (lit. skin), the tongue, and the *manas* (of all). All of these, viz. the sense of smell, the feet etc., (it becomes) on account of taking all of them (i.e. these of the beings) as the means (of its activity). [349]

ज्ञानं सप्रतिघं यद्वत्कार्यं वास्मासु दृश्यते ।
नैवमीशस्य सर्वत्र पूर्वोक्तादेव कारणात् ॥३५०॥

As it is noticed amongst us that knowledge or activity is with limitations, so is it never[1] (seen in the case) of the Lord (Prajāpati), for the reason already stated.[2] [350]

This verse points out that the worshipper of the three foods (*annatrayopāsaka*) is not only the Prāṇa of all, but is also their Vāk.

[1]*na sarvatra* 'never', or 'nowhere'.
[2]Because of *sarvātmatva*; cf. verse 347 above.

किंच सर्वाणि भूतानि तमवन्ति यथाबलम् ।
इममर्थं श्रुतिर्वक्ति दृष्टान्तेन प्रयत्नतः ॥३५१॥

Moreover, all beings protect[1] him (i.e. the worshipper of the three foods) according to their own strength. (And) this thought does the Śruti state with an illustration, with great care.[2] [351]

This is the purport of *sa yathaitaṃ devatāṃ ... gacchati* which explains the nature of the worship.
[1]Already (under verse 167) we have noticed the use of verb root *av* in the sense of 'to protect, or to favour'; cf next verse also.
[2]Or, very carefully.

पूर्वजन्माभिनिर्वृत्तां यथैवावन्ति देवताम् ।
तथैवैवंविदं भोगैः सर्वभूतानि सर्वदा ॥३५२॥

As they (viz. the worshippers of Prāṇa etc.) protect (i.e. keep secure or, favour = serve) the divinity (viz. Vāk), which the sacrificer has secured[1] in his earlier life, so do all beings ever (protect) the knower of all this by (yielding) various enjoyments. [352]

This is the paraphrase (or explanation) of *sa yathaitāṃ* ....
[1]That is, (Vāk) with which he has become one; cf. SP: *pūrvasiddhadevatā* and therefore the worshipper as *tadbhāva-sākṣātkāravat.*

सर्वभूतात्मतापत्तिर्यद्येवंविद इष्यते ।
संगतिर्भौतिकैर्न स्यात्तस्य दुःखादिभिः कथम् ॥३५३॥

(An objection is raised:) If it is desired (by you) that there is for such a knower (i.e. the worshipper of Prāṇa etc.) the

attainment of the nature of all beings, then how is it that there is no connection of him with the miseries etc. experienced by (or belonging to) those beings? [353]

This verse raises a question about what is said in verse 347 above, viz. *bhūtapāpair asaṃkīrṇaḥ.*

नापरिच्छिन्नबुद्धित्वात्तस्य दुःखाद्युपप्लुतिः ।
कुक्षिस्थक्रिमिदुःखैर्नो न मनागपि संगतिः ॥३५४॥

[This and the following verses (up to 361) are the answer to the preceding verse.]

(The answer is:) There is no affliction by grief etc.[1] in the case of him, because he has unlimited knowledge. Also, there is not even a little connection with the miseries caused by small worms which reside in the belly.[2] [354]

[1]The word etc. implies *sukha.*

[2]This is to say that the worshipper who has attained oneness with Prajāpati (or Sūtrātman), might still have worms in the belly. But they cannot affect him as in his earlier life. Cp. the oft-quoted line *prārabdhakarmaṇām* ... cited under verse 257 above.

अस्मदाद्यभिमानित्वे तस्यास्मद्दुःखसंगतिः ।
तस्य कृत्स्नाभिमानित्वान्नास्मन्मात्राभिमानता ॥३५५॥

There is his connection with our (common-felt) sorrows, only while he entertains ego.[1] (But) now when he comes to have the awareness of oneness of being (identical with) all (in the world), he does not entertain his identity with 'I' etc. [355]

[1]The words 'entertains ego' are a brief expression for 'having the notions such as 'I', 'mine' etc.

ईश्वरत्वाच्च तस्यास्मद्दुःखैर्न स्यात्समागमः ।
अस्माकं दुःखसंप्राप्तिरनैश्वर्यकृतैव तु ॥३५६॥

On account of his being the overlord (of all), he does not have any connection with our sorrows. As against this, our experiencing sorrow is caused by not having attained the overlordship. [356]

This is to say: Despite entertaining identity will all, this one does not experience our sorrows— we feel them because we are not one with 'Īśvara' (i.e. Prajāpati or Sūtrātman).

इत्यादि हृदये कृत्वा न्यायं श्रुतिरुदाहरत् ।
यदु किंचेति विस्पष्टं प्रजादुःखनिषेधकृत् ॥३५७॥

Keeping all this[1] in mind, the Śruti has introduced the rule in clear words *yad u kiṃ ca*, which denies (in the case of this one who has become one with Prajāpati) the miseries of the beings. [357]

[1] *ityādi* means this: *iti* is for what is stated in the preceding verses. *ādi* refers to the worshipper's achieving *sarvakṛttva* and *sarvātmatva.*

यच्छोचन्ति प्रजाः सर्वा दुःखैराध्यात्मिकादिभिः ।
आसामेवात्मभिः साकं तद्दुःखमुपयुज्यते ॥३५८॥

Whatever all the beings grieve over, viz. the miseries pertaining to the body etc.,[1] is to be connecte l (only) with their bodies.[2] [358]

This is the meaning of *yad u kiṃ cemāḥ prajāḥ śocanti amaivāsāṃ tad bhavati.*

[1]The word etc. stands for *ādhibhautika* 'caused by elements' and *ādhidaivika* 'caused by gods'.

[2]This is about the common or ordinary people who have to

experience (verb root *bhuj*) the miseries (implying happiness as well) as *bhoga*. These are caused by their identifying themselves with various limitations of their intellect.

यथोक्तन्यायतो दुःखं न सार्धं देवतात्मना ।
कृतनाशस्तथा च स्यादकृताभ्यागमस्तथा ॥३५९॥

On account of the reason(s) stated above, there is no misery (accompanying) him, who has become divine in nature. (But, if it were that)[1] there would follow (these two faults, viz.) nullifying what is done and also the acceptance of what is not done.[2] [359]

The emphasis on *eva* in the preceding verse is explained. Further, the objector again says: 'This Upāsaka, who has obtained oneness with Prajāpati and is also possessed of the nature of all beings (cf. *sarvātmatva*), must experience the *bhoga*s of all.' To this, there is an answer.

[1]That is, if he (the *sarvātman*) was understood to suffer misery.

[2]This is the reason why the worshipper, (now) identical with the divine, does not suffer. Here, *kṛtanāśa* literally means destruction of (i.e. nullifying) what is earlier done (Upāsanā) and *akṛtābhyāgama* means acceptance of result(s) produced by some activity which is not done by the worshipper (Upāsaka).

पुण्यमेव कृतं यस्मात्पुण्यमेवामुमेत्यतः ।
पापस्याकरणादेव नैति पापं कदाचन ॥३६०॥

Since only merit was collected (by the worshipper in his earlier life), therefore only merit comes to him (and) only by not doing any sin, (now in this later state of oneness with Prajāpati), he never comes to have any sin. [360]

The first line explains *puṇyam evāmuṃ gacchati* and the sentence *na ha vai devān pāpaṃ gacchati* clarifies the second line of the previous verse.

अग्निं न तं कते शैत्यमग्निवस्तुस्वभावतः ।
पाप्मानो देवतां तद्वद्देवतात्मस्वभावतः ॥३६१॥

Cold does not affect (lit. come to) fire because of the nature of fire as it is; in the same way sins (do not affect) the god (viz. Prajāpati) because of his nature, viz. godhood. [361]

This illustrates the thought in the preceding verse.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.5.21-22 up to verse 375.

सर्व एव समाः प्राणा इत्युक्तेः साम्यनिश्चितौ ।
उपासने विकल्पेन प्राप्ते मीमांस्यते व्रतम् ॥३६२॥
दैववागादिसंपत्तिर्मृतस्य त्र्यन्नदर्शिनः ।
जीवता किं व्रतं धार्यमिति मीमांस्यतेऽधुना ॥३६३॥

Since it was (earlier) stated that all Prāṇas (i.e. Prāṇa, *manas* and Vāk)[1] are all equal and there was (thus) the decision of their equality, there now follows a doubt as regards their worship[2] and therefore is the vow (or meditation) being considered (in what follows). [362]
(It is learnt that) when a person, who knows (himself as) the three foods, dies, he becomes the divine Vāk etc. Therefore is now considered what vow should be followed by that while he is alive. [363]

What now follows has the purport of answering one who would have said that the discussion of 'seven foods' is completed at the end of BU 1.5.20 and then questioned about the purpose of *athāto vratamīmāṃsā*. Verses 362 and 363 state the purport of the whole argument.

SP and NKL point out the substance in the argument thus: under the doubt if 'any one of the three (i.e. *manas*, Vāk and Prāṇa) is to be worshipped (i.e. meditated upon) or all the three are to be worshipped together' and the decision is that

Prāṇa is to be worshipped principally.

[1]Refer to verse 194 above; also cf. BU: *te ete sarve eva samāḥ sarve anantāḥ* ... mentioned under that verse.

[2]Regarding the superiority of the *upāsya* 'object to be worshipped'.

सर्वात्मकर्मसंन्यासात्प्राप्ते नैष्कर्म्यरूपके ।
प्राणव्रतविधानार्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥३६४॥

(Now) is introduced the subsequent portion (of the Śruti) for presenting the vow of (i.e. the meditation on) Prāṇa, (for a person) after he has attained the state of not having to perform (any ritual activity) by having given up his own ritual activities in their entirety.[1] [364]

[1]This refers to the time of his performing the Sampratti ritual.

बहूक्त्यैव तु सर्वेषां सिद्धं पूर्वमुपासनम् ।
स यो हैतानिति ततो नेदं पूर्वमपेक्षते ॥३६५॥

By the very reference to many (objects of Upāsanā) in the statement *sa yo haitān* ... there is already established the worship of all. Therefore it is not that this vow is related only to Prāṇa. This (vow, viz. the one under consideration) expects (that sentence: *sa yo haitān* to precede it). [365]

This verse anticipates the opponent's view: 'There is reference to the vow of only Prāṇa' and answers it: The earlier sentence (cf. 1.5.13) precedes the statement *athāto vratamīmāṃsā*.

वाक्स्वान्तयोः स्वरूपोक्तिर्वृथैव स्यात्पुरोदिता ।
तयोरुपासनं नो चेत्प्राणवत्स्याद्विवक्षितम् ॥३६६॥

(The argument above goes further:) The description of the nature of Vāk and *manas* which is given earlier would be meaningless if their worship (also) were not intended to be

in the same way as of Prāṇa. [366]

मृत्युना श्रमरूपेण ग्रस्ता वागादयो यतः ।
म्लोचन्त्यपि च श्राम्यन्ति तेन भग्नव्रताः स्मृताः ॥३६७॥

Since Vāk etc.[1] are overpowered by death in the form of fatigue, they (i.e. the gods) feel fatigue and (Vāk etc.) become tired; therefore they are stated to have abandoned (or, have been lost to) their vows (i.e. activities). [367]

This explains the meaning of *tasmād ete etenākhyāyante prāṇa iti.*

[1]The word etc. refers to *manas* and the gods connected with Vāk and *manas.*

तद्रूपो मध्यमो वायुः श्रमास्तमयवर्जितः ।
यतोऽभग्नव्रतस्तस्मात्तस्यैव व्रतमाश्रयेत् ॥३६८॥

[Here follows the story of the quarrel amongst various organs.]

The middle wind and Vāyu,[1] having its[2] form, was not affected by (lit. was without) fatigue and (final) loss. (Thus) since it had not abandoned its vow (i.e. activity); therefore one should take to (i.e. observe) the vow of it alone. [368]

This refers to *athemam eva nāpnod yo 'yam madhyamaḥ prāṇaḥ.*

[1]The words *madhyama* and *vāyu* refer to the *adhyātma* and *adhidaiva* forms of Wind (=Prāṇa).

[2]The word 'it' refers to Prāṇa, i.e. Mṛtyu.

प्राणे म्लोचन्ति वायौ च वागाद्यग्न्यादयो यतः ।
प्राणस्यैव व्रतं धार्यमतो नान्यस्य कस्यचित् ॥३६९॥

Since the Vāk etc. and Agni etc.[1] merge (lit. become lost) into Prāṇa, therefore the vow only of Prāṇa is to be undertaken

and not of any other.[2] [369]

[1]The first etc. refers to *manas* and the second to the gods of Vāk and *manas*.

[2]It means: because Upāsanā of Prāṇa includes that of Vāk and *manas* also. This is clarified in the next verse.

प्राणैकालिङ्गनात्प्राणा यथा तन्नामरूपिणः ।
आसन्प्राणविदप्येवं प्राणात्मोपासनाद्भवेत् ॥३७०॥

Since, on account of their (viz. of Vāk and others) having clung to Prāṇa, they came to have its name and form, therefore a knower of (the nature of) Prāṇa also comes to have, through his meditation on that, the name and form of Prāṇa likewise. [370]

This is the purport of *tasmād ete* ....

सर्वेन्द्रियेषु यावान् स्यात्परिस्पन्दः क्रियात्मसु ।
प्राणस्यैव स विज्ञेयस्तेषां त्वर्थप्रकाशनम् ॥३७१॥

Whatever movement[1] is noticed in all organs[2] which have the nature of doing activity, let that be known as of Prāṇa and, as for them, there is only (the function of) revealing[3] their own objects. [371]

[1]The word 'movement' stands for every activity, even illuminating or revealing; i.e. causing perception of objects.

[2]These are eleven in all; five *jñānendriyas*, five *karmendriyas* and the eleventh is *manas*.

[3]The word 'revealing' signifies all movement (clarified in the note 1 above).

यथा वागादयस्तद्वदधिदैवेऽपि योजयेत् ।
अग्न्यादिषु परिस्पन्दो वायोरेवेति निश्चयः ॥३७२॥

As Vāk etc. (have become known by the name and form of Prāṇa), so also, in the case of the sphere of gods, should one (i.e. the worshipper) understand. The decision is: whatever be the movement (noticeable) in Agni and others, it is only that of Vāyu.[1] [372]

[1]NKL points out *calanasya prāṇadharmatva* (SP: *calanasva-bhāva*).

वागाद्यनुग्रहः सिद्धस्त्वग्न्यादेः कर्म केवलम् ।
सर्वेन्द्रियाणामात्मैव प्राणो सर्गो लयस्तथा ॥३७३॥

The favour of Agni and others[1] done to Vāk and others[2] is (thus) established (in the Śruti) as the singular (or matchless) doing (of Prāṇa). (Therefore) Prāṇa is the (real) nature of all organs[3] and also their origin and merger (i.e. the end/the meeting point).[4] [373]

The first line refers to the Śruti statements *agnir vāg bhūtvā* (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 1.2.4) and others. That means the favour done to Vāk etc. which are explained in note 2 on verse 371 above.

[1]These are various gods who superintend over the activities of the organs. Their entry into these latter is their favour.

[2]Others mean the remaining organs.

[3]This is, in reality, not merely of organs, but also of their gods.

[4]This means: where they finally merge in.

प्राणरूपाभिधानाभ्यां ख्याता वागादयो यथा ।
प्राणवित्संज्ञया ख्यातिं याति विद्वत्कुलं तथा ॥३७४॥

As Vāk and others have been known by the form and name of Prāṇa, so also, does the family of a knower (i.e. the worshipper) of Prāṇa become known as (lit. by the name) the knower of Prāṇa. [374]

यश्चापि प्राणवित्स्पर्धी स्पर्धामनु स मृत्युवत् ।
शोषमित्वा मृतिं याति द्विष्यान्नातोऽनवेदिनम् ॥३७५॥

And whosoever is a rival with the knower of Prāṇa becomes, after (entering into) rivalry with him, withered as after death, and then (or finally) dies. Therefore one should not be inimical to the knower of Prāṇa. [375]

This explains the meaning of *ya u haivaṃvidā spardhate anuśuṣyaty anuśuṣya haivantato mriyate.*

Now follows the discussion of Bu 1.5.23 up to the end.

ब्राह्मणोक्तार्थदार्ढ्याय श्लोको मन्त्रोऽनुकीर्त्यते ।
यतश्चोदेति सूर्योऽसौ यत्र चास्तं निगच्छति ॥३७६॥
प्रश्नरूपमिदं वाक्यं यतः प्रत्युक्तिरुच्यते ।
प्राणादित्यादिना भानोरुदयास्तमयौ कथम् ॥३७७॥

With a view to supporting the matter stated in the Brāhmaṇa[1] there is now stated a verse, a Mantra,[2] viz. *yataś codeti sūryo 'sau, yatra cāstaṃ nigacchati.*[3] [376]
This Śruti statement has the form of a question, since there is an answer stated in the words *prāṇāt* ....[4] (And, on this, the question is:) How are there the rise and the setting understood in the case of the Sun?[5] [377]

[1]That is, the explanation (in prose) of the original Mantras in the Upaniṣad; cf. the usual remark in Vedic literature: *tasyoktam brāhmaṇam.*

[2]*śloka* and Mantra are in apposition. In usual practice, *śloka* is used for a metrical verse in non-Śāstric literature, while Mantra is for a verse in sacred literature or Śruti. Yet, Sureśvara is here using the words in only one sense. The *kaṇḍikā* states: *athaiṣa śloko bhavati.* SP points out that the purpose of the preposition in *anukīrtyate* is to point out that the second line of this Vārtika is not a Mantra— it is *śloka* (already known

as Kārikā, it being in Śāstric literature).

[3]BU 1.5.1-2.

[4]In the Vedic *yataś chodeti* ... there is not used the interrrogative particle *kim* or (or its form). Yet, since what follows as an answer indicates the character of a question.

[5]It means: On what authority it is so said? This is because the Śruti states that these are used on account of Prāṇa.

यदा वै पुरुषः शेते प्राणमप्येति वाक्तदा ।
चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनस्तद्वज्जायते तत एव च ॥३७८॥

When a man sleeps, then does Vāk enter into the Prāṇa, (so also do) eyes, ears and *manas*. Also (each[1] one of them) originates only from that.[2] [378]

In the preceding verse the question is asked about the rise and the setting– this is for merger– of the Sun. The answer, given in the Śruti (cf. note 5 on that verse), is: 'On account of Prāṇa.' Now, in order to explain that answer, Sureśvara first states the rise and merger of Vāk etc. as caused by Prāṇa and then (in verse 379) those of Fire etc., Fire being taken as the Sun (also).

[1]The word 'each' is used in view of every singular form *cakṣus* and *śrotra*.

[2]This implies also their merger into Prāṇa.

अधिदैवतमप्येवं वायोरग्न्यादिसंभवः ।
अप्ययश्च यथाध्यात्मं श्रेयान्प्राणस्ततोऽन्यतः ॥३७९॥

In the world of gods also, the origination of Agni and others is from Vāyu (i.e. Prāṇa) likewise; so also is their merger (into it). Therefore, in relation to the body, Prāṇa is superior to others (viz. *prāṇa*s 'organs'). [379]

आत्मैव प्राणशब्दः स्यात्प्राणबन्धनवाक्यतः ।
असदेवेदमित्युक्तेरात्मनो भानुसंभवः ॥३८०॥

The Ātman is signified by the word *prāṇa*; (this is understood) from the Śruti statement *prāṇabandhana* ....[1] (Also) from the statement *asad evedam*[2] (it follows that) the rise[3] (lit. birth) of the Sun is from the Ātman. [380]

For explanation see SP on this verse; it is too elaborate to reproduce.

[1]Cf. CU 6.8.2.

[2]CU 3.19.1.

[3]This implies the setting also.

यत एव समुत्पत्तिस्तत्रैव प्रलयोऽपि च ।
मृदो जातस्य कुम्भस्य न लयो वीरणादिषु ॥३८१॥

From what there is rise (or, origination of the Sun etc.), in that itself is there (the) merger of them as well. (Verily) a pitcher, which is produced from clay, does not have its merger into a wooden pin of the spindle etc.[1] [381]

[1]The second line is a *vyatirekadṛṣṭānta* 'contrary example'. The word *ādi* stands for various means (i.e. material causes) of other kinds of production.

वागादिगणधारित्वाद्धर्मं वायुव्रतं विदुः ।
चक्रिरे दधिरे धर्मं धारणं प्रकृतं यतः ॥३८२॥

They have known the vow of Prāṇa as Dharma, since it (i.e. Prāṇa) sustains the entire group (of organs) that is headed by Vāk, since they have made, i.e. held, that as Dharma from which all sustenance is obtained (or understood). [382]

This refers to the Śruti: *taṃ devāś cakrire dharmam* ....

अद्यापि क्रियते तैस्तत्कर्तारश्चापि तत्सुराः ।
अध्रियन्त यममुर्हि तस्मिन्काले पराजिताः ।

धर्मव्रतं तदेवाद्य बिभ्रत्यग्न्यादयः शुभम् ॥३८३॥

Even now (that vow) is observed by them; also (their gods) will observe that which they observed[1] then, at that time, when they were defeated. The same auspicious vow of Dharma do Agni and others observe (even) today. [383]

[1]This refers to *yad vā ete amum adhriyanta* ....

अभग्नं मृत्युना यस्मात्प्राणस्यैव व्रतं ततः ।
एकमेव व्रतं प्राणं चरेदा मरणात्सदा ॥३८४॥

Since the vow of (i.e. observed by) Prāṇa was not overcome (i.e. was not set to nought) by death (and fatigue), therefore one should ever observe only one vow, viz. Prāṇa,[1] till death. [384]

[1]*vratam prāṇam* are really *prāṇavratam.* Translation takes the words in apposition. In that case, Prāṇa is to be understood as 'called Prāṇa'.

प्राण्यादपान्यात्प्राणात्मा ह्युक्त्यादिष्वपि कर्मसु ।
अन्तर्भावो यतोऽमीषां श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियकर्मणाम् ॥३८५॥
प्राणकर्मणि तेनैतदेकमेव व्रतं चरेत् ॥३८६॥

May (an individual) breathe in (and/or) breathe out, he is of the nature of Prāṇa in all (his) doings, viz. speaking etc., for the functions of the organs, ears etc., are included in the doing of Prāṇa. Therefore one should observe this vow, the only one (vow). [385-386]

प्राणापानात्मकं यस्माद्व्रतं प्राणैककर्तृकम् ।
प्राण्यादपान्याच्च ततो नित्यमा मरणाद्बुधः ॥३८७॥

Since the vow, which is of the nature of breathing in and breathing out, has Prāṇa alone as its agent, therefore a wise

man should ever, till his death, breathe in and breathe out, [considering the same as the observance of the vow of Prāṇa.] [1]
[387]

[1]The words in the square brackets need to be supplied. Cf. SP: *budhaḥ sarveṣu vāgādivyāpāreṣu prāṇavyāpāradṛṣṭis tad upāsīta.*

प्राणात्मनैव वागादिव्रतान्यपि चरेत्सदा ।
वागाद्यासङ्गवत्तन्मां पाप्मा मा प्रापदासुरः ॥३८८॥
इत्येवमभिसंधिः सन्विद्वान्प्राणव्रतं चरेत् ।
प्राणव्रतं चेदारब्धम् चिकीर्षेत्तत्समापनम् ॥३८९॥

One should ever perform the vows of Vāk and others also as only those, which have the nature of Prāṇa, bearing in mind this intention: Let not the demoniac sin come to me like my attachment to Vāk and others.
If the vow of Prāṇa is (once) commenced (by a person), let him desire to complete the same. [388-389]

अभ्यस्तेनामृतेर्यस्मात्सायुज्यादि समश्नुते ।
त्र्यन्नात्मदेवतायास्तु तस्मादेवं विधीयते ॥३९०॥

Since, by continuous (lit. repeated) observance (of this vow), one attains union etc.[1] (with Prāṇa), therefore is prescribed thus this vow to the god who has the nature of the three foods. [390]

[1]The word etc. refers to *sālokya* and *sārūpya.*

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके प्रथमाध्यायस्य

पञ्चमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥५॥

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BṚHADĀRAṆYAKOPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

1.6

[The Brāhmaṇa is not known by any specific name.]

This is about introducing BU 1.6.

तद्धेदमित्यविद्याया उक्तं कार्यमशेषतः ।
उक्तार्थस्यैव संक्षेपस्त्रयं वा इत्यथोच्यते ॥१॥

In the words *tad dhedam*[1] has been stated the entire (world of the) effects of Avidyā and, now, in the words *trayaṃ vā* ... is stated a summary of what has been said.[2] [1]

This justifies the introduction of the Brāhmaṇa (viz. BU 1.6) beginning with the words *trayaṃ vā.*

[1]That is, from BU 1.4.7 to the end of BU 1.5—this is an extensive discussion on Avidyā.

[2]This shows the purpose of summing up the contents of BU 1.4.7ff.— cf. SP *saṃkṣepavistarau ca sukhapratipattyartham iṣṭau.*

अज्ञातैकात्म्यकार्यं तद्यदेतदभिशब्दितम् ।
न तु विध्वस्तसंमोहप्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वगम् ॥२॥
एवमुक्ते विरक्तोऽस्मान्मुमुक्षुः श्रद्धयान्वितः ।
ब्रह्मज्ञानेऽधिकारी स्यात्कथं नामेति भण्यते ॥३॥

That is the effect of the absence of the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman which is thus (*etat*) mentioned and (*tu*) not that which pertains only to the inner self, together with its nature, the ignorance about which can be destroyed. [2]

That being said, a person, (who has become) averse (to the world) would be desirous of liberation, would be possessed of faith and would be entitled to the knowledge of the

Brahman. How this is to be is stated (in the following Brāhmaṇa). [3]

These two verses point out the purposefulness of these concluding remarks on the portion between BU 1.4.7 and the end of BU 1.5; that is to consider how a person, who has become averse to this world (which is caused by Avidyā), would become entitled to acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman.

अविद्योत्थपुमर्थेभ्यो विमुखीभूतमानसः ।
आत्मतत्त्वविजिज्ञासुस्तद्व्यावृत्तो भवेन्नरः ॥४॥

(It is to this purpose:) A man, whose mind has turned away from the aims of human life (the notions about which) had arisen from Avidyā, and has become desirous of knowing about the true nature of the Ātman, becomes[1] averse to them.[2] [4]

This is to stress the need of aversion to worldly existence.

[1]Sureśvara uses *bhavet* for *bhavati* (in the manner of Vedic injunctions).

[2]The word 'them' refers to *avidyotthapumarthas*, viz. those which have been described in BU 1.4.7.

बाह्यार्थबद्धधिषणः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवित्तये ।
नालं विरोधात्पुरुषः पराञ्चीत्यागमोक्तितः ॥५॥

A person, who has fixed his intellect on the external objects, is not able to get to know the true nature of the inner self, since that (viz. his attempt towards knowing that) involves opposition (as seen) from the Śruti statement *parāñci khāni* ....[1] [5]

This states why a person, non-averse to the world, is unable to ascertain the nature of Reality.

[1]*parāñci khāni vyatṛṇāt svayaṃbhūḥ.. (Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.1).

अविद्यामात्रहेतुत्वं न त्वैकात्म्यानुसारिता ।
यथोक्तवस्तुनः कस्मादित्येतत्प्रतिपाद्यते ॥६॥

It is discussed[1] as to why the thing which is stated[2] has only Avidyā as its cause and does not have the capacity to follow the uniqueness of the Ātman. [6]

[1]That is, ... will be discussed in BU 1.6.
[2]This refers to the world consisting in the seven foods which are discussed in BU 1.5.

अज्ञातादात्मनः साक्षादभिव्यक्तिः पुरोदिता ।
अहेतुफलरूपस्य नामरूपक्रियात्मभिः ॥७॥

There has been earlier stated the direct manifestation from the unknown Ātman which is by nature not a cause and/or an effect and (has become known by) name, form and action. [7]

There is, to begin with, a discussion on prapañca which consists in name, form and action. Now follows the discussion of BU 1.6.1.

नामाद्यात्मकतैवास्य ब्रह्मादेः स्थावरावधेः ।
न तु वस्त्वन्तरं तत्स्याद्यथा तदिह वर्ण्यते ॥८॥

This world,[1] beginning with the Brahman up to what does not move has merely the nature of name etc.[2] It is (really) nothing other (than the real) thing. How that is is explained here.[3] [8]

[1]Supply: which has the nature of the three foods.
[2]The word etc. refers to form and action.
[3]That is, in this Brāhmaṇa, viz. 1.6.

कारणत्वसमानत्वस्वात्मलाभत्वहेतुभिः ।
नामाद्यात्मकतैतस्य प्रपञ्चस्य प्रसाध्यते ॥९॥

It is by (giving) reason, (i.e. by stating that) this world has a cause,[1] equality (among its three constituents[2]) and origination,[3] that it is established to have the nature of name etc. [9]

[1] *kāraṇatva* = *kāraṇavattva.*

[2] The three foods (*annatraya*) are meant.

[3] In NKL, there is a note: name etc. are *uktha*, *sāman* and *brahan* and have, therefore, the nature of the cause etc. Cf. verses 13-15 below based on the Śruti passage *teṣāṃ vāg ity eteṣāṃ* ....

अनेकभेदसंभिन्नं यदेतद्व्याकृतं जगत् ।
नामरूपक्रियातत्त्वमेतत्सर्वं प्रतीयताम् ॥१०॥

Let it be understood that this world, which has become manifest, is entirely made up of (or, characterized by) numerous variety (in it) and has the nature of name, form and action. [10]

त्रयं वा इदमित्येवं प्रतिज्ञार्थमिदं वचः ।
हेतूक्तिरुत्तरो ग्रन्थस्तेषामित्यादिनोच्यते ॥११॥

Or rather, this, viz. (the words) *trayaṃ vā idam* ..., is thus a statement for (merely) enunciating (what has been already discussed) and the subsequent portion (of this Brāhmaṇa), which begins with the word *teṣām* is the statement of the reason. [11]

According to NKL, *trayaṃ vā* does not repeat what is conveyed by *teṣāṃ nāmnām* (this is in the note on this verse).

वागित्यनेन शब्देन नादमात्रं विवक्ष्यते ।

अपजुह्रुषितत्वात्तु नादोत्थस्य विकारतः ॥१२॥

By the word *vāk* is intended all that is sound, since it is intended to conceal[1] what has arisen from sound as its effect.[2] [12]

[1]NKL (text and commentary) read *apajuhūṣitatvāt* for *apajuhnuṣitatvāt* in the AnSS edition (text and commentary). It is difficult to decide what NKL seeks to convey.
[2]*vikārataḥ* is for *vikāratvataḥ*.

एषां नामविकाराणामुक्थं नादस्तदुत्थितेः ।
सर्वनाम्नामतो नाद उक्थमित्यभिधीयते ॥१३॥

Sound is the *uktha* (or origin) of all these modifications, viz. names, because they arise from that. Therefore the sound is described as the *uktha*, i.e. origin of all names. [13]

SP points out: all names (i.e. words in language) are, in essence, not different from their cause (*uktha*) like a pitcher from clay.
[1]This explains *etad eṣām uktham* in BU. In this entire context (i.e. in what follows) *uktha* is understood as 'origin' or 'cause'.

तथा सामान्यतो वाचो विशेषाणां तदात्मता ।
न हि निष्कृष्य सामान्याद्विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥१४॥

So also, sound is the *sāman* (generality) of all the modifications, viz. particular (expressions) of speech, since they arise from the other (i.e. from *sāman*). No particular (object) is experienced as taken away from (i.e. without) generality. [14]

This explains *etad eṣāṃ sāma*. SP remarks that all particular names are understood (or derived) from their generality and each has that in it like the *idam* portion continuing in the apprehension of a serpent etc. in a rope (in false knowledge).

आत्मत्वाच्च तथा वाचो नात्मीयोऽन्योऽवशिष्यते ।
कार्त्स्न्येनैवाभिसंबन्धादात्मीयस्येह वस्तुनः ॥१५॥

So also, owing to the nature of Vāk as the Ātman[1] (of all modifications of speech), there is not left out any other (as an effect) of the Ātman; this is because all the things here have, in their entirety, a close connection with the Ātman. [15]

This explains *etad eṣām brahma*. SP adds: Since Vāk is the Ātman of all sounds, they are not different from it, as a pitcher is not different from on account of (i.e. since it is made from) clay.

[1]That is, the essence.

कार्यकारणगो भेदः प्राप्तो लोके य ईक्ष्यते ।
अविचारितसंसिद्धः सोऽयं श्रुत्या निषिध्यते ॥१६॥

Whatever distinction between cause(s) and effect(s) obtains in this world is (but) established in the absence of (proper) thought and that is (here) rejected by the Śruti. [16]

The verse intends to state: The three preceding verses have rejected all 'distinction' in speech, since all of them are but one (viz. Vāk) in their essence. That distinction has proceeded from want of proper reasoning.

एवं सति प्रमाणत्वमपूर्वार्थावबोधनात् ।
अन्यथातोऽनुवादः स्याच्छ्रुतेर्ज्ञातार्थबोधनात् ॥१७॥

If this is so, there is authoritativeness[1] (in the Brāhmaṇa), for it would be capable of informing (us) of a thing not known before. If it were otherwise, (this Śruti) would have been only an Arthavāda by its informing us about what has been already known. [17]

The purport of this verse, together with its preceding, is: to establish *abheda* among all sounds and *bheda* among them is, in reality, only falsely conceived.

[1]Or, meaningfulness/purposefulness.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.6.2.

चक्षुषो विषयश्चक्षुःशब्देनेहाभिधीयते ।
रूपाणामिति संबन्धाद्रूपात्मत्वात्तथैव च ॥१८॥

Here (in this section), the objects[1] of the eye are stated by the word *cakṣus*, because they have connection with *rūpāṇām*....[2] and also because they are of the nature of the form.[3] [18]

[1]Singular stands for the plural according to *jātāv ekavacanam.*
[2]In *rūpāṇām* ... there is reference to particular *rūpa*s 'forms'.
[3]That is to say: *cakṣus* 'eye' is but an effect of *rūpa* which is the generality in all forms. Therefore the objects of the eye are but form. This is explained in the next verse.

यद्यद्धि रूप्यते किंचिच्छब्दस्पर्शादिकं धिया ।
तत्तद्रूपमिति ज्ञेयं तैजसत्वाविशेषतः ॥१९॥

Whatever, be it word and touch etc., is grasped (lit. seen) by a person's intellect, is to be known as *rūpa* 'form' since (each one of them) is uniformly of the nature of *tejas.*[1] [19]

This explains why one does not have to understand only whiteness etc. as *rūpa.*

[1]*cakṣus* is described as *tejas*, therefore its objects are *taijasa* and, as such, *rūpa.*

त्वाष्ट्रमेव हि सर्वत्र तेजो रूपादिलक्षणम् ।
तस्माद्विषयसामान्यं चक्षुःशब्देन भण्यते ॥२०॥

Everywhere only the *tejas* of the Tvaṣṭṛ[1] is the cause of form

etc.;[2] therefore generality in all the forms is referred to by the word *cakṣus.* [20]

[1]This stands for Savitṛ. Cf. 1.5.184.

[2]'Cause of form etc.' is really the illuminator of form etc. The word etc. has a reference to *yat ... śabdasparśādikaṃ rūpyate dhiyā* in the preceding verse.

हेतुतज्जाविभागेन कार्यकारणहेतुतः ।
वाचारम्भणशास्त्राच्च विकारानृततोच्यते ॥२१॥

This is assertion of the falsity (or unreality) of the modification, because, as the cause and its effects, there is (always) identity between a cause and its effect, and also on the basis of the scriptural statement about the function of speech.[1] [21]

This general remark is introduced here for justifying what is said above, viz. without the generality called *rūpa*, there cannot be (or exist) the particular or individual *rūpa*s 'forms'.

It seems from SP on the next verse that this is an explanation of the statement about *uktha.*

[1]Cf. *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmedheyam* (CU 6.1.4-6).

अन्तर्भावश्च सामान्ये विशेषाणामथोच्यते ।
सामान्यमेतत्सर्वेषां विशेषाणां समं हि तैः ॥२२॥

And then there is stated the inclusion of (all) the particulars in generality, for indeed generality of all particulars is equal to all of them. [22]

This explains the statement about *sāman* above.

न विशेषो न सामान्यं भेदतोऽभेदतोऽस्ति नः ।
तथा रूपविशेषाणां रूपमात्रात्मकत्वतः ।
स्रग्वत्सर्पादिकान्यद्वद्रूपं सर्वं बिभर्ति हि ॥२३॥

According to us, there does not (really) exist either particularity or generality, be it owing to the distinction or non-distinction among forms because all the particular forms are thus only (the general) form in nature and which bears all (other forms) just as a garland bears the form of a snake etc. [23]

From the word *tathā*, there is the explanation of *etad eṣām brahma*.

Now follows the discussion of BU 1.6.3.

उक्तं समासतस्तावदेकत्वं नामरूपयोः ।
कर्मणोऽपि तथैकत्वमधुना प्रतिपाद्यते ॥२४॥

Thus far is stated in brief oneness of name and form. Similarly the oneness of action also is explained. [24]

SP clarifies: As all particular names are explained as only 'name' and all particular forms are only 'form', so are all actions but 'action'.

वाक्चक्षुशब्दतो यद्वद्गृह्यते विषयस्तयोः ।
आत्मनो विषयस्तद्वदात्मशब्देन गृह्यते ॥२५॥

As from the words *vāk* and *cakṣus* are understood the objects of the two; so also from the word *ātman*[1] is grasped the effect(s)[2] of it. [25]

[1]Here the word *ātman* is the body.
[2]The effect (singular for plural) stands for the organ(s).

सर्वेन्द्रियपरिस्पन्दो व्यज्यते नः शरीरके ।
शरीरविषयस्तस्मादात्मेत्यत्राभिधीयते ॥२६॥

The activities[1] of all organs is revealed in our body; therefore

by the word *ātman* is expressed here the activities[2] of the body.[3] [26]

[1]This is *jātāv ekavacanam.*

[2]Here, *viṣaya* stands for activity. Singular indicates plural, as in the preceding line.

[3]In *śarīra*, the suffix *-ka* indicates the little importance of the body; cf. SP on this word in verse 33 below.

आत्मैव त्वस्य कर्मेति तथैवाभिहितं पुरा ।
अतोऽत्र कर्मसामान्यं गृह्यते देहसंश्रितम् ॥२७॥

So it was stated earlier[1] in *ātmaiva tasya karma*; therefore, in this context, action in general is understood as supported by the body. [27]

[1]BUBV 1.4.1845 and 1850.

नाम रूपं तथा कर्म यदेतत्त्रयमीरितम् ।
एकमेव भवत्येतत्त्रयं सद्देहमात्रकम् ॥२८॥

This triad, viz. name, form and action, which has been (thus) described before, is but one and this triad, which is but the body, is *sat* 'the existent (or reality)'. [28]

This explains the meaning of *tad etat trayam.*

विकर्तृत्वेन कर्मात्र नामरूपात्मनोर्भवेत् ।
कर्मणः साधनत्वेन नामरूपे व्यवस्थिते ॥२९॥

In this (body) is[1] here action the modifier[2] of what have the nature of name and form; (indeed) name and form have remained as the means to action. [29]

[1]*bhavet*=*bhavati* in Vedic manner; cf. note 1 on verse 4.
[2]*vikartṛ* 'acting (mutually as the cause and the result)'— SP.

रूपमेव प्रतिष्ठा स्यात्सर्वदा नामकर्मणोः ।
न हि रूपमनाश्रित्य विद्येते नामकर्मणी ॥३०॥

Ever[1] would form be the support of name and action, for name and form cannot exist without having resorted to form. [30]

This explains the significance of the word *itaretarāśraya* in BUB with a view to stating how *rūpa* is the support of *nāma* and *karman*.

[1]The word 'ever' refers to the time so long as these two are limited in a body.

प्राण एव प्रतिष्ठैवं सदा स्यान्नामरूपयोः ।
प्राणैकात्म्याश्रयाद्यस्मादात्मलाभः सदा तयोः ॥३१॥

In the same way, Prāṇa alone would ever[1] be the support of name and form, since the two ever have their origin in their oneness with Prāṇa. [31]

[1]See note on the preceding verse.

तद्वद्वागाश्रयत्वं च तयोः स्याद्रूपकर्मणोः ।
वाचा प्रकाश्यमाने ते प्रयुज्येते यतः सदा ॥३२॥

In the same way,[1] the two, viz. form and action, would be having their support in Vāk, since the two are used (in worldly doings) (only) when they are illuminated by Vāk. [32]

[1]This means: these two also become perceived through their oneness with Vāk.

आश्रयाश्रयिभावेन नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
एकार्थानां सतां तेषां संहतिः स्याच्छरीरके ॥३३॥

In a body, there remains (or exists) the ensemble of those which are of the nature of name, form and action and (which function) for one another as the support and the supported, serving the purpose of only one (viz. the Ātman). [33]

This explains the word *saṃhatam* in BUB.

एकः सन्नेष आत्मापि त्रयमेतत्प्रपद्यते ।
नामद्रूपक्रियाभिन्नो देहोऽयं गृह्यते यतः ॥३४॥

This Ātman also, remaining only one, becomes these three,[1] since this body is understood as characterized by name, form and action. [34]

[1]Namely, name, form and action.

एतन्मयोऽयमात्मेति तथा पूर्वं प्रपञ्चितम् ।
एतावद्व्याकृतं सर्वं यदेतत्संहतं त्रिभिः ॥३५॥

It has been earlier explained that this Ātman is made up of this (i.e. triad, name, form and action);[1] only this much is all that is manifest, viz. the one which formed (lit. collected) into one (whole) by these three. [35]

[1]Cf. BU 1.5.3.

तदेतत्खलु वैराजं नामरूपक्रियात्मकम् ।
नामरूपात्मसत्त्येन च्छन्नं प्राणामृतं तु तत् ॥३६॥

Thus is this indeed the form of Virāj which is made up of (the nature of) name, form and action; (indeed) that is immortal Prāṇa which is called (lit. covered) by the truth, viz. the body[1] consisting in name and form. [36]

[1]The word *ātman* here refers to body; cf. verse 25 above. This refers to the body of Virāj.

प्राणशब्देन लिङ्गात्मा भण्यते करणात्मकः ।
पिण्डस्य मरणे नैतन्म्रियतेऽतोऽमृतं मतम् ॥३७॥

By the word *prāṇa* is expressed the subtle body which is of the nature of (i.e. made up of) organs, (but) when the body dies, it does not die; therefore it is considered to be immortal. [37]

This explains *prāṇo vā amṛtam.*

पृथिव्यब्ग्निभूतानि सत्संज्ञान्यत्र लक्षयेत् ।
त्यत्संज्ञके तु विज्ञेये वाय्वाकाशे महात्मभिः ॥३८॥

Here (among the five known (elements) one should note *pṛthivī*, *ap* and *agni* as having the designation *sat* (and) the wise ones[1] (lit. the great ones) should know *vāyu* and *ākāśa* to have the designation *tyat.* [38]

There is now the derivation of the word *satya* from two words *sat* and *tyat.* (This is an example of the well-known typical Brāhmaṇic tendency to offer such etymology!) It explains the word *sattya* in *nāmarūpe sattyam.*

[1]SP clarifies *mahātmabhiḥ* thus: *mahaty ātmany avacchinne ceto dhārayutum icchadbhiḥ.*

सच्च त्यच्चेति तत्सत्त्यं पञ्चभूतात्मकं विदुः ।
करणायतनं स्थूलं वैराजं यत्प्रचक्षते ॥३९॥

Therefore what are *sat* and *tyat* are, they have known, (the reality) made up of five elements and this gross abode of organs is what they call as the gross form of Virāj. [39]

It is gross, since it can be called by a name; i.e. it is an object which can be perceived (or rather, it is knowable).

pṛthivī, *ap* and *agni* are directly perceptible, whereas *vāyu*

and *ākāśa* are imperceptible. These latter are known as *mahat*, the possible Ātman. *vāyu* indicates *mukhya prāṇa*. (?)

अस्याप्यन्तर्गतः प्राणो विज्ञानात्मेति यं विदुः ।
आ संसारात्स्थितः स्थास्नुः परिणामात्मकः सदा ॥४०॥

And the one, whom they (=the wise ones) have known as the knowing self (*vijñānātman*), the Prāṇa is within this (form of Virāj). That has remained permanent up to the end of transmigratory existence,[1] (but) ever in the form of the modifications.[2] [40]

[1]Cp. *ābhūtasamplavasthāna* in BUBV 1.5.200.
[2]That is, the manifest world. This is the nature of the abode of organs, the form of Virāj, mentioned in the preceding verse.

यथाकर्म यथाज्ञानमुपादत्ते शरीरकम् ।
प्लुष्यादिना समोऽतोऽयं श्रुतावप्यभिधीयते ॥४१॥

This one (viz. Virāj) takes up a body according to action or according to knowledge (of an individual).[1] Therefore this one is sung (or described) in the Śruti also as similar (in size) to a gnat.[2] [41]

This explains why the subtle body of Virāj undergoes transmigratory existence (as said in the preceding verse; this subtle body is in reality somewhat gross, for it is similar to a gnat (in size)– this on the authority of the Śruti– and can then be subject to modification, i.e. various manifestations.
[1]Supply: while he lead his life.
[2]Cf. BU 1.3.22 and BUBV 1.3.305: *samaḥ pluṣiṇā*.

उपात्ताशेषभूतोऽयं यथोक्तोपात्तदेवतः ।
कृत्स्नाविद्योत्थमानी च प्रत्यगज्ञानकारणात् ॥४२॥

This one,[1] which has taken up[2] all the elements, who has

(also) taken up the gods[3] that are (already) mentioned and which, therefore, feels itself to be (identical with) all that has arisen out of Avidyā, (is so[4]) on account of ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self.[5] [42]

[1]That is, the body of Virāj which is so far described as both gross and subtle— naturally the various organs (eleven in number, as pointed out earlier in a note on verse 1.5.371.

[2]That is, assumed the forms of.

[3]Supply: who are associated with the organs.

[4]That is, subject to transmigration.

[5]The Sūtrātman (i.e. the self of Virāj) is really the inner self of the individual, but it is overpowered by ignorance.

हैरण्यगर्भे तत्त्वज्ञो वैराजे च शरीरके ।
आबद्धात्माभिमानोऽयं गार्ग्योऽविद्यासमन्वितः ॥४३॥
कृत्स्नसंसारमान्येष सर्वोऽस्मीति व्यवस्थितः ।
ब्रह्मोपदेशविषयः श्रुत्यैवोत्थाप्यते जडः ॥४४॥

This Gārgya, who is a knower (in respect) of the body of Hiraṇyagarbha and (that of) Virāj[1] and feels himself to be one with the same, is (thus) overpowered (lit. accompanied) by Avidyā and, considering all this world (i.e. transmigratory existence) as his own, has remained (or, is happy) in the state of) feeling 'I am all (this).' (This one), the ignorant one, is (now)[2] introduced by the Śruti as the recipient[3] of the knowledge of the Brahman. [43-44]

This forms the purport of the concluding sentence in BU 1.6.

[1]The two bodies are subtle and gross.

[2]This refers to BU 2.1.1 which is to follow immediately.

[3]The word *viṣaya* stands for *adhikārī* 'eligible to receive'.

नामरूपाभिमानाभ्यां मर्त्याभ्याममृतः स्वयम् ।
प्राणः करणसंघातश्छन्नः संवेष्टितः सदा ॥४५॥

Prāṇa itself being immortal, is ever concealed, it is thus covered by the group of organs by (the subtle and the gross bodies which are) mortal (i.e. perishable) and have association (lit. oneness) with name, form and ego. [45]

This explains the meaning of *tābhyām* etc.

There is now in verses 46-51 the explanation in respect of the passage, tad etat trayam, as given by Bhartṛprapañca and then follows Sureśvara's refutation of it up to the end.

संप्रदायविदस्त्वत्र नानात्वैकत्ववादिनः ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मकं ब्रह्म नामरूपादिवज्जगुः ॥४६॥

But, in this respect,[1] the knowers of Vedānta tradition,[2] who hold (lit. advocate) difference and non-difference[3] (among name etc.), have stated (lit. sung) the Brahman (to be) consisting in difference and non-difference just like name, form etc.[4] [46]

[1]That is, in respect of the sentence *trayaṃ ca tad ekam* which refers to name, form and action.

[2]SP holds this as reference to Bhartṛprapañca (in the plural) for deriding him.

[3]The word etc. indicates *karman.*

त्रयं सदेकमेव स्यादेकं सत्तद्यथा त्रयम् ।
अनेनैवानुमानेन विद्याद्ब्रह्मापि तादृशम् ॥४७॥

Being a triad (i.e. three), it is[1] one; so also, being one, it is a triad. With (the help of) this illustration,[2] one should know that the Brahman also is likewise[3] (viz. like the triad). [47]

This refers to *trayam sat ekam ayam ātmā* which states the oneness of the three and *ātmā ekaḥ sann etat trayam* stating

'one is three'. This explanation of Bhartṛprapañca is opposed to Sureśvara's position: 'the Brahman is not like the three (or triad)'.

[1]That is, they are.

[2]This is for *anumāna*, viz. *dṛṣṭānta*.

[3]That is, *bhinnābhinna*.

दृगादिशक्त्यनेकत्वेऽप्येकमेव परं विदुः ।
शक्तिशक्तिमतोरैक्यादद्वैतमिति भण्यते ॥४८॥

They[1] have known the highest one to be only one[2] even though there is oneness the manyness/plurality of powers (or capacities) of seeing etc.[3] (And) the non-duality (of the Brahman) is posited (i.e. stated in the Śruti) for the reason that capacity and what is capable are, in reality, (but) one.[4] [48]

[1]Namely, seers of the Vedānta.

[2]This suggests that, being *bhinnābhinna*, it can have so many powers.

[3]The word etc. refers to hearing, touching and other functions of organs.

[4]This shows that there is not involved any contradiction with the Śruti.

सास्नादिषु यथा गोत्वमभेदेन व्यवस्थिम् ।
मिथः सास्नादयो भिन्ना गोत्वाभिन्नास्तथापि ते ॥४९॥

(This non-difference in difference is noticed thus:) As *gotva* (cowness) obtains as common in (lit. non-different) among many (animals) having a dewlap etc. the animals having a dewlap etc. are (at the same time) differentiated (from one another) and yet are not differentiated from *gotva*.[2] [49]

This illustration here paves way to Bhartṛprapañca's argument about the Brahman.

[1]That means: oneness of the Brahman exists among many objects which are but the single Brahman.

[2]The implication is: the various objects in the world can be considered as *bhinnābhinna*.

भिन्नाभिन्नात्मता यद्वत्स्थूलेष्वर्थेषु दृश्यते ।
सूक्ष्मेष्वपि तथा विद्यादनुमानबलाद्बुधः ॥५०॥

(Therefore) as being different and yet non-different is noticed among gross objects, so (it is noticed) among even subtle objects [1]— thus should an intelligent man know on the strength of the illustration. [50]

[1]This refers to the power of seeing and similar others— and consequently to the Brahman.

परपक्षे न दृष्टान्तः कश्चिदप्युपलभ्यते ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मकं तस्मात्सर्वं वस्त्विति निश्चयः ॥५१॥

In the view of the other (i.e. the opponent),[1] there is not a single illustration available;[2] therefore the decision is that all objects are both different and non-different.[3] [51]

[1]That is: in confirmation of the theory of the other Advaitin.
[2]Supply: for proving his view.
[3]This includes even the Brahman (as a *vastu*).

Now follows the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view.

अनुमानैकसिद्धत्वाद्भिन्नाभिन्नात्मवस्तुनः ।
आगमेनात्र किं कार्यं लिङ्गसिद्धानुवादिना ॥५२॥

If (thus) the thing which is in nature both differentiated and non-differentiated becomes known (or established) through (the help of) an illustration, what (then) is the use, in regard to this, of the Śruti which (merely) repeats what is known through

an illustration? [1] [52]

The argument about the meaninglessness of the Śruti, in the form of a question, is for asserting the inutility of *anumāna* and for silencing Bhartṛprapañca who also does not hold the Śruti as meaningless.

[1] *liṅga* 'lit. a characteristic' is here used as an equivalent of *anumāna* (used in the first line) in the sense of 'illustration'; cf. verse 47 above.

न चागमस्य तात्पर्यमेवंभूतेऽस्ति वस्तुनि ।
अस्थूलं नेति नेतीति ज्ञाताज्ञातह्नुतेस्तथा ॥५३॥

Also, the Śruti does not purport (to convey) a thing which has been thus,[1] for there is in it the negation of what is either known or unknown in the words *asthūlam*[2] and *neti neti*.[3] [53]

This rejects the idea that the Śruti is the authority for holding the Brahman as both differentiated and non-differentiated.

[1] That is *bhinnābhinna*.

[2] Cf. BU 2.8.8.

[3] Cf. BU 3.9.26; 4.4.22; 4.5.15.

विशेषात्मनिषेधाय तथा सामान्यरूपिणः ।
क्षुरविश्वंभरौ श्रुत्या दृष्टान्तौ प्रतिपादितौ ॥५४॥

(Further) the Śruti[1] has adduced the illustrations of a knife and Viśvambhara 'the supporter of all the world' for rejecting (the view that the Brahman is of) the nature of a particular object and also of what has the form of generality. [54]

[1] This refers to BU 1.4.7; cf. BUBV 1.4.636-645 and also 648-658.

अन्त्या विशेषा दृष्टान्तः परपक्षेऽपि विद्यते ।

त्वत्पक्ष एव दृष्टान्तो यथा नास्ति तथोच्यते ॥५५॥

(As regards the statement that) particular objets have an end (i.e. limit), there is in (your) opponent's view an illustration; but there is not (i.e. cannot be) any illustration in your view itself. How it is not (there) is now (i.e. hereafter) explained. [55]

This is in answer to the argument in verse 51 above, meaning: what Bhartṛprapañca has said to be the fault in the others' view is really in his own view.

In the third quarter, the reading in the NKL edition (text and commentary) is *tavaiva pakṣe* for *tvatpakṣa eva.*

निःसामान्या विशेषाः स्युर्गोता तेभ्यो न चेद्भिरुक् ।
अथ व्यावर्तते तेभ्यो गोत्वं ते खण्डवद्भवेत् ॥५६॥

The particular objects (viz. the cows) would be without generality in them, if *gotā* (=*gotva*) were not differentiated (i.e. existing apart) from them.[1] But if (*atha*) it differs (i.e. exists apart) from them, (only) then *gotva* would be, in your view, like any single (i.e. particular) object.[2] [56]

[1]The first line presupposes that cowness is not different (*abhinna*) from the individual objects; this means non-acceptance of 'generality'!

[2]This line contends the argument that generality is distinct (*bhinna*) from the individual objects; that means: what is called generality is also a particular.

व्यावृत्तं यदि भिन्नेभ्यस्त्वयाभिन्नगिरोच्यते ।
व्यावृत्तं न विशेषश्चेत्यहो विद्याविचेष्टितम् ॥५७॥

If what does not exist in the distinct (individual) objects, as described (by you) in the words '(It is) non-different from them, and what exists apart from (others) is not a particular

(object)', then (we have to say:) 'Oh! What achievement of learning!' [57]

The verse is in derision of the view that 'cowness' is both different and non-different (*bhinnābhinna*) from the particular cows. It presupposes generality as different from the nature of the particulars.

अव्यावृत्तं विशेषेभ्यस्त्वथ सामान्यमुच्यते ।
सामान्यस्य विशेषत्वाद्विशेषा एव केवलाः ॥५८॥

And again, what does not exist in the particular (objects) is described by you as generality, then generality, being (another) particular, (there would remain) only particulars! [58]

This presupposes generality as non-different from the nature of the particulars— cf. also verse 56 above.

न ह्यभिन्नधिया गोत्वं विशेषेषु प्रतीयते ।
विशेषमात्रनिष्ठत्वाद्भिन्नाभिन्नं किमुच्यते ॥५९॥

Indeed, *gotva* is not noticed among particular (cows) with the notion that it is non-different (from them); (thus) because it does exist only among particulars, why is it said that it is 'different and non-different'? [59]

This verse refers to the common experience of generality among cows and sets aside the possibility— suggested by the preceding verse— that there would remain only particulars.

अभेदः किं तयोर्योगः किं वैकात्म्यमभिन्नता ।
नाभेदो मेषयोर्योगे यथा भिन्नौ तथा युतौ ॥६०॥

(A question can be asked thus:) Is non-difference the conjunction of the two?[1] or is it oneness in nature or non-difference? (But it has to be observed that) there is not

non-distinction as in the case of two lambs' conjunction, (for the simple reason that) they are conjoint,[2] since they are different. [60]

It is now proposed to discuss the nature of *abheda* or *abhinnatā*.

[1]This refers to the two notions of generality and of particularity.

[2]The notion of the conjunction of two objects presupposes the distinction (i.e. separate existence) of the two.

व्यामिश्रं यदि वा शुद्धं गोत्वं भेदेषु गम्यते ।
नोभयत्राप्यभिन्नत्वमसाधारण्यसंस्थितेः ॥६१॥

(Possibly) cowness is grasped (or understood) among (cows) different (from one another) in its mixed form[1] or pure.[2] But (the situation is:) in both the cases, there is no non-difference (of cowness from them) on account of its existence in such of its nature as is uncommon.[3] [61]

This argument pertains to the nature of the experience (or grasping) of cowness among cows, disproving their *bhinnābhinatva*.

[1]Namely, that cowness and the individuality of the cow as one single object of experience.

[2]That is, *gotva* 'cowness' as distinct from a *go* 'cow'.

[3]That is to say: *gotva* is noticed in each of the individual cows and is, at the same time, distinguished from each.

भेदेषु चोपयुक्तं तद्गोत्वं तद्वा पृथक्स्थितम् ।
सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा कोऽनयोरभिधीयताम् ॥६२॥

And that cowness, be it existing[1] in the different (cows)[2] or existing apart from them, which of the two[3] is it, as generality or particularity[4] (of cows)? [62]

This argument assumes the non-difference (*abheda*) of cowness

and cows and discusses whether cowness is distinct or non-distinct [as NKL puts it: *īṣad-abhinna* or *atyantābhinna*] from cows. It suggests the difficulty felt in either case while deciding cowness at the *sāmānya* or *viśeṣa* in any cow.

[1]This is for *upayuktam*, 'conveying the sense of *a-pṛthak-sthitam*, i.e. non-different, which is in contrast with *pṛthak-sthitam*, i.e. different.

[2]Different (cows) is for *bhedas*.

[3]Namely, *a-pṛthak-sthita gotva* and *pṛthak-sthita gotva*.

[4]The meaning is: Is cowness, whether non-different or different from the cows, their generality or particularity. Let this be remembered here that *sāmānya* or *viśeṣa* is a *guṇa* in some *vyakti*.

उपयुक्तं विशेषत्वादितरस्याप्यनन्वयात् ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मतां नैति द्वैरूप्यासंभवात्तयोः ॥६३॥

If it is held to be non-different (i.e. existing among the individual cows), it has the nature of what is particular[1] and the other[2] also cannot persist (in each individual[3])— thus, it cannot have twofold[4] nature. [63]

This argues against the non-different existence of cowness among individual cows.

[1]Namely, it is particularity, i.e. it ceases to be generality. Since it is included in an individual, it cannot be said to be in another individual. This is to be understood thus: *gotva*, being included in an individual cow (i.e. a particular body), has to be different from every other cow.

[2]Namely, distinct existence. This is an example of Sureśvara's typically cryptic style. *itara* (in the second quarter) is used here in contrast with *upayukta* (in the first quarter) and stands for 'what is different', i.e. 'what exists as distinct'. Then the argument follows: If it is different, that cannot be said to exist in every other individual. It is like some particular called Khaṇḍa which cannot exist in another individual called Muṇḍa.

[3]It is not connected with them as generality.
[4]Namely, of generality and of particularity.

वस्तुवृत्तं न सामान्यं न विशेषस्तथैव च ।
अपेक्षामात्रतः सिद्धेर्व्योम्नि कार्ष्ण्यादिवृत्तवत् ॥६४॥

The nature[1] of anything is neither generality nor particularity, (since the two, viz. generality and particularity) come to exist only through the expectancy (of (or, dependence on) each other)[2] as darkness etc.[3] come to exist in the sky[3] (etc. owing to one's imagination).[4] [64]

The argument is: What we call generality and particularity are in reality the products of our imagination; i.e. we form the notions of them. This is exactly like our forming a notion of the darkness of the sky; it really does not exist, it is but imaginary.

[1]Sureśvara uses *vastuvṛtta* in the sense of *vastusva- bhāva (= vastusvarūpa)*.

[2]The two expressions generality and particularity represent our notion about the relation among things. Neither can be understood without the other.

[3]Darkness is really 'the blue of the sky'; it is only a product of imagination. *ādi* is possibly for serpent or silver seen through the notion about it.

[4]This is to emphasise the non-duality of what is merely conceived, i.e. taken as existing. Cf. *Gauḍapādakārikā* 4.57.

प्रत्यभिज्ञानतोऽभेदः खण्डमुण्डस्थगोत्वयोः ।
एकाधिकरणज्ञानात्खण्डाद्यैस्तद्विभिन्नता ॥६५॥

(There is a likely argument of Bhartṛprapañca:) There is non-difference of the two *gotvas*, viz. that *gotva* which exists in Khaṇḍa and that which exists in Muṇḍa[1] on account of the recognition of it[2] and owing to (its) having (only) one (individual) for its support. It (viz. *gotva*) appears to be different (on account of its association) with Khaṇḍa and

others.[3] [65]

Bhartṛprapañca would argue about *bhinnābhinnatā* thus: *gotva* seen in Khaṇḍa is recognised as that seen in Muṇḍa; this explains *abhinnatā*. Yet when it is seen only in Khaṇḍa it has to be considered as existing in one particular substratum and that seen in Muṇḍa exists only there. This explains their difference (*bhinnatā*). *bhinnābhinnatā* of *gotva* is thus justified.

[1]These could be the names of particular bulls. (If they were names of cows, then there could be the words Khaṇḍā and Muṇḍā).

[2]One recognises that *gotva* in Khaṇḍa is the same as that seen in Muṇḍa. Therefore 'it' stands for the two *gotva*s.

[3]This presupposes the *abheda* of *gotva* and *go*(*vyakti*). That being so, the *gotva* in Khaṇḍa cannot be the *gotva* in Muṇḍa. And, consequently, these two are different (*bhinna*).

भिन्नाधिकरणज्ञानान्नैवमप्यभिदा तयोः ।
सामान्येऽभिन्नधीर्यस्माद्भिन्नेष्वेव तु भिन्नधीः ॥६६॥

(This is the answer to the above:) Even in this way, there cannot be (posited) non-difference between the two[1] on account of the knowledge of (two) different (individuals as their) supports, since there is knowledge of non-difference only in respect of generality, but knowledge of difference (occurs) in respect of what are different (viz. individuals).[2] [66]

This is to say that though *sāmānya* (viz. *gotva*) and *viśeṣa* (viz. *govyaktitva*) are thus noticed in one individual as their support, they cannot be *bhinnābhinna*. The reason for this is: *gotva* is *anuvṛtta* 'occurring again' in other cows while *govyaktitva* is *vyāvṛtta* 'non-occurring (or absent) in others'. Thus this *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (cf. *ekādhikaraṇa* in the preceding verse) is like in the instance of the 'blue' in 'a lotus'.

[1]That is, *gotva* in Khaṇḍa and that in Muṇḍa.

[2]This argument is summed up by NKL: (*gotvayoḥ*) *abheda-*

buddheḥ sāmānyaviṣayatvān naikādhikaraṇyam ity arthaḥ.

प्रत्यक्षेणानुपात्तत्वान्न स्मृतिस्तदितीक्षणम् ।
न हि प्रत्यक्षतोऽप्राप्तं स्मर्यते वस्तु किंचन ॥६७॥

Again the memory (of *gotva*) does not mean the seeing of it, since that is not grasped by direct perception. Indeed, a thing which is not grasped by direct perception is (said to be) remembered. [67]

The argument pertains to *pratyabhijñāna*. It answers what is said in verse 65 above. It is argued that *gotva* in Muṇḍa is directly perceived and it reminds one of the *gotva* in Khaṇḍa which was earlier perceived; it is not directly perceived. That goes to disprove the difference in non-difference of *gotva*.

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य विभिन्नार्थव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अभेदधीः कथं तत्र विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ॥६८॥

Since existence in the same substratum is here supported in different objects (of cognition),[1] how could there be the perception of non-difference between what are (really) a qualifier and the qualified?[2] [68]

The argument in this verse proceeds to answer away the objector's notion– based on recognition– that the two (viz. generality and particularity) have one and the same substratum and therefore they are *abhinna*; cf. verse 65 above. Existence of *gotva* and *khaṇḍatva* cannot be a valid basis for the argument about *bhinnābhinnatā*.

[1]This means *gotva* (i.e. *jāti*) and *khaṇḍatva* (i.e. *vyakti*) in one individual cow.

[2]Thus: *jāti*, while it belongs to a *vyakti*, distinguishes it from other *vyaktis* and a *vyakti* is therefore *jātiviśiṣṭa*. Here SP and NKL point out: In a blue lotus, blue is blue, and a lotus is a lotus; and there is a lotus qualified (i.e. distinguished from

lotuses of other colours) by the adjective blue. The two, namely blue and lotus cannot therefore be identical.

अभिन्नवचसा भिन्नप्रतिषेधोऽभिधीयते ।
प्राप्तस्य भिन्नरूपस्य शून्यतातः प्रसज्यते ॥६९॥

By (the use of) the word non-different is expressed the rejection of (the nature of) what is different. (Therefore) from this (rejection)[1] there follows meaninglessness[2] of what obtains as having the nature of a different (object). [69]

It is refuted that *bhedābhāva* is the meaning of the word *abheda*. The word *abhinna* can be understood to reject the notion of *bheda*.

[1]This is the rejection of the identity of what is congized as a qualifier and what is qualified.

[2]*śūnyatā* is *asiddhi* of *abhinnatā*.

वचो भेदनिषेधं चेन्न कुर्याद्भेदवाक्यवत् ।
भिन्नाभिन्नात्मतापक्षहानिरेवं प्रसज्यते ॥७०॥

In case a statement would not reject (lit. prohibit) *bheda* in the same way as a statement which conveys *bheda* does, then also there certainly follows rejection (lit. loss) of the view which advocates the nature of non-difference in difference. [70]

This verse considers the possibility that someone would understand the word *abhinna* as not conveying the rejection of *bheda*. In this case, such a person would take *abhinna* to mean *anyabheda*. (This is like the word *aśveta aśva* 'a horse, of any colour other than white'.) Therefore *bhinnābhinna* would mean *bhinna* and *bhinnāntara* (another *bhinna*).

तक्रकौण्डिन्यवन्न्यायो न चेहाप्यवसीयते ।
उत्सर्गानवकाशत्वाच्छून्यतैवात आपतेत् ॥७१॥

Also, there does not apply here the reasoning[1] as (in the maxim of) 'butter-milk to Kauṇḍinya',[2] since there is no occasion for any general rule (to be set aside);[3] and, as such, there follows only meaninglessness.[4] [71]

There is yet more argument regarding *abheda* in the sense of what is other than *bheda*. The objector can, in reply to the two preceding verses, raise some difficulty thus: *abheda* may, in any one of the two senses, tend to reject the view of difference in non-difference, but that should not show the meaninglessness of the view. It is possible to understand the meaningfulness of some action prohibited in the case of an individual when an action is recommended in respect of all. It can be put thus: *sarvatra prāptasya kāryasya viśeṣavidhinā niṣiddhasya na śūnyatā* (= *asiddhiḥ*). See note 2 below.

[1] *nyāya* here stands for *anumāna* which is really reasoning with some illustration (cf. verse 50 above— that is also called *dṛṣṭānta* in verse 51 above).

[2] 'Butter-milk to Kauṇḍinya' is a well-known maxim. It is connected with two instructions: (1) *āryebhyo dadhi dīyatām* 'Curds may be give to the respectable persons (*āryas*)' and (2) *takraṃ kauṇḍinyāya* 'Butter-milk to Kauṇḍinya'. Here, according to (1), which is a general instruction, Kauṇḍinya is already included among the respectable persons and should have been therefore served with curds, but (2) points out an exception to (1). This is thus an example of a general rule together with the mention of an exception to it. This means rejection of *dadhi* for Kauṇḍinya which is otherwise to be given to all (*sarvatra prāpta*), but this rejection/prohibition is not meaningless. Similar procedure can apply to *bhinnābhinna* view, as Bhartṛprapañca might argue.

[3] The meaning of *abheda* and that of what is other than *bheda* do not stand in the relation of a general rule and its exception. It is not a case similar to Kauṇḍinya's (in the note 3 above).

[4] Cf. note 2 on verse 69 above.

भिन्नौ जातिगुणौ द्रव्यात्स्वानुभूत्यनुरोधतः ।
तद्विरोधादभिन्नत्वं कथं मानात्प्रतीयते ॥७२॥

(Again) *jāti* 'genus' and *guṇa* 'property' are distinct from a *dravya* 'substratum'[1]— this is in accordance with general experience. Hence, while there is opposition to it,[2] how could (their) non-difference be understood from the illustration?[3] [72]

This verse rejects yet another alternative meaning of *abheda*, viz. what expresses (or, conveys the sense of) the opposite of *bheda*.

[1]For example, *gotva* 'cowness' and *sāsnādimattva* 'having a dewlap etc.' are different from an individual cow.

[2]The word 'it', here, stands for one's own experience of the distinction between *jāti* or *guṇa* and *dravya*, viz. a cow.

[3]The illustration of butter-milk to Kauṇḍinya. Here, *māna* stands for *anumāna* which is 'illustration' as noticed above. This points out how the non-difference of the property (or properties) of a substance from itself cannot be proved on the basis of *utsargāpavādanyāya* 'the rule regarding a general rule and a particular'.

अभिन्नं सद्विभिन्नत्वं न कथंचित्प्रपद्यते ।
स्वाश्रयत्वादभिन्नस्य कुतोऽस्य स्यात्पराश्रयः ॥७३॥

Being non-different (from another), a thing cannot in any way have the nature of being different from it. Also, how then can what is non-different from its another substratum? [73]

The argument here is for the final rejection of the three above-mentioned views regarding the meaning of *abheda* and for the consequent acceptance of *abheda*. Sureśvara, accepting non-difference alone as the meaning of *abheda*, points out that the non-difference of all so-called things, being their real nature,

सामान्यं च विशेषश्च द्रव्यतन्त्रौ मतौ यदि ।
असामान्यविशेषात्मद्रव्यवत्प्राप्नुतश्च तौ ॥७८॥

If (again) genus and a particularity are held to be non-different from[1] substance(s), they would obtain[2] as what are neither genus nor particularity but (only) as substance(s).[3] [78]

[1]*dravyatantra* is understood here as *dravyābhinna*, i.e. non-different from (or one with) substance(s). This is Sureśvara's peculiar use of the word *tantra*.

[2]That is, become perceived or known.

[3]This means— they would be just *dravya*. In other words, one could not postulate the notions of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* and, as a consequence, any consideration about their *bhinnābhinnatā* would not arise.

गुणतन्त्रं यदा द्रव्यं प्रसिद्धेर्बाधनं तदा ।
एकस्यानेकतापत्तिर्द्रव्यस्यापि प्रसज्यते ॥७९॥

If a substance is taken to be non-different[1] from a property (of it), then that is opposed to what is common knowledge. Also, there would result in the case of a substance the contingency of having manyness even if it is one single substance. [79]

This sets aside that *dravya* can be considered by one as included in (i.e. identical with) *sāmānya*.

[1]*guṇatantra* is *guṇābhinna*. Cp. note 1 on the preceding verse.

द्रव्येणैवाभिसंबन्धाद्गुणानां न परस्परम् ।
अन्योन्यानभिसंबन्धान्न विशेषस्तथेतरत् ॥८०॥

Owing to the close connection[1] of the properties[2] with only a substance, there cannot be mutual (connection) among them; (and) since there is no mutual relation among themselves, there cannot be any particularity, nor can there be the other.[3] [80]

This sets aside the possible notion of the inclusion of genus and/or particularity with *dravya*.

[1]This stands for non-difference; *abhisambandha = abheda*.

[2]These are genus and particularity.

[3]That is, any genus.

सामान्येतरतो भिन्नं द्रव्यं चेद्भवतो मतम् ।
तन्निषेधेन तत्सिद्धेः कथं स्यात्तदभिन्नता ॥८१॥

(Now) if it is your opinion that substance is different from genus and the other,[1] then, since by the denial of the same (viz. the two)[2] that (viz. substance) gets established, how could there be then non-difference between them? [81]

The notion of difference between *dravya* and *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (discussed in the two ways above) leads to the rejection of their *bhinnābhinnatā*.

[1]That is, particularities.

[2]That is, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

अथाभिन्नं मतं ताभ्यां द्रव्यस्यापह्नवस्ततः ।
न विशेषो न सामान्यमन्योन्यासंगतेर्भवेत् ॥८२॥

If again it is understood as non-different from the two, there would result the denial (of the existence) of a substance; (for) there could not exist (i.e. be conceivable) either particularity or genus owing to the non-association[1] of them. [82]

[1]That is, absence of *āśrayāśrayibhāva*.

भिन्नाभेदादभिन्नस्य भेदः स्यात्पिण्डवद्ध्रुवम् ।
पिण्डश्च सर्वगस्तद्वद्गोत्वाभेदात्प्रसज्यते ॥८३॥

On account of the non-different being identical with what is different, there will certainly be a difference of what is

non-different (from the other), as (there is a difference) of a body (from another). And it would contingently follow that a body, being non-different from *gotva*, will obtain among all (cows). [83]

While discussing (what he considers as) the wrong (or unacceptable) in Bhartṛprapañca's view, Sureśvara uses such expressions (i.e. words and phrases) as would cause some confusion for a reader. Thus, here he uses the words *bhinnābheda*, and *abhinna* for *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. (In some subsequent verses also, he uses *jāti* and *vyakti*; *samasta* and *vyasta* for the same.)

With this in view, the following should clarify the argument in this verse which pertains to the relation of non-difference between *jāti* or *sāmānya* and *vyakti* or *viśeṣa*. Thus, according to the advocate of the theory of *bhedābheda*, *sāmānya* (=*gotva*) being non-differenct from *viśeṣa* (=*govyakti*) will have difference from *viśeṣa* (*govyakti*) which (also) is not different from the non-different (=*sāmānya*).

अन्योन्याव्यतिरेकित्वादैकात्म्यं प्राप्नुयात्तयोः ।
ततः प्रत्यक्षबाधः स्यात्तद्भेदो हि तदाश्रयः ॥८४॥

(Further) there would be oneness of nature of the two on account of their being inseparable from each other and there would result from that opposition to direct perception,[1] since the difference between the two rests on the two (themselves as different). [84]

It would be useful to write the relevant part of the verse by using the words *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in suitable places (and with a little modification) thus: *samānyaviśeṣayor abhinnatvāt* (=*avyatirekitvāt*) *tayoḥ aikātmyam* (=*ekasvarūpavattvam*) ... *sāmānyaviśeṣabhedo hi* (*bhinna-*)*sāmānyaviśeṣāśrayaḥ*.

[1]This pertains to *anubhūtivirodha*.

व्यस्ताभेदात्समस्तोऽर्थो व्यस्तवन्न मनागपि ।
समस्ताकारवज्ज्ञानं कुर्यात्प्रत्यक्षबाधतः ॥८५॥

Owing to (its) non-difference with a particular object, generality would not, like (some) particular object, yield even a little knowledge of what has the nature of generality— since (that would involve) stultification of what is directly perceived by its having the nature of a particular. [85]

This verse also needs replacement of its original words by other relevant words; then the verse would read: *viśeṣābhedāt sāmānyarūpo 'rthaḥ viścṣavan na manāg api sāmānyākāravaj-jñānaṃ kuryāt*, (*tena*) *pratyakṣabādhaḥ* (*bhaved ity*) *ataḥ*.

The argument is: generality, being non-different from particularity, would not, like any particular object, yield even a little knowledge of what has the nature (lit. shape) of generality. If it yielded that, there would be disagreement with (our) daily experience in direct perception.

व्यस्ताभेदेऽपि चेत्कुर्यात्समस्तधिषणां बलात् ।
व्यस्तात्मनासमस्तोऽपि कुर्यात्प्लुषिधियं गिरिः ॥८६॥

In case there is accepted non-difference (of genus) from a particular and yet it[1] would cause the knowledge[2] of (what is) genus, then (it has to be accepted) that a mountain, which is not genus, would give rise to the knowledge of an ant, by its nature of a particular. [86]

[1]That is, a particular.
[2]*dhiṣaṇā* = *buddhi, jñāna.*

असाधारणरूपेण भेदो जगति निश्चितः ।
साधारण्यं तयोर्मानात्समस्तव्यस्तयोः कुतः ॥८७॥

The difference (between genus and particularity) has been (already) decided in this world[1] on account of their non-

common nature. (Therefore) by what authoritative means of knowing (could there be) non-difference between genus and particularity? [87]

[1]This is reference to *vyavahārabhūmi*. Once again, *anubhūti* (of conventional *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra*) is the basis of Sureśvara's argument.

सर्वाभेदाच्च सर्वस्य रज्ज्वां सर्पादिबुद्धयः ।
रज्जुबुद्धिवदेव स्युस्तद्धीश्चाप्यहिबुद्धिवत् ॥८८॥

And, further, everything (lit. all that is thing) being non-different from every (other) thing, there would arise the knowledge of a serpent etc.[1] in a rope just like the knowledge of (it as a) rope and the knowledge of that (viz. rope, would also be) like that of a serpent.[2] [88]

The argument is: In the theory of non-difference in difference there cannot be postulated any *pramāṇa* as right or false.

[1]Sureśvara's use of *ādi* refers to other mistaken objects involved in an error— yet this use of mere *rajjvām* in connection with *sarpādi* is a bit of non-careful expression (which he has adopted, possibly for metre's sake).

[2]This knowledge of a serpent is what is accepted as correct knowledge— not an error (*bhrama*). The earlier reference to it meant error.

निषेधविधिहेतूनां सर्वेषां सर्ववस्तुषु ।
समाप्तेरधिकाराणामप्रवृत्तिः प्रसज्यते ॥८९॥

(Also) there follows the contingency that all (the Śruti statements which) pertain to prohibition and/or injunction[1] would decide[2] the eligibility of all[3] (persons) in respect of all activities[4] and (thus) there would result non-activity. [89]

The argument here pertains to the absence of any distinction

as *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa* which would result from the view of non-difference in difference. There would be no means for deciding what statement in the Śruti is *niṣedha* or *vidhi* and, consequently, anybody would enter upon any ritual activity. This is undesirable! Cf. a quotation in SP: *apravittinivṛttīdam prāptaṃ sarvatra hi jagat*— possibly from the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca.

[1]It literally means: are (i.e. act as) the causes indicating prohibition or injunction.

[2]That is, would be understood as laying down ....

[3]Cf. SP: *adhikārāṇam pravṛttyādihetumatām adhikāriṇām ity arthaḥ* and NKL: *adhikārāṇām pravṛttinivṛttinimittabrāhmaṇatvādīnām.* NKL appears preferable.

[4]Cf. NKL: *sarvavastuṣu caṇḍālādiṣv api bhāvād ity arthaḥ.* SP does not specifically explain this, yet seems to accept what we have given in translation; cf. its remark— we quote only relevant words— *sarveṣām brahmakṣatrādīnam adhikṛtānāṃ sarveṣu bṛhaspatisavarājasūyādiṣu* ....

अभावमानक्लृप्त्यर्थो यश्चायासः कृतो महान् ।
निष्फलः सोऽभिसंवृत्तो भिन्नाभिन्नाव्यवस्थितौ ॥९०॥

This (thus, i.e. above discussed) disorderliness[1] (in the theory of) difference in non-difference obtaining, the great effort, which is made (by its advocate) for postulating the (authoritative) means of deciding (the nature of) *abhāva*,[2] has become (or proved to be) without utility (lit. fruitless). [90]

The thought in this verse presupposed that all things are different and non-different from all others (*sarvaṃ sarvasmād bhinnābhinnam*). It is then argued that the theory of non-difference in difference [*bhinnābhinna* would literally mean different and yet not different; this order is maintained in the verse and its translation] is advocated without a quite carefully formulated view on *pramāṇa*s. Accepting that theory would only yield improper results, particularly in respect of Vedic texts. Cf. NKL's remark: *ghaṭādeḥ bhūtalādyātmanā gṛhyamāṇasya*

yogyānupalambhāsiddheḥ. SP gives more details regarding *yogyānupalabdher akiṃcitkaratva.*

[1]This means: the theory of *bhedābheda* is not coherently postulated. That is to say, it is unsystematic.

[2]*abhāva* suggests *bhedābhāva.*

स्वविशेषानुरोधित्वं सामान्यानां मतं यदि ।
समस्तव्यस्ततापक्षस्तदा कुप्यति कल्पितः ॥९१॥

(Again) if it is held that all that is genus[1] resembles (in nature) the particulars related to itself,[2] then there would be defiance of[3] what is conceived as the theory of genus and particularity. [91]

This verse argues about another aspect of the theory of *bhedābheda*; it would mean that some genus is different and non-different from some particulars (connected with it). According to Sureśvara, this involves the fault of *ardhajaratīya* 'regarding a half of someone as old' (as SP calls it); or as NKL puts it thus: *kiṃcit kutaścid* (*bhinnābhinnam*).

[1]SP points out that the mention of the relation between genus and particulars is indicative of the relation between (i) a whole and its parts, (ii) properties and what possesses them, and (iii) effects and causes.

[2]Again, SP explains: *kvacid bhinnābhinnatātyāge sarvatra tattyāgaḥ.* Possibly it means: cowness is associated with only some cows and not with some others. NKL remarks: *gotvaṃ svavyaktibhiḥ bhinnabhinnam, aśvatvādy api tathā.*

[3]It literally means: the theory would be angry (this means 'violated').

न चापि सर्वसामान्यविशेषार्थावबुद्धये ।
कश्चिदप्यधिकार्यस्ति कृत्स्नेऽपि जगतीदृशः ॥९२॥

And there is not in the whole world a single such person[1] who is capable of (lit. eligible for) understanding all the things

having the natures of genus and particular. [92]

The thought is here of knowing or worshipping (perhaps, meditating on) what are genus and particular. The view of *bhedābheda* would not lead any person to any certainty in respect of them (as shown above). This culminates into meaninglessness of his knowledge or worship.

न वेदार्थो न चापीदृक्तर्केणाप्युपपद्यते ।
भिन्नाभिन्नेक्षणं सर्वं यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥९३॥

According to the explanation which we have thus far given, neither the entire view of *bhedābheda* of this kind nor the meaning of the Veda (according to it) can by any reason be taken as acceptable. [93]

इति श्रीबृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके प्रथमाध्यायस्य
षष्ठं ब्राह्मणम् ॥६॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीसुरेश्वराचार्यविरचिते
बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्तिके प्रथमाध्यायः ॥१॥

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